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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is comprised of three chapters on preferential trade agreements (PTAs). The first
two chapters examine why countries sign PTAs with other countries, while the final chapter studies
the effect of PTAs on imports.
The first chapter provides direct empirical evidence that PTAs are consistent with the terms-
of-trade theory. In other words, PTAs internalize the temptation to increase tariffs when countries
possess importer market power. Using PTAs that occur between 2001-2015, I study the formation
of PTAs and the structure of first year PTA tariff cuts. I first show the likelihood of a PTA increases
when both countries have more importer market power. This suggests countries form PTAs in a
way that internalizes the terms-of-trade externality by agreeing to mutual tariff decreases. Second,
using recently available tariff data for 39 bilateral PTAs, I show high importer market power leads
to tariff cuts that are 103 percent larger in magnitude when PTAs enter into force. Thus, countries
target tariffs they have a strong temptation to raise in the absence of an agreement, as predicted by
the terms-of-trade theory. These results provide a rationale for why PTAs are allowed under the
World Trade Organization’s rules.
The second chapter focuses on an alternative rationale for PTAs by examining the empirical
relationship between trade agreements and domestic labor mobility. The domestic-commitment
motive from Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) and standard trade models with labor frictions
predict that trade liberalization should occur when labor is more mobile. I find support for this
prediction. Using PTAs covering 56 countries in 2015, I show labor mobility is a strong predictor of
trade liberalization. The probability of a PTA increases when the country pair’s average domestic
labor market is less rigid. When the average labor mobility increases by 1 standard deviation from
the mean, the probability of a PTA increases by 14-26 percent. These results are also consistent
with results on the bound tariffs negotiated under the World Trade Organization, where less rigid
labor markets are associated with lower bound tariffs.
The final chapter, co-authored with Xiuming Dong, estimates the causal effect of phase-in
tariffs on import growth for 11 PTAs signed by the United States between 2000-2007. The phase-
in hypothesis from Baier and Bergstrand (2007) implies that products with longer periods of tariff
cuts should experience slower and longer periods of import growth relative to unchanged tariffs.
Using recently available PTA tariff data, we extend the work of Besedes et al. (2020) and utilize a
triple-difference strategy to provide additional evidence that import growth is not consistent with
the phase-in hypothesis. We show that phase-in tariffs do not necessarily yield additional import
growth relative to already duty-free products. Our analysis documents the average effect of phase-
in tariffs and PTA-specific trends.
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CHAPTER 1
Do Multilateral and Bilateral Trade Agreements Share the Same Motive?
An Empirical Investigation
1.1 Introduction
In the last half century, the world has witnessed an unprecedented rise in trade agreements. Mem-
bership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the number of preferential trade agreements
(PTAs) are currently at all-time highs, as shown in Figure 1.1. One explanation for why countries
engage in these trade agreements is the terms-of-trade theory.1 The terms-of-trade theory states,
when possessing importer market power, countries have a temptation to set higher import tariffs
to shift the cost of protecting industries onto their trading partners. This results in tariffs that are
too high from the point of view of the country’s welfare and trade agreements lead to lower, more
efficient tariff levels. The literature has already provided strong empirical support of the terms-of-
trade theory for the WTO (see Broda et al., 2008; Bagwell and Staiger, 2011; Ludema and Mayda,
2013; Bown and Crowley, 2013). While, somewhat surprisingly, much less is known about the
terms-of-trade theory for PTAs (Limão, 2016; Blanchard et al., 2016).
Studying the terms-of-trade theory for PTAs is important. First, PTAs differ in some important
dimensions from the WTO. PTAs are bilateral agreements between two countries or plurilateral
agreements between a small group of countries. In contrast, the WTO is a multilateral organization
that currently covers 164 members. Moreover, PTA members are not obligated to extend lower tar-
iffs to nonmembers, departing from the WTO’s nondiscrimination principle of Most-Favored Na-
tion (MFN) tariffs.2 Second, a growing literature shows importer market power is related to MFN
tariffs, implying the terms-of-trade externality still exists after WTO negotiations (see Ludema and
Mayda, 2013; Soderbery, 2018; Nicita et al., 2018). This means countries did not reach efficient
1See Maggi (2014) for a detailed overview of motives for trade agreements.
2Under MFN tariffs, if a country grants lower tariffs to a single country, then the same tariff is automatically
extended to all WTO members. PTAs serve as an exception that results in different tariffs for PTA members versus
nonmembers, no matter their WTO membership status.
1
tariffs under the last completed multilateral negotiation, known as the Uruguay Round, and there
are potential unrealized welfare gains. Thus, finding support of the terms-of-trade theory for PTAs
suggests that PTAs may actually help improve the efficiency of the world trading system.3 In this
way, the terms-of-trade theory provides an explanation for why PTAs are allowed under the WTO’s
rules.
This paper provides direct empirical evidence that PTAs are consistent with the terms-of-trade
theory. It shows PTAs occurring between 2001-2015 are formed and structured in a way that
internalizes the terms-of-trade externality. The advantage of this time period is PTAs have been
the main driver of trade liberalization, while WTO negotiations stalled.4 Thus, during this period
countries take the actions of the WTO as given, and then decide whether to pursue additional
bilateral liberalization with PTAs. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to provide
direct empirical support of the terms-of-trade theory for PTAs.
The analysis first examines the link between the terms-of-trade theory and the formation of
PTAs for 156 countries, using a country pair specification that builds on the work of Baier and
Bergstrand (2004).5 The outcome is whether or not a PTA formed, allowing for estimation of
the probability of PTA formation. I show a PTA is more likely if both countries have a stronger
temptation to increase tariffs. This suggests countries form PTAs in a way that internalizes the
terms-of-trade externality by agreeing to mutual tariff decreases.
The connection between the terms-of-trade theory and PTA formation is robust to allowing
for transfers between countries by considering a country pair’s average terms-of-trade motive. A
potential threat to identification is the assumption of independent country pairs. This is unlikely
since a subset of PTAs are plurilateral agreements between at least three countries. To address
3This also suggests there is more work for the WTO to do with future rounds of negotiations being relevant and
important. If future WTO negotiations are not possible, then PTAs will need to continue serving as the main force
behind trade liberalization.
4The Uruguay Round concluded in 1994, with the current Doha Round having yet to be completed since 2001.
5Baier and Bergstrand (2004) is a seminal work that examines the probability of a country pair being in a free trade
agreement due to economic reasons in 1996. They find that countries are more likely to form free trade agreements
if the country pair is: (i) closer to one another; (ii) more remote continental trading partners relative to the rest of the
world; (iii) larger in economic size; (iv) more similar in economic size; (v) less similar in terms of factor endowments;
(vi) more similar in terms of factor endowments relative to the rest of the world’s factor endowments.
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this I show the results hold in settings where the assumption is more plausible, such as excluding
European Union (EU) members who join PTAs as a bloc and when focusing on bilateral PTAs.
Next, the paper studies the structure of tariffs within PTAs to identify the terms-of-trade motive.
The WTO permits members to form PTAs if a substantial number of tariffs go to zero, yielding
little variation in final tariffs. However, many PTAs implement their tariff reductions in stages,
known as phase-ins. Countries have flexibility over how to structure phase-in tariffs (Baccini
and Dür, 2018). Thus, the structure of first year tariff cuts should highlight what is important to
PTA members. Using recently available tariff data covering 39 bilateral PTAs from Baccini et al.
(2018), I show importers with high market power experience tariff cuts that are 103 percent larger
in magnitude during the first year of a PTA. This implies countries target tariffs they have a strong
temptation to raise in the absence of a PTA, as predicted by the terms-of-trade theory.
The advantage of detailed tariff data is it allows for identification of the causal effect of im-
porter market power on tariffs cuts. A wide range of fixed effects and an instrumental variable
strategy, that leverages the rest of the world’s average importer market power, account for poten-
tial unobservables, including political economy motives as highlighted by Grossman and Helpman
(1995). Moreover, given the focus on bilateral PTAs, interpretation of the importer’s market power
is straightforward and unlikely influenced by free-riding that is present in larger agreements (see
Ludema and Mayda, 2013).
One challenge for both the PTA formation and tariff level analysis is how to measure importer
market power. Theoretically this is straightforward; importer market power is equal to the inverse
foreign export supply elasticity faced by the importer.6 Estimating these elasticities is challenging
since the observed equilibrium price and quantity are the outcome of both the demand and supply
curves. A set of papers attempt to estimate the elasticities with the assumption that elasticities vary
at the importer – product level (e.g., Broda et al., 2008; Nicita et al., 2018). This implies the market
power the United States has on car imports is the same for cars from Japan and Italy. More recently,
6When the importer faces a higher inverse export supply elasticity, the exporter’s supply curve is steeper. This
means the importer’s tariff will affect the exporter by a greater amount, and implies the importer will have a stronger
incentive to pass additional costs onto them with higher tariffs.
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Soderbery (2018) has relaxed this assumption to allow elasticities to also vary by exporter.7 Ex-
porter heterogeneity in the elasticities is crucial when studying the terms-of-trade theory for PTAs
because countries only decide to sign PTAs with certain trading partners. This is different than
examining MFN tariffs where importer – product elasticities are appropriate since MFN tariffs do
not vary by exporter. Given this paper’s focus on PTAs, I use the heterogeneous elasticities from
Soderbery (2018). As a robustness check, I use Rauch (1999)’s product differentiation index that
varies at the product level and is available for almost all products.
This paper contributes to three lines of literature. First, is the terms-of-trade theory for PTAs,
also known as the bilateral terms-of-trade literature. Blanchard et al. (2016) is the only other
paper that finds support that PTAs neutralize the terms-of-trade externality. Incorporating global
value chains into a standard terms-of-trade model, they show domestic value added in foreign
production of final goods does not affect bilateral tariffs within PTAs. Intuitively, this occurs
because the effect of domestic value added flows through the foreign country’s price (i.e., the terms-
of-trade externality). However, the terms-of-trade motive is only identified indirectly through the
use of global value chains, while the direct effect of the inverse foreign export supply elasticity
is absorbed with fixed effects. My paper directly identifies the bilateral terms-of-trade motive by
using the inverse foreign export supply elasticities and finds situations where the effect of these
elasticities is plausibly present, such as PTA formation and first year tariff cuts. An additional
advantage is I do not restrict attention to final goods as done in Blanchard et al. (2016). All products
that have tariff data and importer market power estimates available are included. Moreover, the
PTA tariff data I use is more detailed than the data in Blanchard et al. (2016). For example, in
the tariff cut analysis they include 7 PTAs, while my paper covers 39 PTAs. Given the different
approaches in Blanchard et al. (2016) and this paper, the papers taken together provide strong
support for the terms-of-trade theory for PTAs. I provide evidence regarding the effect of importer
market power on PTAs that has been absent in the literature.
7Due to the vast number of parameters to estimate, Soderbery (2018) imposes the restriction that elasticities vary
at the importer bloc – exporter bloc – product level. Larger countries are treated as separate blocs, while smaller
countries in the same region are put into one bloc. I return to the implications of this assumption in section 1.4.
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Second, this paper also contributes to the literature studying the empirical determinants of
trade agreement, beginning with Magee (2003) and Baier and Bergstrand (2004). These papers
examine the probability of a country pair being in a trade agreement and include measures such as
distance, remoteness, size, and factor endowments. One notable extension has been to study the
contagion effect of trade agreements (see Egger and Larch, 2008; Chen and Joshi, 2010; Baldwin
and Jaimovich, 2012; Baier et al., 2014). There also exists a political science literature trying to
explain trade agreement formation (e.g., Mansfield et al., 2000, 2002; Mansfield and Reinhardt,
2003; Mansfield and Milner, 2012). My paper is the first to examine the terms-of-trade theory
within this framework by using measures that are closely linked with the theory. Additionally, I
attempt to address the assumption of independent country pairs that has plagued this literature by
explicitly differentiating between plurilateral and bilateral PTAs.
Finally, I contribute to the recent and growing literature that uses detailed information on phase-
in tariffs. Besedes et al. (2020) uses the United States’ phase-in tariffs from the North American
Free Trade Agreement to examine the effects of delayed tariff cuts on the growth of imports.
Deardorff and Sharma (2020) examine product exclusions for a wide range of PTAs. Baccini
et al. (2018) and Baccini and Dür (2018) use the phase-in lengths and first year tariff cuts to study
global value chains and intra-industry trade. Phase-in tariffs yield variation that is valuable for
identification, and my paper demonstrates another setting that benefits from this detailed data.
The next section reviews a simple model that highlights the relationship between tariffs and
importer market power. This model yields two hypotheses that guide the empirical analysis. Sec-
tion 1.3 details the PTA formation analysis and results. Section 1.4 conducts the tariff cut analysis
and results. Finally, section 1.5 concludes and discusses possible avenues for future research.
1.2 Theory
The terms-of-trade theory is already well developed and is not a contribution of this paper. For
completeness I review a simple model with two countries and many products that highlights the
importance of importer market power, similar to Broda et al. (2008).8 I present the optimal import
8Appendix 1.8.1 provides a graphical depiction of the terms-of-trade theory.
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tariffs set by the Home country. The Foreign country behaves in a similar manner and it is straight-
forward to obtain optimal import tariffs set by the Foreign country. From the model I obtain two
hypotheses that guide the empirical analysis in the remaining sections.
1.2.1 Basic Model
The Home country (no superscript ∗) takes the policy of the Foreign country (superscript ∗) as
given, setting trade policy unilaterally. In each country, individual h has utility for a numeraire
good, ch0, and a set of non-numeraire goods, c
h
g where g 6= 0. The numeraire good’s price is nor-
malized to one and the domestic price for each non-numeraire good is pg. With the individual’s













s.t. ch0 + ∑
g6=0
pg chg = I
h. (1.1b)
Demand for each of the non-numeraire goods are independent of income, and only a function of its
own price. This is due to utility being quasi-linear, additively separable, and the numeraire good’s
price equaling one. The indirect utility of individual h is







− pg cg (pg)
]
= Ih + ∑
g 6=0
ψg (pg) , (1.2)
with consumer surplus denoted as ψg (pg).
The following additional assumptions pin down income in Equation 1.2. First, the numeraire
is assumed to be freely traded and produced using only labor with a constant returns production.
This implies the wage is equal to one. Second, the non-numeraire goods are also produced under
constant returns to scale, but use two factors of production: labor and one factor specific to the
good. This implies that the specific factor earns a quasi-rent, πg (pg). Individuals each own one
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unit of labor and some fraction also own one unit of the specific factor. Finally, tariff revenue is
collected by the government and redistributed uniformly to all individuals, rg (pg). Now individual
h’s income can be written as
Ih = 1+ ∑
g6=0
[πg (pg)+ rg (pg)] , (1.3)
which can be substituted into Equation 1.2. Normalizing the population to one and adding all
individual indirect utility functions in the Home country yields the Home’s social welfare function,
W (pg) = ∑
h
V h = 1+ ∑
g6=0
[πg (pg)+ rg (pg)+ψg (pg)] . (1.4)
Market clearing conditions allow for prices, and hence social welfare, to be expressed as func-
tions of the Home country’s ad valorem import tariffs, τg. Define the Home’s import demand




. Using pg = (1+ τg)p∗g, the market clearing









∀g ∈ Gtraded , (1.5)
where Gtraded is the set of traded goods. Solving this system of equations yields pg (τg) and p∗g (τg).
This implies that Equation 1.4 can be written as
W (τg) = 1+ ∑
g6=0
[πg (τg)+ rg (τg)+ψg (τg)] . (1.6)
1.2.2 Optimal Non-Cooperative Tariffs
The Home government maximizes the social welfare in Equation 1.4 by selecting τg. This yields









= 0 ∀g ∈ Gtraded , (1.7)
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where d p∗g/dτg represents the Home country’s effect on the Foreign price (i.e., the terms-of-trade
effect). When the Home country cannot influence their partner’s price, such that d p∗g/dτg = 0, the
optimal tariff is zero. If the Home country can influence the price, the optimal tariff is
τ
optimal









)]−1 ∀g ∈ Gtraded , (1.8)
where ωg is the inverse foreign export supply elasticity faced by the Home country (i.e., importer’s
market power). When the importer has more market power the non-cooperative tariff will be
higher. Intuitively, this occurs because the importer is able to influence the exporter’s price by a
greater amount.
Grossman and Helpman (1995) shows that introducing lobbying for protection into the govern-
ment’s welfare function yields a political economy equilibrium tariff that still depends on ωg and
an additional political economy term.9 This shows that even in alternative welfare specifications,
whenever countries set trade policy non-cooperatively, there is a temptation to shift their trading
partner’s price with the use of higher tariffs. This temptation is increasing in the importer’s market
power.
1.2.3 Optimal Cooperative Tariffs
When countries set trade policy cooperatively through trade agreements, does the terms-of-trade
externality continue to exist? In a cooperative setting the Home country no longer takes the Foreign
country’s actions as given. The tariffs are determined together. Now, the optimal tariff maximizes
the sum of the Home and Foreign countries’ welfare instead of Equation 1.4. Grossman and Help-
man (1995) and Bagwell and Staiger (1999) show the optimal cooperative tariff internalizes the
terms-of-trade externality. In other words, ωg does not affect the optimal cooperative tariff. How-
ever, internalization of the terms-of-trade externality does not imply optimal cooperative tariffs
have to equal zero. Efficient tariffs are still able to be positive due to political economy reasons.
9The key components of the political economy term are the inverse import penetration ratio (i.e., the ratio of
domestic production value to import value) and the import demand elasticity.
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What matters is the price shifting externality is internalized.
1.2.4 Discussion
At the center of the terms-of-trade theory is manipulation of the partner’s price. The optimal tariffs
in Equation 1.8 show the size of the terms-of-trade externality is determined by the importer’s
market power. This suggests if countries use PTAs to internalize the terms-of-trade externality,
then both countries should be able to manipulate one another’s price in the absence of a PTA. This
is because the PTA must be Pareto-improving when compensatory transfers are unavailable, since
both countries need to agree to join the PTA (Martin et al., 2012).10
Consider the case when only one country has importer market power over the partner’s price.
The tariffs of the non-market power country, who is unable to affect the partner’s price, will already
be independent of the inverse foreign export supply elasticity. Thus, the non-market power country
will not need to use a PTA to internalize its temptation to manipulate the other country’s price.
Moreover, the market power country will unlikely want to constrain its use of tariffs with a PTA,
since there is no terms-of-trade improvement when its partner is unable to influence the price in
the absence of a PTA. Thus, there is no terms-of-trade rationale for the country with market power
to join a PTA. This leads to the first hypothesis,
Hypothesis 1: A PTA is more likely to occur when the import market power of both countries
within the potential PTA is higher.
The first hypothesis is with regards to the formation of PTAs, however, the terms-of-trade
theory also yields a prediction about the structure of PTA tariffs. The terms-of-trade theory im-
plies when countries move from a non-cooperative to cooperative setting, the magnitude of the
importer’s tariff cut should be increasing in the importer’s market power. Bagwell and Staiger
(2011) find support for this prediction when countries accede to the WTO. However, there is grow-
ing evidence that tariffs set under the WTO do not fully internalize the terms-of-trade externality
(see Ludema and Mayda, 2013; Soderbery, 2018; Nicita et al., 2018). If PTAs are structured in a
10Section 1.3.1 shows the country pair specification captures the underlying welfare of both countries.
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way to internalize the terms-of-trade externality that remains in tariffs negotiated under the GATT
and WTO, then the positive relationship between the magnitude of tariff cuts and importer market
power should still be present for WTO members when joining a PTA.11 Since many PTAs use
phase-in tariffs, this relationship should be the strongest during the first year of implementation.
This yields the second hypothesis,
Hypothesis 2: The size of the importer’s tariff cuts are increasing in their market power when the
PTA enters into force.
The second hypothesis can survive in a model that incorporates alternative rationales for PTAs.
For example, Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) show when countries have a terms-of-trade and
domestic-commitment motive for trade agreements, the terms-of-trade externality drives large tar-
iff reductions in early periods. Here the domestic-commitment motive refers to countries pursuing
trade agreements to “tie-their-hands” against domestic lobbying distortions, that leads to further
smaller tariff decreases in later periods.
1.3 PTA Formation Analysis
This section provides evidence of the terms-of-trade theory for PTAs by examining the formation
of PTAs (i.e., Hypothesis 1). It also addresses misspecification and endogeneity challenges that
are common in country pair specifications.
1.3.1 Empirical Model
The empirical model is a quantitative choice model (McFadden, 1975, 1976) that builds on the
work of Baier and Bergstrand (2004). The observable PTA status proxies for the unobservable
welfare of the country pair. Let the observable outcome PTAi j be equal to 1 if countries i and j are
in the same PTA, and 0 otherwise. Throughout this paper whenever i and j are both in the subscript
this implies a nondirectional country pair. For example, the country pair of {United States, China}
11In appendix 1.8.2, I highlight why bilateral agreements may be appropriate for addressing the terms-of-trade
externality.
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is treated the same as {China, United States}, and only appears as one observation. In other words,
PTAi j is the same as PTA ji.
Define the unobservable variable PTAlatenti j as the difference between the governments’ welfare





(4Wj) is the change in government i’s ( j’s) welfare from not having a PTA to having one with
country j (i). Since PTAlatenti j is unobservable I define the following equation:
PTAlatenti j = α +β ln(MarketPoweri j)+Z
′
i jγ + εi j, (1.9)
where α is a constant, MarketPoweri j is the variable of interest that proxies for the terms-of-trade
motive for both countries i and j, Zi j is a vector of standard economic controls for the pair that
may be correlated with importer market power, and εi j is the error term that is assumed to have a
standard normal distribution. The log transformation of MarketPoweri j is used since measures of
importer market power are commonly skewed to the right.
A country pair will be in a PTA if it benefits both countries. Using the indicator function
1 [·] and the latent variable defined above, this implies PTAi j = 1
[
PTAlatenti j > 0
]








α +β ln(MarketPoweri j)+Z′i jγ
]
, (1.10)
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative density function with parameters α , β , and γ to be
estimated.12
To define MarketPoweri j I return to Hypothesis 1: the import market power needs to matter
in both countries. To implement this into Equation 1.10, let MarketPowerij and MarketPower
j
i
be the country specific measures of market power for importers i and j, respectively. Here the
superscript denotes the importer and subscript the exporter. If market power matters for both
countries then the minimum market power of countries i and j, denoted minMarketPoweri j, should
12Equation 1.10 uses P(PTAi j = 1) = P
(
PTAlatenti j > 0
)
to derive the probit regression.
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matter. Equation 1.10 now becomes
P
(




α +β ln(minMarketPoweri j)+Z′i jγ
]
, (1.11)
where support for Hypothesis 1 is given by β̂ positive and significant. A positive estimate on the
minimum market power implies country pairs are more likely to form a PTA when both countries
have higher market power.13 In other words, when both countries have a stronger temptation to
manipulate each others price, mutual tariff cuts with a PTA are more likely.
For one robustness check the minimum market power in Equation 1.11 is replaced with the
average market power, aveMarketPoweri j. The average is a reduced form way to account for pos-
sible transfers between countries (Martin et al., 2012). These transfers do not need to be limited to
just monetary payments, but could also include provisions related to nontariff barriers and behind-
the-border policies, such as intellectual property rights. Similar to the minimum measure, support
for Hypothesis 1 is given when the estimated coefficient on the average is positive and significant.
One may worry the minimum market power is capturing variation in the maximum market
power, since a larger minimum may be associated with a larger maximum. However, unlike the
minimum and average, the theory does not indicate any rationale for including the maximum. In
regressions that replace the minimum with the maximum, the estimate is the change in the prob-
ability of a PTA when at least one country’s market power increases. Thus, it is unclear if the
maximum captures the market power of both countries. Including the minimum and maximum in
both regressions can yield difficult to interpret estimates. The coefficient on the minimum is inter-
preted assuming the maximum is held constant. This is problematic because when the minimum
increases, the maximum will eventually have to increase by definition. Additionally, controlling for
the maximum likely absorbs some variation in the minimum that is important to the identification.
Nevertheless, I consider the maximum in appendix 1.8.3.
13The minimum market power could increase by an amount such that the partner’s market power is unchanged.
However, when the minimum market power increases by enough, the partner’s market power will eventually have to
increase. For this reason, the minimum market power captures the market power of both countries within the pair.
Similarly, another way to interpret the minimum market power is both countries have at least this much market power
over one another.
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1.3.2 Data and Variables
The data and variables for the PTA formation analysis are covered in this section. The summary
statistics are in Table 1.1 and the list of countries in Table 1.2.
Trade Agreement Status
The dependent variable PTAi j is equal to 1 if countries i and j have a PTA in the year 2015, and
0 otherwise. Country pairs in a PTA prior to 2001 are dropped, yielding a sample of countries
who decide whether to form PTAs in a period of stalled WTO liberalization. In other words, coun-
tries take the multilateral trade liberalization environment as given, then decide whether to pursue
additional liberalization with PTAs. Information on PTA formation is from the Centre d’Etudes
Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) Gravity dataset (Head and Mayer, 2014;
Head et al., 2010). This covers free trade agreements and currency unions notified to the WTO
under Article XXIV and the Enabling Clause. These are all reciprocal bilateral and plurilateral
agreements that require liberalization from all members.
For a robustness check, I consider a specification that focuses on bilateral PTAs. I define a
separate dependent variable, BILAT ERAL PTAi j that equals 1 if countries have a bilateral PTA in
2015, and 0 otherwise. To determine whether a PTA is bilateral, I use the WTO’s Regional Trade
Agreement Database that records the number of PTA members per agreement. Some observations
are in both bilateral PTAs and plurilateral PTAs. For the empirics these are treated as bilateral
PTAs, and set to 1. Observations with EU members are omitted since the common external re-
quirement makes it impossible for an EU member to sign a bilateral PTA. The remaining country
pairs in plurilateral PTAs are set to 0, where results are similar when dropping these plurilateral
PTAs and are available upon request. As before, country pairs that joined any PTA prior to 2001
are dropped. This helps to ensure the results are not driven by using different samples.
Terms-of-Trade Proxy
The minimum market power is the main variable of interest and proxies for the terms-of-trade
motive in Equation 1.11. Calculating the minimum market power requires market power measures
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at the country level. However, Soderbery (2018)’s inverse foreign export supply elasticity estimates
vary at the importer bloc – exporter bloc – HS4 level.14 I propose a strategy to aggregate the
elasticities that builds on the insight from Ludema and Mayda (2013): the exporter’s welfare gains
from removing the terms-of-trade externality depends on the exporter’s share of total exports to
the importer’s market. In other words, the volume of products receiving tariffs cuts is important to
the exporter.
Specifically, I interact each elasticity with the trade share, yielding the market power of im-











where X ijg is the trade value of product g from country j to i, X j is country j’s total exports, and
ω ijg is the inverse foreign export supply elasticity of the importer with respect to products from
the exporter.15 I sum over the set of products that are traded between the two countries and have
elasticity estimates available, Sij.
16 The weight X ijg/X j is the importer’s importance to the exporter
for a given product, and follows the intuition of the welfare effects from Ludema and Mayda
(2013). To see this notice that summing the weights across all importers and products for a given
exporter yields a measure of 1. For each elasticity a fraction is allocated based on how much the
exporter trades with the importer. Countries that trade more with one another will receive a larger
weight, while countries that trade with many partners do not weight a single importer’s market
power by as much.
Trade is likely to increase after a PTA, so a five-year average of trade flows over 1996-2000 are
used, where the averaging smooths out yearly trade fluctuations. Trade data is from the CEPII’s
14To help understand the notation and blocing of countries from Soderbery (2018), consider Vietnam and Thailand
who are both in the Asia bloc. If both countries are importers of product g from exporter j, this implies that ωVietnamjg =
ωT hailandjg . In section 1.4.1 I discuss the elasticity estimates and blocing in greater detail.
15Superscripts denote the importer, while subscripts denote the exporter and product. Whenever variables follow
this notation they are directional (i.e., importer – exporter specific).
16For the calculation of total exports, products that have elasticity estimates missing are dropped. Including exports
for products that do not have elasticity estimates implies the missing elasticities are treated as zero. Including all
exports yields similar results and are available in appendix 1.8.5.
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BACI database, which is a cleaned version of the standard United Nations International Trade
Statistics Database (Gaulier and Zignago, 2010). In addition, the aggregation strategy helps to
relax the grouping of Soderbery (2018)’s elasiticies, where directional trade flows in the numerator
brings in importer – exporter variation. In appendix 1.8.5, I show the results are robust to alternative
aggregation weighting strategies.
With the measure of market power aggregated to the country level it is straightforward to cal-
culate the country pair variables:
minMarketPoweri j = min{MarketPowerij, MarketPower
j
i }, (1.13a)
aveMarketPoweri j = (MarketPowerij +MarketPower
j
i )/2, (1.13b)
where min{·} in the minimum operator.
Controls
To control for variables that are correlated with market power, and could also independently impact
the probability of PTA formation, I include standard economic controls from Baier and Bergstrand
(2004). The predicted coefficient signs from Baier and Bergstrand (2004) are in parentheses.
NATURALi j (+) is the natural logarithm of the inverse distance between the capitals of coun-
tries i and j. The distance data comes from the CEPII’s GeoDist dataset (Mayer and Zignago,
2011). This implies the larger the distance between countries, the smaller the value of NATURALi j.
REMOT Ei j (+) is the interaction of a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the pair is on the same
continent with a measure that captures how remote the country pair is relative to the rest of the
world.17 Continent status is based on the United Nations’ classification. Intuitively, if there are
two relatively more remote countries from the rest of the world, such as Australia and New Zealand,
17


















they may benefit more from a PTA.
Data on real GDP and real GDP per capita are from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators and are in constant 2010 United States dollars. RGDPi j (+) equals the sum of the natu-
ral logarithm of real GDP in countries i and j, and DRGDPi j (–) is the absolute difference of the
natural logarithm of real GDP in countries i and j. These measure the total size of the pair and
how similar in size each country is from one another, respectively. To proxy for differences in
factor endowments I use the absolute difference of the natural logarithm of real GDP per capita
in countries i and j, denoted DKLi j (+).18 The more different the factor endowments for the pair
implies greater differences in the comparative advantages for each country. Accordingly, SQDKLi j
(–) is the square DKLi j to account for the hypothesis that increasing differences in factor endow-
ments increases the probability of a PTA only up to a point. Finally, DROWKLi j (–) measures how
similar the factor endowments are to the factor endowments of the rest of the world.19 A larger
DROWKLi j signifies there is a higher opportunity cost for the pair to join a PTA, since countries i
and j are not capitalizing on their comparative advantage with other countries.
The controls that vary over time may be an outcome of PTAs. For example, a country’s real
GDP may be affected when a they join a PTA. To account for this endogeneity, all time varying
controls are lagged to the prior period by also using a 5-year average over 1996-2000.
1.3.3 Nonparametric Evidence
Before presenting the probit results, I provide nonparametric evidence of the terms-of-trade theory
for PTAs. Figure 1.2 examines the distribution of the log minimum market power for country
pairs in a PTA versus not in a PTA. The plot on the left includes all country pairs in the sample,
18Baier and Bergstrand (2004) use capital-labor ratios instead of real GDP per capita. Egger and Larch (2008) use
the same strategy as I do here and show this measure is highly correlated with capital-labor ratios.
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and the plot on the right drops EU members. For both graphs, the minimum’s distribution for
country pairs in a PTA is shifted to the right of non-PTA country pairs, where the shift is even
more pronounced when dropping EU members. The difference in distributions is not only visibly
significant, but is also statistically significant under a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.20 This suggests
when both countries have higher importer market power, they are more likely to be in a PTA with
each other, as predicted by Hypothesis 1.
1.3.4 PTA Formation Main Results
The main probit results are in Table 1.3. The advantage of the probit model is it bounds the
predicted probability between 0 and 1, but only the sign and significance of the coefficients can be
interpreted due to the non-linear structure of Φ(·). The sign signifies the direction of the marginal
effect, while the magnitude of the marginal effect is dependent on where the function is evaluated.
Results are robust to OLS and logit specifications, both available upon request.
In column 1, the estimate on minimum market power is positive and significant at the 1 percent
level. From the empirical model, the minimum market power is the main variable of interest since
a PTA only occurs when both countries agree to join. The positive estimate implies when the
importer market power in both countries increases, all else equal, the probability of the country
pair being in a PTA increases. In other words, trade liberalization is more likely when the trading
partners have a greater temptation to shift the partner’s price in the absence of a PTA. This is
consistent with Hypothesis 1 and provides strong support for the terms-of-trade theory for PTAs.
To allow for transfers between countries, the minimum is replaced with the average market
power in column 2. The estimate is also positive and significant at the 1 percent level, and is in line
with the minimum’s result. This implies, as the overall market power in the pair increases, all else
equal, the probability of a PTA increases. The average gives equal weight to each trading partner.
An alternative strategy is to weight each country by its size, such as real GDP. Using a real GDP
weighted average yields similar results, and are available upon request.
The country pair specification treats each pair as an independent observation. However, the
20Available upon request.
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EU joins PTAs as a bloc since EU members set common external tariffs for non-EU members.
Therefore, observations that include EU members may not be independent.21 For other customs
unions it is more plausible to treat countries as independent since most have not fully implemented
common external tariffs (Deardorff and Sharma, 2020). Thus, I omit pairs with at least one EU
member as of 2015, and rerun the analysis in columns 3 and 4.22 The minimum and average are
still positive and significant at the 1 percent level, implying the results are robust to the exclusion
of EU members.
Even with the exclusion of the EU, some country pairs are part of plurilateral PTAs. These
observations also likely violate the independence assumption. Additionally, when PTAs have more
than two countries it is challenging to interpret the country pair variables. For example, consider
a PTA between three countries. The minimum measure only captures the market power between
any two countries at a time. One may think why not take the minimum market power among the
three countries within the PTA? This would result in conditioning on PTA status, which is the
outcome. Another possible solution may be looking at all possible combinations of countries, but
this dramatically increases the sample size (Limão, 2016). To further address the independence
assumption and ease the interpretation of the country pair variables, I take a different approach and
use bilateral PTAs as the dependent variable. These results are in columns 5 and 6. Once again, the
minimum and average are positive and significant at the 1 percent level, giving even more support
for Hypothesis 1.
Finally, I consider the estimates on the Baier and Bergstrand (2004) controls. In the All Country
Pairs sample, the estimates on REMOTE, RGDP, and DRGDP are different than the predicted
signs. This appears to be driven by the inclusion of EU members, since the correct signs are
obtained when dropping EU members in columns 3 to 6. When studying bilateral PTAs many of
the controls become insignificant. It is challenging to know how this compares to other studies,
21Baier and Bergstrand (2004) treats EU members as independent since, “every country in the EU has the ability to
veto an FTA with a nonmember” (pg. 34).
22An alternative method is to aggregate the EU to a single “country”. This aggregation requires additional as-
sumptions on how to weight the country specific market power measures. The theory yields little guidance on the
aggregation so this method is not considered.
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since to the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to explicitly consider bilateral agreements.
A possible explanation for the drop in significance is bilateral PTAs are a relatively rare event with
104 out of the 2,158 country pairs involved in bilateral PTAs. Additionally, as a reminder, the
sample I use starts in 2001. Looking over a longer time period, as in Egger and Larch (2008),
may yield the predicted estimates on the controls. Given the focus on studying PTAs in a period of
stalled WTO liberalization, a longer time period is not implemented.
Response Probabilities
To quantify the economic significance of the estimates I calculate the predicted probabilities at
different values of the log minimum market power in Equation 1.11 while holding the controls
at their mean values. To proceed the sample is split into “natural” trading partners that are on
the same continent and “unnatural” trading partners on different continents, similar to Baier and
Bergstrand (2004) and Baier et al. (2014).23
Figure 1.3 plots the predicted probability on the vertical axis with the horizontal axis showing
log minimum market power changing by 1, 2, and 3 standard deviations from the mean. The
predicted probabilities of PTA status are monotonically increasing in the minimum market power.
Starting at the mean value for natural trading partners, when the minimum market power increases
by 1 standard deviation the probability of a PTA increases by 42.57 percent (13.14 percentage
points). For unnatural trading partners, the probability of a PTA increases by 20.85 percent (3.3
percentage points). These large absolute and relative changes highlight that minimum market
power, and accordingly the terms-of-trade theory, have economic meaningful implications on the
probability of being in a PTA.
1.3.5 Robustness
The main results in Table 1.3 account for misspecification concerns by omitting EU members and
using bilateral PTAs as the dependent variable. Here I address possible sources of endogeneity.
23The reason for splitting the sample is because interpretation of the mean value of REMOTE is unclear since it is
a product of a binary and continuous variable.
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Reverse Causality
Excluding PTAs prior to 2001 and lagging time-varying variables to the prior period helps to al-
leviate reverse causality concerns. However, the inverse foreign export supply elasticity estimates
from Soderbery (2018) use trade data from 1991 to 2007. The elasticity estimates do not vary
over time, and re-estimating these elasticities with a smaller time horizon may result in impre-
cise estimates (Soderbery, 2015). To account for the possible effects that PTAs may have on the
elasticity estimates, I consider a sample that only includes PTAs that occur after 2007 (i.e., PTAs
between 2008 to 2015). Now any country pair that has a PTA prior to 2008 is dropped and the
results are presented in Table 1.4. The estimates on the minimum and average market power are
mostly similar to the main probit results in Table 1.3. The significance of some estimates slightly
decreases. For example, in column 1 the minimum market power measure is now significant at the
5 percent level instead of the 1 percent level. This is not surprising given the 12 percent decrease
in the number of observations.
Measurement Error
The main probit results use the exact estimates of the inverse foreign export supply elasticities from
Soderbery (2018) to construct the country pair market power measures. It is well documented that
elasticity estimates can be imprecise (Broda et al., 2008). Aggregating the estimates to the country
level helps to smooth the estimates, but looking at the summary statistics in Table 1.1, some of the
Market Power Measures are still very small and large. To account for possible measurement error,
I use the following binary transformation. I order the country pair market power measures from
smallest to largest and set the binary variable equal to 1 if it is above the 33rd percentile, and 0
otherwise.24 Using the 66th percentile as the cutoff yields similar results, and are available upon
request. In other words, the binary measures imply the country pair has high market power when
equal to 1. The results are in Table 1.5 and are consistent with the main results in Table 1.3. In
addition, appendix 1.8.4 shows the results are robust to dropping elasticities in the top and bottom
24Broda et al. (2008) follow a similar strategy, but do the ordering by importer since their analysis is at the product
level.
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0.5th percentiles prior to the aggregation.
Sample Selection
Another challenge is the availability of the inverse foreign export supply elasticities. While the
elasticity estimates cover 94 percent of the yearly trade values (Soderbery, 2018), some countries
have estimates available for only a few HS4 lines. To see if the availability of elasticity estimates
influences the results, I consider the product differentiation index from Rauch (1999) that is readily
available for almost all products. It is well established that the product differentiation index is
positively correlated with the inverse foreign export supply elasticity (Broda et al., 2008; Ludema
and Mayda, 2013; Soderbery, 2018).25 Intuitively, when a country imports a differentiated product,
it holds greater importer market power since it is more difficult for the exporter to find another
country to import the product at the same price.
To make this analysis comparable to the main results I use variation of the product differ-
ent index at the HS4 level. Specifically, I use the proportion of product lines at the HS4 level
that are considered differentiated. This proportion ranges between 0 and 1, and replaces ω ijg in
Equation 1.12 to calculate the country’s market power. The minimum and average market power
measures are then calculated as before. The downside of using the product differentiation index is
it only uses variation across products; however, interacting the index with trade shares brings the
importer – exporter specific variation back into the market power measures.
The results are in Table 1.6. The number of observations more than doubles compared to the
main probit results in Table 1.3. The minimum and average market power are still positive and
significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting the previous results are not driven by the availability
of elasticity estimates. For some observations in Table 1.6 the minimum and average market power
are zero. When taking the log these observations are dropped. For example, in column 2 about
0.4 percent (41 out of 9,354) of the observations are dropped due to zero values. Using the level
25Beshkar and Lee (2020) suggest the product differentiation index may capture the import demand elasticity. It is
a common challenge that proxies may capture many different effects when they are not directly linked with the theory.
For this reason I use Soderbery (2018)’s estimates as the main measure and use the product differentiation index as a
robustness check.
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values instead of the log transformation yields larger estimates that are still positive and significant,
available upon request.
1.4 Tariff Analysis
Now the relationship between tariff cuts and importer market power is examined to provide support
for Hypothesis 2: the size of the importer’s tariff cuts are increasing in their market power when
the PTA enters into force. The detailed tariff data allows for estimation of the causal effect of
importer market power on the first year tariff cuts.
1.4.1 Data
The analysis requires PTA tariffs, MFN tariffs, and estimates of the inverse foreign export supply
elasticities. The sample covers 39 bilateral PTAs, where each agreement is a free trade agreement
notified under Article XXIV of GATT. As in the PTA formation analysis, the PTAs enter into force
in 2001 or later. I also use the insights of the previous section and focus on bilateral PTAs since this
provides the cleanest and most straightforward identification. In other words, the sample covers
bilateral PTAs that occur during a period of stalled WTO liberalization.
The tariff data allows for the inclusion of plurilateral PTAs. However, PTAs involving many
countries bring additional challenges. For example, potential bargaining challenges, such as free-
riding, that are present in the WTO are likely to occur in plurilateral PTAs. Additionally, including
plurilateral PTAs requires a decision on how to aggregate elasticity estimates for countries that
negotiate as a bloc. Finally, Soderbery (2018) shows when countries do not differentiate among
partners with tariffs, as in plurilateral PTAs, the optimal non-cooperative tariff is a combination of
the inverse foreign export supply elasticity and market composition (i.e., trade flows). However,
when a unique tariff is set for each partner, as in bilateral PTAs, the optimal non-cooperative tariff
is equal to the inverse foreign export supply elasticity as presented in section 1.2. For these reasons,




The PTA tariff data is from Baccini et al. (2018) and kindly provided by Leonardo Baccini.26 This
is high quality data that records the negotiated ad valorem PTA tariff at the HS6 level for both
trading partners. They use appendices from official PTA tariff schedules to collect the average
and maximum negotiated tariffs for each year of the PTA. This includes future years since the
negotiated tariffs are listed for all years through completion of the phase-in process. The data
abstracts from the well known problems with ad valorem equivalent tariffs, as discussed in Irwin
(1998), by setting specific tariff and tariff rate quotas to zero. This follows the same strategy as
used by the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS).27 I use the negotiated tariff as a measure of
the applied PTA tariff. While it is possible for countries to deviate from negotiated tariffs, Baccini
et al. (2018) note applied and negotiated PTA tariffs usually correspond with one another.
Tariffs are aggregated to the HS4 level, the same level of the Soderbery (2018)’s elasticities,
with the common practice of taking a simple average across HS6 tariffs within each HS4. The
year each PTA became active is required. Baccini et al. (2018) record the year PTAs are signed.
However, the year of implementation for some PTAs is different than the year of signature. The
date of entry into force for each PTA is collected from the WTO’s Regional Trade Agreement
Database and is defined as the first year of the PTA.
I end this subsection by briefly discussing the advantages of this tariff data over common tariff
databases since, to the best of my knowledge, I am the first to apply this data in the economics
literature. Using the Trade Analysis Information System and WTO Integrated Data Base, both
available through WITS, is challenging since they are far from complete for PTA tariffs (Baccini
et al., 2018; Deardorff and Sharma, 2020). For the few PTAs available in these datasets, WITS
mostly covers developed countries, such as the United States, and usually lacks the tariffs of the
26Baccini et al. (2018) examine the time it takes for tariffs to reach zero and relative tariff cuts to show that trade
in intermediates supports trade liberalization. The results for intra-industry trade are mixed with the direction of the
impact being specification specific.
27While the data does not include non-ad valorem tariffs, there is evidence that ad valorem tariffs are the most
common type of tariff. Only 4 countries in my sample have more than 5 percent of their applied MFN (HS6) tariffs
expressed as non-ad valorem tariffs (WTO, 2007). This includes (with percentage share in parentheses): Switzerland
(80.2), Thailand (21.9), United States (8.2), India (5.3).
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corresponding trade partner. Additionally, Baccini et al. (2018) documents that missing data from
WITS is not random and concentrated in certain tariffs lines. In contrast, the PTA data I use in
this paper covers a wide set of developed and developing countries and is highly detailed with
approximately 1,200 tariff lines at the HS4 (or about 5,000 at the HS6).
MFN Tariffs
The MFN tariffs are the applied rates from WITS. Since all countries in the sample are WTO
members at the time their PTA enters into force, MFN tariffs would be implemented in the absence
of a PTA.28 For MFN tariffs it is well documented that bound and applied rates can be quite
different (see Beshkar et al., 2015; Nicita et al., 2018). I use applied instead of bound tariffs
because I want to identify the tariff cut that actually occurs. The MFN tariffs vary at the importer –
HS6 level. To aggregate the tariffs to the HS4 level, I also take a simple average across HS4 lines.
For some years the MFN data is missing. When possible, I fill in the missing data with the nearest
available year, with preference given to prior years. The PTA tariff data from Baccini et al. (2018)
also has some information on MFN tariffs that helps with this process.
Elasticity Estimates
The inverse foreign export supply elasticity estimates are from Soderbery (2018). These estimates
are available at the importer bloc – exporter bloc – HS4 level. The blocing of countries is done for
small countries in the same region to reduce the number of parameters, see Table 1.7 for group-
ings. This assumes that smaller countries within the same region have the same elasticity. For
example, the United States would have the same elasticity for products it imports from Thailand
and Vietnam. In practice this may be reasonable because elasticities are not directly observable by
any country. Countries may only have a general ranking of how much importer market power it
has against exporters, and may not be able to differentiate between similar countries in the same
region. In the empirical analysis, I account for the correlation of countries within the same bloc by
28Some developing countries who are granted lower tariffs under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)
would return to GSP tariffs in the absence of a PTA, but Hakobyan (2020) discusses the uncertainty with the renewal
process. Thus, I abstract away from GSP tariffs and use MFN tariffs to measure the tariff cut.
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clustering the standard errors at the importer bloc – exporter bloc – HS4 level.
Merging the elasticities with the tariff data results in many observations being dropped due to
missing elasticity estimates. Since the elasticity estimates cover the majority of world trade, this
suggests that many PTAs include products in the tariff negotiations that PTA members do not trade
with one another. To see if the sample is influencing the results, I follow a similar strategy as the
PTA formation analysis and use the product differentiation index from Rauch (1999) to proxy for
the elasticities. To make the analysis comparable with the elasticity results I use variation at the
HS4 level by defining Rauch Proportion as the proportion of HS6 products within the HS4 heading
that are consider differentiated, as done in previous section. Table 1.8 highlights the differences
for samples using the elasticity estimates and Rauch Proportion.
1.4.2 Empirical Strategy












where the dependent variable is the difference between the PTA and MFN tariffs of product g from
exporter j to importer i in the first year of the PTA.29 The difference is more negative when the PTA
tariff is further below the MFN tariff. WTO rules stipulate importers cannot set a PTA tariff that
is larger than the MFN rate. This implies the dependent variable equals to zero if τ i,PTAjg − τ
i,MFN
g
is positive. Additionally, since tariffs cannot be negative, a MFN tariff equal to zero implies the
difference has to also be zero. When the MFN tariff equals zero there is no room for bilateral tariff
changes, and thus, a PTA cannot have any terms-of-trade effect. In the sample all of the MFN
tariffs set by Singapore and Switzerland are equal to zero.30
To examine whether zero MFN tariffs are affecting the results I consider two samples: (i) the
Full Sample that includes products with any MFN tariff; (ii) the Positive MFN Sample that drops
29The tariff cut dependent variable follows the definition of Blanchard et al. (2016).
30Switzerland’s tariffs equal zero because specific tariffs are set to zero, and the majority of Switzerland’s tariffs are
specific. This likely pushes β̂ to zero, and may understate the true effect of importer market power on tariff cuts.
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observations when the MFN tariff equals zero.31 The summary statistics are in Table 1.9, and the
distributions of tariff cuts for both samples are in Figure 1.4. The majority of tariff cuts are less
than 5 percentage points. Figure 1.5 plots the distributions by importer.32
The main variable of interest, ω ijg, is the inverse foreign export supply elasticity and captures
the importer market power. The function f (·) allows for alternative functional forms of the elastic-
ity as suggested by Broda et al. (2008): level, log, and binary. The level elasticity is the functional
form that follows the terms-of-trade theory. In practice, the elasticity estimates are highly skewed
to the right. The log transformation helps to account for this skewness, and is a reduced form way
to account for the possible diminishing effect of importer market power. I also consider a binary
transformation that addresses possible measurement error in the elasticities that only uses variation
in the ordering. The binary measure sorts the elasticities from smallest to largest for each importer,
and sets the dummy variable High Market Power equal to 1 when above the 33rd percentile, and 0
otherwise. Results are similar when using the 66th percentile as a cutoff, available upon request.
With the level, log, and binary functional forms, support for Hypothesis 2 is given by β̂ negative
and significant. In other words, higher importer market power leads to larger tariffs cuts in the first
year of the PTA.
To control for political economy motives highlighted by Grossman and Helpman (1995), a
wide set of fixed effects with η ijG are implemented. At first the importer, exporter, and industry
(G) fixed effects are separated.33 This means η ijG is replaced with the additively separable fixed
effects η i +η j +ηG. These fixed effects control for aggregate unobservables that are common to
each country and for industry factors that are common across all countries. The inverse import
penetration ratio is an important determinant of tariffs that may not be captured by the separate
country and industry effects. Thus, the country and industry effects are interacted to control for
31The positive MFN tariff sample may suffer from selection bias since products that have MFN tariffs equal to zero
are likely non-random. However, accounting for selection empirically is difficult because finding an instrument that
predicts the outcome of a zero MFN tariff and does not influence the degree of tariff cut is challenging. Baccini et al.
(2018) and Baccini and Dür (2018) use a Heckman selection model to attempt to address this, but it is not clear the
competition instrument satisfies the exclusion restriction when studying the effect of importer market power.
32Appendix 1.8.6 shows these distributions are not influenced by the availability of elasticity estimates.
33Industries are defined by the 21 Harmonized Tariff Schedule heading titles from the United Nations.
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unobservables that are importer – industry and exporter – industry specific, replacing η ijG with
η iG +η jG.
For all regressions a non-directional country pair fixed effect is included to capture underlying
characteristics that likely influence tariff negotiations between countries such as distance, common
language, development status, etc. The country pair fixed effect also controls for the year of entry
into force, which absorbs worldwide macroeconomic shocks such as a global recession. This
is because Equation 1.14 is a cross-sectional regression and each country pair combination only
shows up in one PTA since bilateral PTAs are used. Thus, the country pair fixed effect can be
thought of as a PTA fixed effect.
Endogeneity
There may exist product level characteristics that are correlated with the inverse foreign export
supply elasticity and the error term, ε ijg (i.e., OLS results may suffer from omitted variables bias).
Using additional fixed effects would absorb important product variation. Thus, I use an instru-
mental variable (IV) that is similar to Broda et al. (2008) to identify the causal effect of importer
market power on tariff cuts.34
The IV for ω ijg is the average importer market power of the blocs that do not include the coun-
tries who are members within the respective PTA.35 Excluding the blocs with the PTA members
implies the IV is independent of the country specific characteristics within each PTA, and thus,
likely satisfies the exclusion restriction. Also calculating the IV at the bloc level ensures smaller
countries are not over-weighted in the average. The IV may still suffer from endogeneity concerns
due to measurement error in the elasticity estimates. For this reason the IV uses a binary transfor-
mation of the importer market power that is similar to the above High Market Power, but uses the
34Broda et al. (2008) uses an IV strategy to control for omitted product variables that may be correlated with
importer market power and affects the non-cooperative tariff.
35I use the bloc level of the elasticities for calculation of the IV. The importers and exporters now include: Australia,
Brazil, Canada, China, Germany, France, UK, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, USA, Africa, Asia, Caribbean,
Oceania, South America, Northern/Western Europe, Southern/Eastern Europe. For example, instead of including
Vietnam and Thailand as separate importers, I now consider them as a single importer called Asia (ωAsiajg ). The value








blocs. Specifically, for each importer bloc I order the elasticity estimates from smallest to largest
and define the dummy variable, MarketPowerHigh, that equals 1 when the elasticity is above the





N ∑d 6=i, j
o6=i, j
MarketPowerHighdog, (1.15)
where d is the importing (destination) bloc, o is the exporting (origin) bloc, and N is the number
of terms that are summed over.
Finally, the IV is relevant since products are traded in the world market between many countries
and there likely exists some underlying variation that is correlated with importer market power.
For example, certain products may be inherently more elastically supplied for all importers (Broda
et al., 2008). Additionally, many countries other than the importer and exporter consume each
product, and these demand elasticities should influence the export supply elasticities of all coun-
tries. Empirically, the first stage regression also provides some suggestive evidence on the rele-
vance of the IV. A first stage F-statistic above 10 suggests the IV is in fact a strong predictor.
1.4.3 Tariff Cut Main Results
The OLS results of Equation 1.14 with the Full Sample are in Table 1.10. Columns 1-3 separates
the country and industry fixed effects, while columns 4-6 interacts the country and industry fixed
effects. Since the results are similar I focus on the more detailed set of fixed effects in the last
three columns. In column 4, the estimate on the inverse export supply elasticity is small and not
significant at the 10 percent level. This is due to the right skewness of the elasticity estimates,
implying the empirics should use alternative functional forms. Nevertheless, I report the level
estimate in the main OLS results since the theory implies this functional form. Moving to column
5, I take the log of the inverse export supply elasticity. The estimate is negative and significant
at the 1 percent level, suggesting higher importer market power is associated with larger tariff
36Results are robust to using the 66th percentile cutoff, available upon request.
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cuts in the first year of the PTA. Column 6 addresses the possible measurement error with the
elasticity estimates by using the previously discussed binary transformation that equals 1 when the
importer has high market power. The estimate is also negative and significant at the 1 percent level.
Importers with high market power are associated with tariff cuts that are 0.16 percentage points
larger in magnitude. These results are supportive of Hypothesis 2, but do not identify the causal
effect due to potential product level unobservables.
Table 1.11 estimates the causal effect of importer market power on tariff cuts for the Full
Sample using the IV from Equation 1.15. Once again, I focus on the preferred fixed effects in
column 4–6 due to the similarity with the first three columns. The estimates for the level, log,
and binary importer market power measures are more negative than the OLS estimates, suggesting
that unobservables and measurement error in the level and log measures push the OLS estimates
towards zero. The estimate on the inverse export supply elasticity in column 4 is now negative and
significant at the 5 percent level. For the log and binary market power measures in columns 5 and
6, the estimates continue to be negative and significant at the 1 percent level. For both columns the
first stage F-statistic is well above the value of 10 with values of 231 and 592. These F-statistics
are similar to Broda et al. (2008) and suggests the IV is strong, yielding support for the relevance
of the IV. The estimate in column 6 is my preferred specification since it is the least likely to be
affected by outliers in the elasticties. It implies when the importer has high market power, tariff
cuts are 2.52 percentage points larger in magnitude. The mean tariff cut is 2.44 percentage points,
which implies high market power leads to tariff cuts that are over double in size of the average
tariff cut (i.e., (2.52/2.44)×100 = 103 percent). This is strong support for Hyothesis 2.
To examine the effect of including observations with no room in the tariff, observations with
a MFN tariff equal to zero are dropped (i.e., the Positive MFN Sample). The IV results are in
Table 1.12. I focus on the results with the interacted fixed effects in columns 4-6. In column 4,
the elasticity coefficient is negative, but no longer significant. One possible reason for this is the
decrease in the sample size from 31,674 to 20,899. For columns 5 and 6, the estimates of the
log and binary market power are negative and significant at the 5 percent level. The estimate in
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column 6 implies, conditional on a positive MFN tariff, high importer market power leads to tariff
cuts that are 1.57 percentage points larger in magnitude. With a mean tariff cut of 3.70 percentage
points, this implies high market power leads to tariff cuts that are over 42 percent larger (i.e.,
(1.57/3.70)×100). This value is smaller than the Full Sample, but the persistence of the negative
coefficient yields strong support for Hypothesis 2. It appears countries are structuring their tariffs
to decrease tariffs they would be the most tempted to increase in the absence of a PTA.
1.4.4 Robustness
Endogeneity challenges similar to those in the PTA formation analysis, such as reverse causality
and sample selection, are also present in the tariff analysis. There are also some new challenges,
and I address these first.
Clustering
Standard errors for the main PTA tariff cut results are clustered at the level of variation of the
elasticity estimates. The construction of the IV uses variation at the nondirectional country pair –
product level. Clustering at the nondirectional country pair – product level yields similar standard
errors as the main results. Additionally, most of the variation of the IV is at the product level since
the IV takes an average over all blocs not in the PTA. Clustering at the product level also yields
similar standard errors. Both sets of results are available upon request.
Fully Implemented PTAs
For some PTAs, there is no phase-in period with all tariffs going to zero in the first year. This
yields the question of whether the PTA tariffs are actively being negotiated over to internalize the
terms-of-trade externality or if they go to zero by definition? To examine this, a sample that omits
PTAs if all tariffs go to zero in the first year is considered in Table 1.13.37 This decreases the size
of the Full and Positive MFN Samples, where the results for most columns are similar to the main
37To calculate the number of tariff lines that go to zero per PTA, the Full Sample not conditioning on the availability
of elasticity estimates is used.
30
results. The IV regressions with the log and binary market power measures continue to be negative
and significant.
As an additional robustness check, I control for the phase-in length. This controls for the
number of years it takes the product to reach the final PTA tariff. The advantage of this strategy is
it does not decrease the original sample size. The results are in Table 1.A.8 and are also consistent
with the main analysis. Both strategies imply the elasticities are capturing the effect of importer
market power on tariff cuts, and not a mechanical relationship between MFN and PTA tariffs. I
return to this point in subsection 1.4.5.
Non-Bloc Estimates
Some elasticities from Soderbery (2018) are country specific, allowing for Equation 1.14 to be re-
estimated with the country specific sample to see if the blocing assumption is driving the results.
Larger countries are treated separately and not grouped with other countries in the same region,
yielding a sample where the elasticities vary at the importer – exporter – product level. The down-
side is this drastically decreases the sample size from 31,674 to 3,541 for the Full Sample, and
20,899 to 2,555 for the Positive MFN Sample.
The results with the country specific sample are in Table 1.14. The IV estimates for the Full
Sample are negative and significant at the 1 percent level for the log and binary importer market
power in columns 3 and 4, respectively. For the Positive MFN Sample the log market power is no
longer significantly different from zero, while the binary estimate is significant at the 10 percent
level. The OLS estimates for both samples are not significantly different from zero. This is not
surprising given the smaller samples. The robustness of the IV results provides evidence the main
results are not due to the blocing assumption.
Reverse Causality
As discussed in the PTA formation analysis, Soderbery (2018)’s elasticity estimates use trade data
from 1991 to 2007, and there may be concerns that PTAs prior to 2008 influence the elasticities. I
use a similar strategy as for the PTA formation analysis and consider a sample that only includes
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PTAs that occur after 2007. The results are in Table 1.15 and are mostly the same as the main
tariff cut results with the significance decreasing slightly in a few columns. Once again, part of
this decrease is likely due to the decrease in the sample size.
Sample Selection
As previously discussed, many products are dropped due to missing elasticities. To examine how
this is influencing the results, I replace the elasticities with Rauch Proportion. In Table 1.16 the
number of observations increases by almost 3 times (i.e., 31,674 to 94,818). While the increase
in observations is reassuring, it does not come without a cost. Only the OLS estimates can be
implemented since it is not possible to calculate the IV with the Rauch Proportion, which only
varies at the product level. Accordingly, standard errors are now clustered at the product level. For
the Full Sample, in columns 1 and 2 the estimate in negative and significant at the 1 percent level.
That is, as the proportion of products that are differentiated increases, the tariff cut is larger. For
the Positive MFN Sample, the point estimates are negative, but only significant when interacting
the fixed effects. These results follow the results that use Soderbery (2018)’s elasticities.
1.4.5 Mechanism
The tariff cut results establish greater importer market power leads to larger tariff cuts in the first
year of a PTA. This section examines additional details of the tariffs to attempt to highlight the
mechanism of the tariff cuts. To do this I replace the dependent variable in Equation 1.14 with
different outcomes. The results are in Table 1.17 and similar for the Full Sample and Positive
MFN Sample, so I discuss the former.38 The log transformation of the importer market power is
used, with the previous High Market Power measure yielding similar results, and available upon
request.
First, the relationship between MFN tariffs and importer market power is examined by replac-
ing the dependent variable with τ i,MFNg in column 1. The positive and significant estimate implies
that tariffs set under the WTO do not fully internalize the terms-of-trade motive, consistent with
38Results are robust to using the Rauch Proportion variable, see Table 1.A.9.
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the literature. This result is the bilateral version of the regressions used in Soderbery (2018).
Next, the dependent variable is replaced with a binary variable that equals to 1 when τ i,PTAjg = 0,
and 0 otherwise. This is a linear probability model that examines the probability PTA tariffs equal
zero in the first year.39 The negative estimate in column 2 implies higher market power goods are
less likely to be zero. This result is sensitive to the cutoff for the IV, where the estimate goes to
zero when using the 66th percentile, and are available upon request. I view a non-positive estimate
as suggestive support that products are actively being negotiated over and not just going to zero by
definition.
Finally, I replace the dependent variable with τ i,PTAjg in column 3. If the terms-of-trade ex-
ternality is fully internalized when PTAs enter into force, then the coefficient on importer market
power should be zero. The estimate is positive and significant, suggesting PTAs are unable to fully
internalize the terms-of-trade externality in the first year. Notice the coefficient of the PTA tariff
in column 3 is smaller than the MFN tariff regression in column 1. Thus, while the terms-of-trade
externality is still present in the first year of the PTA, the effect of importer market power on the
applied tariff is smaller. This means PTAs are able to internalize some portion of the terms-of-
trade externality present in MFN tariffs. Taking the coefficient estimates in columns 1 and 3 at
face value, PTAs internalize 33 percent of the terms-of-trade externality that the WTO is unable to
address.40
1.5 Conclusion
This paper studies the formation of PTAs, and structure of first year PTA tariff cuts, to provide
direct empirical evidence that PTAs are consistent with the terms-of-trade theory. I show when
importer market power is larger in both countries, the trading partners are more likely to form a
PTA with each other. In other words, countries form PTAs in a way that internalizes the terms-
of-trade externality by agreeing to mutual tariff decreases. This is robust to allowing for transfers
between countries, excluding EU members, and focusing on bilateral PTAs. The robustness checks




∣∣×100 = 33 percent. For the Positive MFN Sample, ∣∣ 0.767−0.9810.981 ∣∣×100 = 22 percent.
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help address the independent country pairs assumption that has plagued the literature. Additionally,
I find greater importer market power in a given product leads to larger tariff cuts when the PTA
enters into force. While PTAs do not entirely internalize the terms-of-trade externality in the first
year, the effect of importer market power on tariffs is diminished. This suggests countries are
moving closer to the efficient tariffs predicted by the terms-of-trade theory.
It is important to note the analysis does not imply the structure of multilateral and bilateral
agreements are exactly the same. The former are generally viewed as shallow and the latter as
deeper agreements (Bagwell et al., 2016). This paper also does not imply the WTO is unimportant
or passé; rather, it shows multilateral and bilateral agreements do share a similar motive.
There are potential avenues for future research. First, extending the tariff cut analysis to pluri-
lateral PTAs would be of interest. This extension would make it possible to examine if bilateral
and plurilateral PTAs result in different tariffs. A second path for future research is to incorporate
the terms-of-trade and domestic-commitment motives into the same empirical model. This model
would provide a comparison of the two most cited rationales for trade agreements. Finally, us-
ing the detailed PTA phase-in tariffs may be useful to quantify the effects of PTAs. For example,
Besedes et al. (2020) use phase-in tariffs from a single PTA to examine the effect of phase-in tariffs
on import growth. However, it is unclear how phase-in tariffs affect import growth in other PTAs,
and is a area for future research.
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1.6 Figures
Figure 1.1: WTO Membership and PTA Formation
Notes: The “PTAs” line counts the number of active PTAs as of August 21, 2020 from the WTO’s Regional Trade
Agreement Database (http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx). Including inactive PTAs yields a sim-
ilar trend with a line that is shifted up. The “GATT/WTO Members” line counts the number of active members
per year in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or World Trade Organization (WTO). Member-
ship dates are from the WTO’s website: (i) GATT (https://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/gattmem e.htm); (ii) WTO
(https://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/org6 e.htm). The drop in 1995 is due to the transition from the
GATT to the WTO. It took a set of countries 2 years to make the transition.
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Figure 1.2: Kernel Densities, Minimum Market Power by PTA Status
Notes: “PTA” includes country pairs that do have an agreement. “No PTA” includes country pairs that do not have an
agreement. Calculation of Market Power Measures aggregates Soderbery (2018)’s estimates of inverse foreign export
supply elasticities using Equation 1.12.
36
Figure 1.3: Response Probabilities, Minimum Market Power
Notes: 95 percent confidence intervals denoted with vertical bands. Controls are set to their mean values. Calculation
of Market Power Measures aggregates Soderbery (2018)’s estimates of inverse foreign export supply elasticities using
Equation 1.12.
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Figure 1.4: Tariff Cuts Distribution
Notes: Sample is the merged tariff data with Soderbery (2018)’s elasticities. For ease of exposition, values below the
1st percentile are omitted. Bin width is 1. PTA and MFN tariffs are ad valorem tariffs.
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Figure 1.5: Tariff Cuts Distribution by Importer
Notes: Sample is the merged tariff data with Soderbery (2018)’s elasticities. For ease of exposition, values below the
1st percentile are omitted. Bin width is 1. PTA and MFN tariffs are ad valorem tariffs. N is the number of observations
by importer for the Full Sample.
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1.7 Tables
Table 1.1: PTA Formation Summary Statistics
All Country Pairs EU Members Dropped
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Trade Agreement Status
PTA 0.228 0.420 0 1 0.106 0.307 0 1
BILATERAL PTA - - - - 0.048 0.213 0 1
Market Power Measures
ln(minMarketPower) -8.031 5.210 -43.9 9.01 -8.566 5.544 -43.9 9.01
ln(aveMarketPower) -4.778 3.965 -22.1 9.24 -5.198 4.028 -22.1 9.24
Controls
NATURAL -8.676 0.783 -9.89 -4.11 -8.777 0.771 -9.89 -4.11
REMOTE 2.080 3.743 0 9.42 2.944 4.194 0 9.42
RGDP 50.709 2.259 42.6 59.4 50.616 2.310 42.6 59.4
DRGDP 2.843 1.958 .000102 11.4 2.864 2.009 .00302 11.4
DKL 1.908 1.305 .000748 5.99 1.812 1.286 .000748 5.99
SQDKL 5.342 6.122 5.59e-07 35.9 4.934 6.014 5.59e-07 35.9
DROWKL 1.414 0.646 .0199 4.37 1.449 0.663 .0199 4.37
Continent Status
CONTINENT 0.236 0.425 0 1 0.330 0.470 0 1
Observations 4,154 2,158
Notes: The BILATERAL PTA variable is only available for the sample that drops EU members since it is not
possible for EU members to join a bilateral PTA. Calculation of Market Power Measures aggregates Soderbery
(2018)’s estimates of inverse foreign export supply elasticities using Equation 1.12.
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Table 1.2: PTA Formation Sample
Number of Observations Number of Observations
Country PTA Bilateral PTA Total Country PTA Bilateral PTA Total
Albania 20 1 24 Kuwait 1 0 38
Algeria 7 0 33 Kyrgyz Republic 0 0 19
Andorra 0 0 3 Latvia∗ 26 0 47
Argentina 0 0 84 Lebanon 22 0 58
Armenia 0 0 21 Lithuania∗ 28 0 53
Australia 13 8 117 Macao 1 1 35
Austria∗ 25 0 73 Macedonia 27 2 41
Azerbaijan 0 0 30 Madagascar 1 0 38
Bahamas 5 0 14 Malawi 3 0 39
Bahrain 2 1 38 Malaysia 8 7 101
Bangladesh 4 0 72 Maldives 2 0 16
Barbados 11 0 26 Mali 0 0 19
Belarus 0 0 57 Malta∗ 39 0 61
Belgium∗ 30 0 101 Mauritania 0 0 15
Belize 6 0 13 Mauritius 2 1 53
Benin 0 0 30 Mexico 38 5 91
Bhutan 3 1 5 Moldova 24 0 33
Bolivia 0 0 39 Mongolia 0 0 18
Bosnia and Herzegovina 25 1 36 Morocco 15 2 65
Brazil 0 0 96 Mozambique 4 0 29
Brunei 5 1 9 Myanmar 5 0 6
Bulgaria∗ 25 0 61 Nepal 2 0 22
Burkina Faso 0 0 20 Netherlands∗ 33 0 105
Burundi 0 0 16 New Zealand 11 6 104
Cambodia 5 0 27 Nicaragua 18 2 38
Cameroon 17 0 51 Niger 0 0 5
Canada 8 7 124 Nigeria 0 0 45
Cape Verde 0 0 6 Norway 24 0 80
Central African Republic 0 0 12 Oman 2 1 42
Chile 47 17 78 Pakistan 5 3 83
China 18 12 133 Panama 24 11 55
Colombia 34 3 77 Papua New Guinea 6 0 17
Comoros 0 0 5 Paraguay 0 0 39
Congo 1 0 23 Peru 37 10 73
Costa Rica 29 6 57 Philippines 6 1 71
Cote d’Ivoire 20 0 63 Poland∗ 32 0 81
Croatia∗ 45 0 72 Portugal∗ 25 0 83
Cuba 1 0 49 Qatar 1 0 43
Cyprus∗ 47 0 80 Romania∗ 29 0 70
Czech Republic∗ 33 0 74 Russia 0 0 98
Denmark∗ 26 0 78 Rwanda 0 0 16
Dominica 2 0 4 Saint Kitts and Nevis 1 0 2
Dominican Republic 6 0 51 Saint Lucia 3 0 5
Ecuador 0 0 65 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 2 0 5
Egypt 30 1 76 Samoa 0 0 4
El Salvador 22 2 44 Saudi Arabia 1 0 65
Estonia∗ 29 0 57 Senegal 0 0 34
Ethiopia 0 0 49 Seychelles 0 0 17
Fiji 6 0 16 Singapore 20 11 103
Finland∗ 24 0 71 Slovak Republic∗ 23 0 50
France∗ 37 0 113 Slovenia∗ 29 0 57
Gabon 0 0 38 South Africa 24 0 97
Gambia 0 0 7 South Korea 45 11 119
Georgia 22 1 34 Spain∗ 32 0 101
Germany∗ 35 0 109 Sri Lanka 4 2 73
Ghana 0 0 51 Sudan 0 0 36
Greece∗ 24 0 75 Suriname 0 0 13
Greenland 0 0 6 Sweden∗ 24 0 77
Grenada 7 0 13 Switzerland 28 2 104
Guatemala 25 2 59 Tanzania 8 0 58
Guinea 0 0 21 Thailand 6 4 104
Guyana 8 0 30 Togo 0 0 32
Honduras 21 2 41 Tonga 0 0 5
Hong Kong 6 3 121 Trinidad and Tobago 14 0 46
Hungary∗ 27 0 64 Tunisia 13 1 53
Iceland 16 1 29 Turkey 19 12 94
India 15 6 125 Uganda 2 0 47
Indonesia 6 1 95 Ukraine 30 1 79
Iran 0 0 78 United Arab Emirates 1 0 73
Ireland∗ 21 0 66 United Kingdom∗ 38 0 111
Israel 12 1 63 United States 17 11 145
Italy∗ 33 0 104 Uruguay 1 1 61
Jamaica 11 0 36 Vanuatu 0 0 6
Japan 15 13 141 Venezuela 0 0 63
Jordan 26 4 53 Vietnam 7 3 75
Kazakhstan 0 0 47 Yemen 0 0 30
Kenya 2 0 70 Zambia 2 0 34
Kiribati 0 0 2 Zimbabwe 3 0 34
Notes: Star denotes EU members as of 2015. The PTA column is the number of observations the Country appears and they are in a
PTA with a partner country. The Bilateral PTA column is the number of observations the Country appears and they are in a bilateral
PTA with a partner country. The Total column is the number of observations the Country appears in the All Country Pairs sample no
matter the PTA status.
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Table 1.3: Probit Results for the Probability of a PTA





Sample All Country Pairs EU Members Dropped
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(minMarketPower) 0.027∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.012) (0.019)
ln(aveMarketPower) 0.033∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.013) (0.017)
NATURAL 0.611∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.364∗∗∗ 0.068 0.144∗
(0.039) (0.039) (0.066) (0.065) (0.090) (0.086)
REMOTE -0.043∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ 0.017 0.020∗ 0.007 0.016
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015)
RGDP -0.027∗ -0.026∗ 0.034 0.059∗∗∗ 0.015 0.082∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.023) (0.022) (0.031) (0.029)
DRGDP 0.042∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ -0.015 -0.020
(0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) (0.029) (0.028)
DKL 0.564∗∗∗ 0.566∗∗∗ 0.183∗ 0.186∗ 0.152 0.150
(0.070) (0.069) (0.110) (0.109) (0.165) (0.158)
SQDKL -0.135∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.049∗ -0.051∗∗ -0.045 -0.045
(0.017) (0.017) (0.026) (0.025) (0.043) (0.041)
DROWKL -0.401∗∗∗ -0.406∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗ 0.136∗ -0.383∗∗∗ -0.343∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.052) (0.073) (0.073) (0.114) (0.111)
CONSTANT 6.195∗∗∗ 6.142∗∗∗ 0.233 -0.995 -0.611 -3.922∗∗∗
(0.698) (0.704) (1.170) (1.126) (1.586) (1.465)
Pseudo R-squared 0.139 0.138 0.152 0.140 0.196 0.158
Log Likelihood -1,922.9 -1,924.2 -617.4 -625.7 -332.9 -348.3
Observations 4,154 4,154 2,158 2,158 2,158 2,158
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Calculation of Market Power Measures aggregates Soderbery (2018)’s esti-
mates of inverse foreign export supply elasticities using Equation 1.12.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.4: Probit Results for the Probability of a PTA after 2007





Sample All Country Pairs EU Members Dropped
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(minMarketPower) 0.015∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.014) (0.024)
ln(aveMarketPower) 0.015∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.016) (0.021)
NATURAL 0.265∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.133 0.161∗ 0.017 0.089
(0.050) (0.050) (0.085) (0.084) (0.110) (0.105)
REMOTE -0.022∗∗ -0.021∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.018 0.029
(0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.018)
RGDP -0.022 -0.018 0.070∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ -0.001 0.079∗∗
(0.016) (0.017) (0.029) (0.028) (0.038) (0.034)
DRGDP 0.055∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗ -0.054 -0.054
(0.014) (0.015) (0.027) (0.027) (0.035) (0.034)
DKL 0.750∗∗∗ 0.750∗∗∗ 0.092 0.089 0.216 0.203
(0.082) (0.082) (0.127) (0.126) (0.193) (0.184)
SQDKL -0.149∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.007 -0.048 -0.046
(0.019) (0.019) (0.028) (0.028) (0.049) (0.047)
DROWKL -0.347∗∗∗ -0.350∗∗∗ 0.045 0.045 -0.312∗∗ -0.279∗∗
(0.068) (0.069) (0.094) (0.095) (0.141) (0.136)
CONSTANT 2.141∗∗ 1.937∗∗ -3.751∗∗ -5.355∗∗∗ -0.558 -4.597∗∗∗
(0.841) (0.853) (1.489) (1.438) (1.935) (1.745)
Pseudo R-squared 0.062 0.061 0.105 0.095 0.180 0.139
Log Likelihood -1,378.6 -1,379.7 -401.5 -405.9 -230.6 -242.3
Observations 3,707 3,707 2,047 2,047 2,047 2,047
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Calculation of Market Power Measures aggregates Soderbery (2018)’s esti-
mates of inverse foreign export supply elasticities using Equation 1.12. Drops PTAs and BILATERAL PTAs that occur
prior to 2008.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.5: Probit Results with Binary Market Power Measures





Sample All Country Pairs EU Members Dropped
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
minMarketPowerHigh 0.137∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.776∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.107) (0.195)
aveMarketPowerHigh 0.192∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗ 0.665∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.100) (0.164)
NATURAL 0.639∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗ 0.191∗∗
(0.039) (0.038) (0.064) (0.064) (0.084) (0.084)
REMOTE -0.040∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.027∗ 0.029∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015)
RGDP -0.001 -0.006 0.104∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.019) (0.019) (0.024) (0.024)
DRGDP 0.045∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.018
(0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) (0.028) (0.028)
DKL 0.562∗∗∗ 0.566∗∗∗ 0.182∗ 0.198∗ 0.173 0.179
(0.070) (0.069) (0.109) (0.108) (0.159) (0.157)
SQDKL -0.135∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗ -0.055∗∗ -0.053 -0.053
(0.017) (0.017) (0.025) (0.025) (0.042) (0.041)
DROWKL -0.387∗∗∗ -0.398∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗ 0.165∗∗ -0.276∗∗ -0.300∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.052) (0.072) (0.072) (0.109) (0.110)
CONSTANT 4.780∗∗∗ 4.997∗∗∗ -3.739∗∗∗ -3.708∗∗∗ -7.554∗∗∗ -7.218∗∗∗
(0.595) (0.599) (0.937) (0.941) (1.226) (1.229)
Pseudo R-squared 0.135 0.136 0.132 0.131 0.154 0.152
Log likelihood -1,930.6 -1,927.7 -632.0 -632.9 -350.2 -350.9
Observations 4,154 4,154 2,158 2,158 2,158 2,158
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Calculation of Market Power Measures aggregates Soderbery (2018)’s esti-
mates of inverse foreign export supply elasticities using Equation 1.12. Binary measures use the 33rd percentile as
cutoff.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.6: Probit Results with Product Differentiation Index





Sample All Country Pairs EU Members Dropped
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(minMarketPower) 0.140∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.383∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.023) (0.043)
ln(aveMarketPower) 0.132∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.020) (0.038)
NATURAL 0.449∗∗∗ 0.456∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗ -0.080 0.001
(0.030) (0.029) (0.057) (0.053) (0.092) (0.087)
REMOTE -0.038∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.023 0.031∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015)
RGDP -0.026∗∗∗ -0.012 0.038∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.014) (0.025) (0.023)
DRGDP 0.048∗∗∗ -0.007 -0.026 -0.107∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.019) (0.018) (0.029) (0.028)
DKL 0.414∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗ 0.199 0.236
(0.053) (0.051) (0.093) (0.089) (0.162) (0.159)
SQDKL -0.093∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗ -0.049∗∗ -0.046 -0.066
(0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) (0.042) (0.042)
DROWKL -0.570∗∗∗ -0.591∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗ 0.110∗ -0.359∗∗∗ -0.398∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.039) (0.058) (0.056) (0.111) (0.114)
CONSTANT 5.885∗∗∗ 5.117∗∗∗ 0.343 -1.181 -2.482∗ -4.507∗∗∗
(0.488) (0.450) (0.837) (0.769) (1.335) (1.245)
Pseudo R-squared 0.141 0.142 0.240 0.222 0.340 0.333
Log Likelihood -3,275.3 -3,418.9 -835.5 -891.9 -336.7 -346.5
Observations 8,677 9,312 5,199 5,713 5,199 5,713
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Calculation of Market Power Measures aggregates Rauch (1999)’s product
differentiation index (proportion), instead of inverse foreign export supply elasticities, using Equation 1.12. Sample
size decreases due to the zero values for the both the minimum and average. Without the log transformation the number
of observations for the All Country Pairs sample is 9,354 and for the EU Members Dropped sample is 5,749.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.9: Tariff Analysis Summary Statistics
Full Sample Positive MFN Sample





g -2.444 5.118 -339 0 -3.700 5.919 -339 0
Market Power: ω ijg 915.944 21,546.850 2.16e-18 2,140,660 832.275 17,260.524 2.16e-18 85,0815
Log Market Power: ln(ω ijg) -1.429 5.698 -40.7 14.6 -1.318 5.541 -40.7 13.7
High Market Power 0.671 0.470 0 1 0.677 0.467 0 1
Observations 31,674 20,899
Notes: High Market Power uses the 33rd percentile as the cutoff.
Table 1.10: Bilateral Tariff Changes and Importer Market Power, OLS Estimates
Dependent Variable τ i,PTAjg − τ
i,MFN
g
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Market Power: ω ijg -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Log Market Power: ln(ω ijg) -0.012
∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
High Market Power -0.136∗ -0.164∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.061)
R-squared 0.160 0.160 0.160 0.304 0.305 0.305
Observations 31,674 31,674 31,674 31,674 31,674 31,674
Fixed Effects:
Importer X X X
Exporter X X X
Industry X X X
Importer-Industry X X X
Exporter-Industry X X X
Country Pair X X X X X X
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered by importer bloc – exporter bloc – product. Number of clusters is
16,407. Singleton observations are dropped.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.11: Bilateral Tariff Changes and Importer Market Power, IV Estimates
Dependent Variable τ i,PTAjg − τ
i,MFN
g
Estimation Method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Market Power: ω ijg -0.001
∗∗ -0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Log Market Power: ln(ω ijg) -0.340
∗∗∗ -0.338∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.057)
High Market Power -2.499∗∗∗ -2.515∗∗∗
(0.427) (0.405)
First Stage F Statistic 6 220 570 8 231 592
Observations 31,674 31,674 31,674 31,674 31,674 31,674
Fixed Effects:
Importer X X X
Exporter X X X
Industry X X X
Importer-Industry X X X
Exporter-Industry X X X
Country Pair X X X X X X
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered by importer bloc – exporter bloc – product. Number of clusters is
16,407. Singleton observations are dropped.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.12: Bilateral Tariff Changes and Market Power, Positive MFN Sample
Dependent Variable τ i,PTAjg − τ
i,MFN
g
Estimation Method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Market Power: ω ijg -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Log Market Power: ln(ω ijg) -0.199
∗∗ -0.213∗∗
(0.090) (0.087)
High Market Power -1.454∗∗ -1.569∗∗
(0.649) (0.638)
First Stage F Statistic 2 194 449 2 203 466
Observations 20,899 20,899 20,899 20,899 20,899 20,899
Fixed Effects:
Importer X X X
Exporter X X X
Industry X X X
Importer-Industry X X X
Exporter-Industry X X X
Country Pair X X X X X X
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered by importer bloc – exporter bloc – product. Number of clusters
for is 12,382. Singleton observations are dropped.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.13: Bilateral Tariff Changes and Market Power, Drops If All Tariffs Go to Zero in Year 1
Dependent Variable τ i,PTAjg − τ
i,MFN
g
Sample Full Sample Positive MFN Sample
Estimation Method OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Market Power: ln(ω ijg) -0.012
∗∗ -0.392∗∗∗ -0.009 -0.202∗∗
(0.005) (0.070) (0.006) (0.089)
High Market Power -0.160∗∗ -2.853∗∗∗ -0.072 -1.509∗∗
(0.071) (0.484) (0.092) (0.661)
First Stage F Statistic 212 522 198 453
Observations 26,971 26,971 26,971 26,971 20,134 20,134 20,134 20,134
Fixed Effects:
Importer-Industry X X X X X X X X
Exporter-Industry X X X X X X X X
Country Pair X X X X X X X X
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered by importer bloc – exporter bloc – product. Number of clusters for
Full Sample is 15,347. Number of clusters for Positive MFN Sample is 12,279. Singleton observations are dropped. Drops
agreements where all PTA tariffs go to zero in the first year.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1.14: Bilateral Tariff Changes and Market Power, Non-Bloc Estimates
Dependent Variable τ i,PTAjg − τ
i,MFN
g
Sample Full Sample Positive MFN Sample
Estimation Method OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Market Power: ln(ω ijg) 0.002 -0.352
∗∗∗ 0.007 -0.126
(0.006) (0.091) (0.008) (0.078)
High Market Power -0.082 -3.854∗∗∗ 0.066 -1.585∗
(0.092) (0.845) (0.114) (0.959)
First Stage F Statistic 30 67 23 43
Observations 3,541 3,541 3,541 3,541 2,555 2,555 2,555 2,555
Fixed Effects:
Importer-Industry X X X X X X X X
Exporter-Industry X X X X X X X X
Country Pair X X X X X X X X
Notes: Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parenthesis. Singleton observations are dropped. Includes only
observations not grouped by Soderbery (2018).
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.15: Bilateral Tariff Changes and Market Power, After 2007 Sample
Dependent Variable τ i,PTAjg − τ
i,MFN
g
Sample Full Sample Positive MFN Sample
Estimation Method OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Market Power: ln(ω ijg) -0.020
∗∗∗ -0.345∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗ -0.228∗
(0.006) (0.078) (0.008) (0.122)
High Market Power -0.195∗∗ -2.483∗∗∗ -0.102 -1.635∗
(0.086) (0.544) (0.126) (0.874)
First Stage F Statistic 200 537 137 351
Observations 16,971 16,971 16,971 16,971 11,407 11,407 11,407 11,407
Fixed Effects:
Importer-Industry X X X X X X X X
Exporter-Industry X X X X X X X X
Country Pair X X X X X X X X
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered by importer bloc – exporter bloc – product. Number of clusters for
Full Sample is 12,176. Number of clusters for Positive MFN Sample is 8,193. Singleton observations are dropped. Only
includes PTAs implemented after 2007.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1.16: Bilateral Tariff Changes and Market Power, Rauch Proportion
Dependent Variable τ i,PTAjg − τ
i,MFN
g
Sample Full Sample Positive MFN Sample
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rauch Proportion -0.334∗∗∗ -0.335∗∗∗ -0.168 -0.241∗
(0.109) (0.110) (0.136) (0.139)
R-squared 0.111 0.212 0.103 0.218







Country Pair X X X X
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered by product. Number
of clusters equals 1,239. Singleton observations are dropped.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.17: Mechanism
Dependent Variable τ i,MFNjg P(τ
i,PTA






jg = 0) τ
i,PTA
jg
Sample Full Sample Positive MFN Sample
Estimation Method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Market Power: ln(ω ijg) 1.011
∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ 0.677∗∗∗ 0.981∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ 0.767∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.005) (0.095) (0.177) (0.005) (0.142)
Mean of Dependent Variable 5.349 0.639 3.058 8.101 0.463 4.584
First Stage F Statistic 231 231 231 203 203 203
Observations 31,674 31,674 31,674 20,899 20,899 20,899
Fixed Effects:
Importer-Industry X X X X X X
Exporter-Industry X X X X X X
Country Pair X X X X X X
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered by importer bloc – exporter bloc – product. Singleton
observations are dropped.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Terms-of-Trade Theory Intuition
Figure 1.A.1 provides a graphical explanation of the terms-of-trade theory, following Bagwell
and Staiger (1999). The horizontal and vertical axes are the Foreign and Home import tariffs,
respectively. The optimal non-cooperative unilateral tariff occurs where the iso-welfare curves
(W ∗N and W N) intersect. This occurs at point N and is known as the Nash tariff. The terms-of-
trade externality results in tariffs that are too high, and thus, inefficient. A trade agreement allows
for the countries to lower their tariffs and obtain an outcome of the contract curve (i.e., the bold
line on the EE curve). The optimal cooperative tariff occurs at point PO where the iso-welfare
curves are tangent.
Figure 1.A.1: Optimal Non-Cooperative and Cooperative Tariffs
Source: Bagwell and Staiger (1999).
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1.8.2 Multilateral Versus Bilateral Negotiations
Why may tariffs under multilateral negotiations not fully internalize the terms-of-trade motive,
while bilateral agreements can? More precisely, what is different about a multilateral versus bilat-
eral cooperative setting? In the two country setting from Bagwell and Staiger (1999), reciprocity is
instrumental to internalizing the terms-of-trade externality. When including additional countries,
reciprocity and non-discrimination allow for the terms-of-trade externality to be internalized. The
MFN principle of the WTO has been rationalized as providing non-discrimination among WTO
members. However, the MFN principle yields new bargaining challenges, such as free-riding (see
Ludema and Mayda, 2013), that can prevent internalization of the terms-of-trade externality. In
bilateral PTAs these challenges are plausibly absent, since a country only needs to negotiate with
a single partner. Additionally, for bilateral PTAs to internalize the terms-of-trade externality the
only requirement is reciprocity (i.e., the same as the two country setting from Bagwell and Staiger
(1999)). This is a much weaker condition than the WTO setting, and likely satisfied for PTAs since
the agreements require liberalization from both trading partners.
1.8.3 Maximum Market Power
This section examines whether the minimum market power is capturing the effect of the maximum
market power, maxMarketPoweri j. At first I replace the minimum market power with the maxi-
mum market power in Equation 1.12. These results are in columns 1, 3, and 5 of Table 1.A.1. The
maximum is positive and significant at the 1 percent level. This suggests when at least one coun-
try’s market power increases, all else equal, the probability of a PTA increases. This is suggestive
of the terms-of-trade theory, but does not necessarily imply the market power of both countries is
important. To attempt to disentangle the minimum and maximum market power, I include both
measures in the same regression. In column 2, for the all country pairs sample, both measures
are positive and significant. When dropping the EU members in columns 4 to 6, the minimum
is still positive and significant, while the maximum is no longer significant. This provides strong
support that the minimum is not capturing the effect of the maximum. One caveat is the interpreta-
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tion on the minimum and maximum is somewhat challenging given that each variable’s coefficient
assumes the other variable is held constant. Nevertheless, I view the results as support that the
minimum is not a direction proxy for the maximum.
Table 1.A.1: Probit Results for the Probability of a PTA, Maximum Market Power





Sample All Country Pairs EU Members Dropped
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(minMarketPower) 0.020∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.015) (0.029)
ln(maxMarketPower) 0.031∗∗∗ 0.018∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.019 0.081∗∗∗ -0.019
(0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.027)
NATURAL 0.619∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.150∗ 0.072
(0.039) (0.040) (0.065) (0.066) (0.086) (0.090)
REMOTE -0.044∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ 0.020∗ 0.016 0.017 0.009
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016)
RGDP -0.023∗ -0.036∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.028 0.087∗∗∗ 0.018
(0.014) (0.015) (0.022) (0.024) (0.029) (0.032)
DRGDP 0.038∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ -0.019 -0.014
(0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) (0.028) (0.029)
DKL 0.566∗∗∗ 0.566∗∗∗ 0.186∗ 0.185∗ 0.149 0.154
(0.069) (0.069) (0.108) (0.110) (0.158) (0.165)
SQDKL -0.135∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗ -0.049∗ -0.045 -0.045
(0.017) (0.017) (0.025) (0.025) (0.041) (0.043)
DROWKL -0.405∗∗∗ -0.408∗∗∗ 0.138∗ 0.139∗ -0.340∗∗∗ -0.380∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.052) (0.073) (0.073) (0.111) (0.114)
CONSTANT 6.025∗∗∗ 6.609∗∗∗ -1.258 0.495 -4.221∗∗∗ -0.724
(0.697) (0.730) (1.114) (1.192) (1.449) (1.598)
Pseudo R-squared 0.138 0.139 0.139 0.153 0.156 0.196
Log Likelihood -1,924.8 -1,921.0 -626.9 -616.8 -349.2 -332.7
Observations 4,154 4,154 2,158 2,158 2,158 2,158
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Calculation of Market Power Measures aggregates Soderbery (2018)’s esti-
mates of inverse foreign export supply elasticities using Equation 1.12.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
56
1.8.4 Elasticity Outliers
Another strategy to account for measurement error in the inverse foreign export supply estimates
is to drop the values in the top and bottom of the distribution. This ensures the main results from
Table 1.3 are not driven by outliers in the elasticity estimates. I drop elasticity estimates in the top
and bottom 0.5th percentiles and redo the analysis. The results are consistent with the main results
and are presented in Table 1.A.2.
Table 1.A.2: Probit Results for the Probability of a PTA, Outliers Dropped





Sample All Country Pairs EU Members Dropped
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(minMarketPower) 0.026∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.014) (0.023)
ln(aveMarketPower) 0.021∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.015) (0.021)
NATURAL 0.622∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗ 0.029 0.122
(0.039) (0.039) (0.066) (0.065) (0.092) (0.087)
REMOTE -0.042∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ 0.021∗ 0.021∗ 0.016 0.019
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015)
RGDP -0.017 -0.005 0.042∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.010 0.073∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.023) (0.022) (0.031) (0.028)
DRGDP 0.046∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.026
(0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) (0.029) (0.028)
DKL 0.571∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗ 0.194∗ 0.204∗ 0.174 0.178
(0.070) (0.070) (0.109) (0.109) (0.164) (0.159)
SQDKL -0.135∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.049∗ -0.053∗∗ -0.046 -0.051
(0.017) (0.017) (0.025) (0.025) (0.043) (0.042)
DROWKL -0.411∗∗∗ -0.411∗∗∗ 0.131∗ 0.128∗ -0.362∗∗∗ -0.342∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.053) (0.073) (0.074) (0.114) (0.112)
CONSTANT 5.799∗∗∗ 5.308∗∗∗ -0.192 -0.956 -0.552 -3.465∗∗
(0.688) (0.713) (1.146) (1.107) (1.551) (1.441)
Pseudo R-squared 0.138 0.136 0.150 0.143 0.203 0.169
Log Likelihood -1,916.7 -1,921.5 -616.3 -621.4 -329.4 -343.8
Observations 4,141 4,141 2,151 2,151 2,151 2,151
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Calculation of Market Power Measures aggregates Soderbery (2018)’s esti-
mates of inverse foreign export supply elasticities using Equation 1.12. Elasticities estimates in the top and bottom of
the distribution are dropped prior to the aggregation.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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1.8.5 Alternative Aggregation Strategies
The main PTA formation results use the aggregation strategy in Equation 1.12. This strategy is
consistent with the intuition from the terms-of-trade theory as discussed in Ludema and Mayda
(2013). Mainly, the welfare gains from removing the terms-of-trade externality depends on the
amount of trade. There are other potential aggregation strategies that could be implemented, and
I consider four in this section. The first alternative measure uses the same strategy as the main
measure from Equation 1.12, but for the calculation of total exports by country j it now does not










. (Alternative Aggregation #1)
The second alternative measure replaces the total exports in the denominator with the total
exports from country j to i. Now, each elasticity is weighed by the importance of the product within
the directional country pair relationship. As in Equation 1.12, the total trade flows are conditioned
on the availability of the elasticity estimates. This implies the weights for each directional country










. (Alternative Aggregation #2)
The third alternative measure uses the importance of each product within the non-directional









 . (Alternative Aggregation #3)
The fourth and final alternative strategy takes a simple average across all products. With a
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jg, (Alternative Aggregation #4)
where N are the number of elasticizes within the directional country pair.
The summary statistics of all four measures are in Table 1.A.3, and the regression results are
in Tables 1.A.4 to 1.A.7. Overall, the minimum and average market power measures are positive
and significant. This is similar to the main results in Table 1.3. The main difference is the in-
significant estimate on the minimum in column 1 of Table 1.A.5. When dropping EU members in
columns 3 and 5, the minimum becomes significant again at the 1 percent level. Additionally, the
magnitude of the point estimates vary from the main results. This is as expected given the different
distributions of each measure, as shown with the summary statistics.
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Table 1.A.3: Summary Statistics, Alternative Aggregation Strategies
All Country Pairs EU Members Dropped
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Alternative Aggregation #1: X j Not Conditional on ω ijg
ln(minMarketPower) -0.949 3.964 -34.6 10.6 -1.471 4.276 -34.6 10.6
ln(aveMarketPower) 2.081 3.044 -11.4 12.3 1.675 3.041 -11.4 12.3
Alternative Aggregation #2: Weight = X ijg/X
i
j
ln(minMarketPower) -2.218 4.524 -35 12.1 -2.896 4.848 -35 12.1
ln(aveMarketPower) 1.468 3.237 -12.1 12.1 1.044 3.225 -12.1 12.1







ln(minMarketPower) -8.287 5.264 -44.2 8.99 -8.834 5.603 -44.2 8.99
ln(aveMarketPower) -5.060 4.013 -22.3 9.18 -5.486 4.069 -22.3 9.18
Alternative Aggregation #4: Simple Average
ln(minMarketPower) -0.311 4.164 -34.6 10.8 -0.844 4.501 -34.6 10.8
ln(aveMarketPower) 2.588 3.145 -11.5 12.2 2.167 3.145 -11.5 12.2
Observations 4,154 2,158
Notes: The summary statistics for the dependent variables and controls are in Table 1.1.
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Table 1.A.4: Probit Results, Alternative Aggregation #1





Sample All Country Pairs EU Members Dropped
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(minMarketPower) 0.030∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.012) (0.019)
ln(aveMarketPower) 0.036∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.013) (0.017)
NATURAL 0.608∗∗∗ 0.614∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗ 0.364∗∗∗ 0.068 0.147∗
(0.039) (0.039) (0.066) (0.065) (0.090) (0.086)
REMOTE -0.043∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ 0.017 0.018 0.008 0.015
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015)
RGDP -0.031∗∗ -0.030∗∗ 0.029 0.052∗∗ 0.011 0.077∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.023) (0.022) (0.032) (0.029)
DRGDP 0.042∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗ -0.014 -0.018
(0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) (0.029) (0.028)
DKL 0.565∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗ 0.186∗ 0.183∗ 0.155 0.148
(0.070) (0.069) (0.110) (0.109) (0.165) (0.158)
SQDKL -0.135∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗ -0.049∗∗ -0.045 -0.045
(0.017) (0.017) (0.026) (0.025) (0.043) (0.041)
DROWKL -0.402∗∗∗ -0.408∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗ 0.135∗ -0.382∗∗∗ -0.344∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.052) (0.073) (0.073) (0.114) (0.111)
CONSTANT 6.418∗∗∗ 6.399∗∗∗ 0.501 -0.641 -0.368 -3.609∗∗
(0.705) (0.718) (1.181) (1.144) (1.601) (1.486)
Pseudo R-squared 0.140 0.139 0.154 0.143 0.198 0.160
Log Likelihood -1,920.8 -1,922.5 -615.8 -624.1 -332.1 -347.5
Observations 4,154 4,154 2,158 2,158 2,158 2,158
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Calculation of Market Power Measures aggregates Soderbery (2018)’s esti-
mates of inverse foreign export supply elasticities using Alternative Aggregation #1.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.A.5: Probit Results, Alternative Aggregation #2





Sample All Country Pairs EU Members Dropped
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(minMarketPower) 0.009 0.051∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.014) (0.022)
ln(aveMarketPower) 0.052∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.015) (0.020)
NATURAL 0.649∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.038) (0.064) (0.063) (0.084) (0.082)
REMOTE -0.039∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.023∗ 0.026∗ 0.022
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
RGDP 0.005 -0.027∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.020) (0.021) (0.027) (0.027)
DRGDP 0.045∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗ -0.054∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.023
(0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.022) (0.028) (0.028)
DKL 0.565∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗ 0.189∗ 0.160 0.164 0.133
(0.070) (0.070) (0.109) (0.109) (0.158) (0.157)
SQDKL -0.136∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗ -0.047∗ -0.052 -0.044
(0.017) (0.017) (0.025) (0.025) (0.041) (0.041)
DROWKL -0.383∗∗∗ -0.397∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗ 0.155∗∗ -0.319∗∗∗ -0.313∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.052) (0.072) (0.072) (0.109) (0.109)
CONSTANT 4.682∗∗∗ 6.128∗∗∗ -2.979∗∗∗ -2.616∗∗ -6.272∗∗∗ -6.369∗∗∗
(0.613) (0.649) (1.010) (1.061) (1.338) (1.384)
Pseudo R-squared 0.134 0.141 0.130 0.129 0.143 0.137
Log Likelihood -1,932.5 -1,916.9 -633.1 -633.8 -354.7 -357.0
Observations 4,154 4,154 2,158 2,158 2,158 2,158
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Calculation of Market Power Measures aggregates Soderbery (2018)’s esti-
mates of inverse foreign export supply elasticities using Alternative Aggregation #2.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.A.6: Probit Results, Alternative Aggregation #3





Sample All Country Pairs EU Members Dropped
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(minMarketPower) 0.028∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.013) (0.019)
ln(aveMarketPower) 0.048∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.014) (0.019)
NATURAL 0.627∗∗∗ 0.631∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.418∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.038) (0.064) (0.063) (0.085) (0.082)
REMOTE -0.041∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.022∗ 0.022 0.021
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
RGDP -0.016 -0.027∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) (0.028) (0.027)
DRGDP 0.046∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗ -0.046∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ 0.007 -0.024
(0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) (0.028) (0.028)
DKL 0.571∗∗∗ 0.548∗∗∗ 0.204∗ 0.150 0.178 0.124
(0.070) (0.070) (0.109) (0.109) (0.160) (0.158)
SQDKL -0.138∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗ -0.045∗ -0.055 -0.042
(0.017) (0.017) (0.025) (0.025) (0.042) (0.041)
DROWKL -0.387∗∗∗ -0.399∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗ 0.149∗∗ -0.339∗∗∗ -0.322∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.052) (0.072) (0.072) (0.111) (0.109)
CONSTANT 5.623∗∗∗ 6.116∗∗∗ -1.449 -2.172∗∗ -4.636∗∗∗ -5.920∗∗∗
(0.639) (0.653) (1.060) (1.061) (1.396) (1.380)
Pseudo R-squared 0.138 0.141 0.145 0.134 0.160 0.142
Log Likelihood -1,923.8 -1,918.0 -622.4 -630.6 -347.6 -355.0
Observations 4,154 4,154 2,158 2,158 2,158 2,158
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Calculation of Market Power Measures aggregates Soderbery (2018)’s esti-
mates of inverse foreign export supply elasticities using Alternative Aggregation #3.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
63
Table 1.A.7: Probit Results, Alternative Aggregation #4





Sample All Country Pairs EU Members Dropped
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(minMarketPower) 0.015∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.014) (0.022)
ln(aveMarketPower) 0.049∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.015) (0.021)
NATURAL 0.642∗∗∗ 0.628∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗ 0.166∗ 0.223∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.038) (0.064) (0.063) (0.085) (0.082)
REMOTE -0.040∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.022 0.025∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015)
RGDP -0.002 -0.028∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) (0.029) (0.028)
DRGDP 0.045∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.018
(0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) (0.028) (0.028)
DKL 0.565∗∗∗ 0.548∗∗∗ 0.181∗ 0.160 0.143 0.135
(0.069) (0.070) (0.109) (0.109) (0.158) (0.157)
SQDKL -0.136∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗ -0.047∗ -0.046 -0.044
(0.017) (0.017) (0.025) (0.025) (0.041) (0.041)
DROWKL -0.384∗∗∗ -0.397∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗ 0.156∗∗ -0.335∗∗∗ -0.311∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.052) (0.072) (0.072) (0.110) (0.109)
CONSTANT 4.966∗∗∗ 6.087∗∗∗ -2.156∗∗ -2.761∗∗∗ -4.994∗∗∗ -6.525∗∗∗
(0.631) (0.653) (1.055) (1.062) (1.410) (1.378)
Pseudo R-squared 0.135 0.141 0.136 0.128 0.153 0.136
Log Likelihood -1,931.0 -1,918.6 -628.9 -634.8 -350.3 -357.5
Observations 4,154 4,154 2,158 2,158 2,158 2,158
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Calculation of Market Power Measures aggregates Soderbery (2018)’s esti-
mates of inverse foreign export supply elasticities using Alternative Aggregation #4.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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1.8.6 Tariff Cuts Distributions For Rauch Sample
Figure 1.A.2: Tariff Cuts Distribution, Rauch Sample
Notes: For ease of exposition, values below the 1st percentile are omitted. Bin width is 1. PTA and MFN tariffs are ad
valorem tariffs.
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Figure 1.A.3: Tariff Cuts Distribution by Importer, Rauch Sample
Notes: For ease of exposition, values below the 1st percentile are omitted. Bin width is 1. PTA and MFN tariffs are ad
valorem tariffs. N is the number of observations by importer for the Full Sample.
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1.8.7 Additional Tables
Table 1.A.8: Bilateral Tariff Changes and Market Power, Phase-In Length Control
Dependent Variable τ i,PTAjg − τ
i,MFN
g
Sample Full Sample Positive MFN Sample
Estimation Method OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Market Power: ln(ω ijg) -0.013
∗∗∗ -0.363∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗ -0.270∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.059) (0.006) (0.089)
High Market Power -0.172∗∗∗ -2.680∗∗∗ -0.095 -1.975∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.412) (0.090) (0.644)
Phase-In Length 0.053∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
First Stage F Statistic 227 592 199 468
Observations 31,674 31,674 31,674 31,674 20,899 20,899 20,899 20,899
Fixed Effects:
Importer-Industry X X X X X X X X
Exporter-Industry X X X X X X X X
Country Pair X X X X X X X X
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered by importer bloc – exporter bloc – product. All columns also include a
non-directional country pair fixed effect. Number of clusters for Full Sample is 15,347. Number of clusters for Positive MFN
Sample is 12,279. Singleton observations are dropped.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1.A.9: Mechanism, Rauch Proportion
Dependent Variable τ i,MFNjg P(τ
i,PTA






jg = 0) τ
i,PTA
jg
Sample Full Sample Positive MFN Sample
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rauch Proportion 0.669∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗ 0.661∗∗ -0.008 0.433∗∗
(0.229) (0.008) (0.158) (0.270) (0.008) (0.189)
R-squared 0.332 0.500 0.371 0.320 0.558 0.389
Observations 94,818 94,818 94,818 61,184 61,184 61,184
Fixed Effects:
Importer-Industry X X X X X X
Exporter-Industry X X X X X X
Country Pair X X X X X X
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered by product. All columns also include a non-
directional country pair fixed effect. Singleton observations are dropped.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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CHAPTER 2
The Effects of Domestic Labor Mobility on Trade Agreements:
Empirical Evidence
2.1 Introduction
The explosion of trade agreements in the last half century is well documented, as shown in Fig-
ure 2.1. Why do countries sign trade agreements? Possible explanations range from internalizing
a negative price shifting externality, to serving as a commitment device that helps the government
“tie its hands” to domestic lobbying distortions. These are commonly referred to as the terms-
of-trade and domestic-commitment motives, respectively.1 Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007)
combine both motives into a unified model where domestic intersectoral factor mobility captures
the importance of the domestic-commitment motive. The model predicts that, “trade agreements
should lead to less deep tariff cuts when they involve countries with more rigid labor markets” (pg.
1387).2 In other words, when it is difficult to reallocate domestic labor between sectors, lobbies
will resist trade liberalization since they are particularly susceptible to import competition.
A similar prediction between domestic intersectoral labor mobility and trade liberalization can
also be obtained when introducing labor frictions into standard trade models, such as Ricardo-
Viner. Standard models assume labor is perfectly mobile within each country, which allows for
labor to reallocate until domestic wages equalize. Under this assumption, trade liberalization that
results in lower prices will not yield sector specific wages. However, when labor is unable to real-
locate immediately after trade liberalization, wages no longer equalize and now results in sector-
specific wages (Topalova, 2010). This implies the welfare for labor is directly related to how easily
reallocation can occur. Since the government’s welfare is likely some function of social welfare,
as in Grossman and Helpman (1994), domestic intersectoral labor mobility has a direct effect on
the formation of trade agreements. More broadly, reallocation is precisely what allows countries
1See Maggi (2014) for a detailed overview of motives for trade agreements.
2They mainly focus on the mobility of capital, but it is straightforward to apply their model to a setting with labor
frictions. Due to the availability of factor mobility measures, I focus on labor mobility in this paper.
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to benefit from such agreements.3 With slower reallocation, the benefits of trade liberalization are
diminished, which should influence the likelihood of countries pursing trade agreements in the first
place. Somewhat surprisingly, to the best of my knowledge, no paper has empirically examined
the effect of labor mobility on trade agreement formation.
This paper attempts to address this gap in the literature by examining the research question:
are countries more likely to experience trade liberalization when domestic intersectoral labor mo-
bility increases? Using preferential trade agreements (PTAs) notified to the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) as a proxy for trade liberalization, I examine the probability of 56 countries being
in PTAs during the year 2015. To implement this, I extend the country pair framework of Baier
and Bergstrand (2004), henceforth referred to as BB (2004), that estimates the probability of PTA
formation.4
I find support for the research question and show domestic intersectoral labor mobility has
strong predictive power for PTAs. Conditional on standard controls, the probability of a PTA
increases when the average labor mobility of the country pair increases. In other words, trade lib-
eralization is more likely when the pair’s overall labor market is less rigid. When the average labor
mobility of a country pair increases by 1 standard deviation from the mean for trading partners on
the same continent, the probability of a PTA increases by 14.1 percent. For trading partners on
different continents, the likelihood of a PTA increases by 26.1 percent. The empirical strategy also
allows for examination of the asymmetries between domestic labor mobility within the country
pair. I find that PTAs are more likely when labor mobility is more different between countries.
Moreover, I show PTAs are more likely when one country has a sufficiently mobile labor market.
A 1 standard deviation increase in labor mobility of the more mobile country results in the prob-
ability of a PTA to increase by 16.7 percent for a country pair on the same continent, and 13.6
percent if on different continents.
3Reallocation across firms within a sector also plays an important role in the gains from trade (see Irwin, 2020).
4BB (2004) is a seminal work that examines the probability of a country pair being in a free trade agreement in
1996. They find that countries are more likely to form free trade agreements if the country pair is: (i) closer to one
another; (ii) more remote continental trading partners relative to the rest of the world (ROW); (iii) larger in economic
size; (iv) more similar in economic size; (v) less similar in terms of factor endowments; (vi) more similar in terms of
factor endowments relative to the ROW’s factor endowments.
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Studying labor mobility and trade liberalization does not require the analysis to be constrained
to PTAs. Thus, I use the bound Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) tariffs negotiated under the WTO to
examine the effect of labor mobility in a multilateral trade agreement setting.5 Using a one-way
fixed-effects model, I show countries with less mobile labor markets are associated with larger
bound tariffs. The point estimates suggest that doubling labor frictions is associated with tariffs
that are 61 percent higher, consistent with the country pair analysis.
The main challenge when studying labor frictions and trade liberalization is that domestic
intersectoral labor mobility is not directly observed. This makes finding measures nontrivial. Some
papers have estimated intersectoral labor mobility within the United States (Artuc et al., 2010; Lee
and Wolpin, 2006; Hiscox, 2002), but require data that is not readily available for a wide range
of countries. Thus, I implement recent estimates of intersectoral mobility costs from Artuc et al.
(2015) that cover the developed and developing world to proxy for intersectoral labor mobility.
The estimates are referred to as “labor mobility costs” and are common to all workers within each
country. I assume when labor mobility costs increase, labor becomes less mobile and more rigid.6
An additional challenge is determining the appropriate level of analysis. Many empirical terms-
of-trade papers use importer by product variation to examine tariffs (e.g., Broda et al., 2008). This
approach is difficult since there is a single estimate of labor mobility costs for each country. Thus,
for the main results I use a cross-sectional country pair framework that only requires country level
variation, and use the bound MFN tariffs as additional suggestive support.
This paper contributes to three lines of literature. First is the empirical domestic-commitment
literature. Staiger and Tabellini (1999) is one of the first papers to empirically examine if govern-
ments commit to trade agreements to solve the time-inconsistency problem that results in misal-
location. Examining sector exclusions by the United States in the Tokyo Round, they find some
evidence of greater trade liberalization in sectors with a higher likelihood of production distortions
due to import protection. Limão and Tovar (2011) use WTO tariff commitments for Turkey to pro-
5Unilateral trade liberalization is also important. However, unilateral policies do not fit with the intuition from the
domestic-commitment theory since there is no outside institution that serves as a credible commitment device.
6Throughout this paper, the terms “labor mobility” and “labor mobility costs” are both used. These terms are both
discussing domestic intersectoral labor mobility, but they have an inverse relationship with each other.
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vide evidence that the government’s bargaining power relative to special interest groups provides
a rationale for commitment to trade agreements. Liu and Ornelas (2014) show trade agreements
serve as a commitment device for fragile democracies to limit the likelihood of future authoritarian
rule.7 These three papers capture the general story of the domestic-commitment theory, but none
of them directly use the prediction from Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) as I do in this paper.
The second line of literature is the empirical determinants of trade agreement literature. Magee
(2003) and BB (2004) examine the probability of a country pair being in a trade agreement. One
notable extension of this framework has been in the area of research of “third country” effects on
the formation of trade agreements (Egger and Larch, 2008; Chen and Joshi, 2010; Baldwin and
Jaimovich, 2012; Baier et al., 2014). In addition to the economic literature, there is a political
science literature that also examines determinants of trade agreements (Mansfield et al., 2000,
2002; Mansfield and Reinhardt, 2003; Mansfield and Milner, 2012). While my paper benefits from
this detailed empirical work, I add the additional mechanism of labor mobility that has not been
studied in this literature.
Finally, this paper fits into a broader literature related to international trade and labor frictions.
Many studies examine the reallocation of labor in response to trade liberalization (see Goldberg
and Pavcnik, 2007, 2016). For developing countries, the evidence largely suggests there is little
to no labor reallocation after trade liberalization. The literature includes country-specific studies
for: Mexico (Revenga, 1997; Hanson and Harrison, 1999; Feliciano, 2001), Morocco (Currie and
Harrison, 1997), Colombia (Attanasio et al., 2004), India (Topalova, 2010), and Vietnam (McCaig
and Pavcnik, 2018). The results are also consistent with cross-country analysis (Wacziarg and
Wallack, 2004). For developed countries there is some evidence of labor reallocation in response
to trade liberalization. This analysis mostly focuses on the United States (Grossman, 1986; Re-
venga, 1992). Some studies document reductions of manufacturing employment due to increased
competition from trade liberalization for the United States (Bernard et al., 2006; David et al., 2013;
Pierce and Schott, 2016) and Canada (Trefler, 2004). The intuition from this literature is similar to
7The role for the commitment device in Liu and Ornelas (2014) is to affect the successor’s policies, while in Maggi
and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) the commitment device is to affect the government’s own policies.
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my paper, where the welfare of workers relates to how easily they can reallocate. However, I am
the first to show this intuition also suggests that labor mobility influences whether countries form
trade agreements.
This paper demonstrates the importance of labor mobility on trade liberalization. What does it
imply about the domestic-commitment motive? The domestic-commitment story from Maggi and
Rodriguez-Clare (2007) requires lobbying to be the underlying mechanism.8 Since the prediction
between labor mobility and trade liberalization can also be obtained in models where lobbying
plays no role, the results are silent on whether lobbying is the precise channel. The most that can
be said is the empirical results are consistent with the domestic-commitment prediction on labor
mobility and trade liberalization.
Additionally, empirical evidence of lobbying is scarce due to data limitations. One example
includes Blanga-Gubbay et al. (2020). They show almost no firms have lobbied against the rati-
fication of recent trade agreements in the United States. The authors note the rise of global value
chains (GVCs) as a possible explanation for this stylized fact.9 This stylized fact is also consistent
with the prediction studied in my paper. The United States has a relatively mobile labor force
implying reallocation is not of grave concern to firms. However, this does not imply that trade lib-
eralization is unimportant to workers. Anecdotal evidence suggests that labor unions in the United
States strongly oppose PTAs (Irwin, 2020).
The next section presents a simple model that highlights the role of labor mobility in trade
liberalization. Section 2.3 details the qualitative choice model that incorporates labor mobility.
Section 2.4 reviews the data. Section 2.5 presents the PTA formation results and robustness checks.
Section 2.6 examines the relationship between bound MFN tariffs and labor mobility. Section 2.7
concludes.
8In general, the domestic-commitment theory does not require lobbying. The key insight is allocation takes place
prior to the trade agreement, which may result in a misallocation problem. A trade agreement is a way for the
government to correct this misallocation.




To highlight the role of domestic intersectoral labor mobility on trade liberalization, I present a
simple model that considers the two extreme cases of perfect mobility and perfect immobility.10
There are two goods (1 and 2) produced in 2 countries (domestic and foreign). Production of both
goods uses labor (L) and capital (K). For ease of exposition, I present the results for the domestic
country since the results hold for both countries. Using subscripts to denote the allocation of factors
to the production of each good yields the production functions f1(L1,K1) and f2(L2,K2). The
production functions are assumed to be homogeneous of degree one, twice differentiable, strictly
quasi-concave, and increasing in both factors. Let the total factor endowment in the country be L
and K, such that L1+L2 = L and K1+K2 =K. To focus on the mobility of labor, I fix the allocation
of capital in each sector to K1 and K2.
When labor is perfectly mobile across sectors, the returns to labor equalize:
w = p1 f1L(L1,K1) = p2 f2L(L2,K2), (2.1)
where w is the wage, p is the price, and f1L(L1,K1) = ∂ f1(L1,K1)/∂L. Suppose the domestic
country enters a PTA with the foreign country that results in a decrease of p1 due to lower import











where the inequality is due to f1LL < 0 and dL1/d p1 > 0. The final equality uses equation (2.1).
With d p1 < 0, it follows that 0 > dw/w > d p1/p1, which implies the real wage with respect to
good 1 (w/p1) has increased. In other words, the decrease in the wage is less than proportional to
the decrease in p1.
Now suppose that labor is perfectly immobile, such that L1 and L2 are the fixed labor alloca-
10Topalova (2010) uses a similar model to show the effect of trade liberalization on poverty depends on the mobility
of labor.
11When the country enters into the PTA, p2 likely decreases too. It is straightforward to apply the good 1 results to
good 2 when p2 decreases.
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tions. The wages in both sectors no longer have to equalize since
w1 = p1 f1L(L1,K1), (2.3a)
w2 = p2 f2L(L2,K2). (2.3b)
As before, suppose p1 decreases. Differentiating equation (2.3a) yields the following,
dw1
d p1







The second equality follows from dL1/d p1 = 0. Equation (2.4) implies that dw1/w1 = d p1/p1 < 0
when d p1 < 0. Now the wage change for labor employed in the production of good 1 is exactly
proportional to the change in the good 1 price. Thus, when consuming any positive quantity of
good 1, labor employed in the production of good 1 is strictly worst off relative to when labor is
mobile.12
The degree of labor mobility captures the gap between the percentage change in the wage and
price. When labor is less mobile, it is more likely to be hurt by trade liberalization since labor is
not able to reallocate. Since the government’s welfare is likely some function of social welfare,
as in Grossman and Helpman (1994), domestic intersectoral labor mobility has a direct effect on
the probability of PTA formation. Thus, trade liberalization is less likely when the labor market
is more rigid, all else equal, which is similar to the prediction from Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare
(2007) as presented in the introduction.
2.3 Empirical Model
The empirical model adds domestic labor mobility to the qualitative choice model (McFadden,
1975, 1976) implemented by BB (2004). They use economic determinants to examine the prob-
ability of joining a free trade agreement. This framework uses an observable outcome to model
12The labor employed in the production of good 2 is strictly better off in the perfectly immobile case compared to
the perfectly mobile case. This only occurs since p2 is assumed to be unchanged for ease of exposition. However, as
previously mentioned, p2 likely decreases as well when a PTA is implemented.
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the unobservable outcome, referred to as the latent variable. Let the observable outcome PTAi j
be equal to 1 if countries i and j are in the same PTA, and 0 otherwise. Define the latent variable
PTA∗i j as the change in the governments’ welfare from joining a PTA. Welfare is a combination of
social welfare and the welfare of the lobbies. A country pair will be in a PTA if it benefits both




where4Wi (4Wj) is the change
in government i’s ( j’s) welfare from not having a PTA to having one. In my empirical model the
government can benefit from the PTA due to domestic intersectoral labor mobility and economic
factors studied by BB (2004). Since PTA∗i j is unobservable I define the following equation:
PTA∗i j = α +βLMCi j +Z
′
i jγ + εi j, (2.5)
where α is a constant, Zi j is a vector of controls, and εi j is the error term that is assumed to have a
standard normal distribution. LMCi j is the labor mobility costs for the country pair and is the main
variable of interest. I assume as labor mobility costs decrease, labor mobility increases and labor
markets become less rigid. Using the indicator function 1 [·] and the latent variable defined above,
PTAi j = 1
[
PTA∗i j > 0
]












α +βLMCi j +Z′i jγ
)
, (2.6)
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative density function with parameters α , β , and γ to be
estimated. Equation (2.6) is a probit regression.
To address the research question regarding trade liberalization and labor mobility, I separate
the empirics into two stages. First, I examine the average labor mobility for a country pair. The
average is reduced form method to allow for transfers between countries since it reflects the pair’s
“overall” labor mobility (as discussed in Martin et al., 2012). I return to this point at the end of this
section. To calculate the average first define LMCi and LMC j as observable proxies that inversely
capture the domestic intersectoral labor mobility for countries i and j, respectively. In equation
(2.6), let LMCi j be the real GDP weighted average of labor mobility costs for the country pair,
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, where RGDPi is the real GDP of country i. Using real GDP for the weights
helps to account for the different sizes of the countries’ labor markets. Taking a simple average
of the labor mobility costs gives equal weight to both countries and may not give an accurate
representation of the pair’s overall labor mobility. Support for inverse relationship between PTA
formation and average labor mobility costs is given by β̂ < 0 and statistically significant.
Second, I address asymmetries between countries i and j to analyze if labor mobility in both
or only one of the countries influences the propensity of PTA formation. I first consider a mea-
sure that captures how similar the labor mobility costs are between countries such that LMCi j =∣∣LMCi−LMC j∣∣ in equation (2.6). This variable is only suggestive if the difference in labor mo-
bility costs is important. To answer whether the labor mobility costs in one or both the countries
matters I present an empirical setup similar to Holmes (2005).13 For clarity, I will focus only on
labor mobility and keep the economic controls in the background. Let cutoff∗ be the unobservable
cutoff such that the country pair will be in a PTA if labor mobility is high enough in only one or
both countries. This yields the following:
PTAi j = 1 i f LMCi < cuto f f ∗ and LMC j < cuto f f ∗, (2.7)
PTAi j = 1 i f LMCi < cuto f f ∗ or LMC j < cuto f f ∗. (2.8)
Equation (2.7) states the labor mobility is high enough in both countries, while equation (2.8) states
the labor mobility is high enough in only one country. To implement this into my empirical model,








. Equations (2.7) and
(2.8) become:
PTAi j = 1 i f maxLMCi j < cuto f f ∗, (2.9)
PTAi j = 1 i f minLMCi j < cuto f f ∗. (2.10)
13Holmes (2005) examines the probability of country pairs being in an “effective PTA” given the mercantilist interest
in both countries. “Effective PTAs” are agreements where the trade flows have increased.
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Given equations (2.9) and (2.10), I can compare the asymmetries in labor mobility within a country
pair by including these into equation (2.6), such that
P
(




α +β1minLMCi j +β2maxLMCi j +Z′i jγ
)
. (2.11)
Support for the view that labor only needs to be sufficiently mobile in one country is given
by: β̂1 < 0 and significant; β̂2 not significant. Support for the alternative that labor needs to be
sufficiently mobile in both countries is given by: β̂1 not significant; β̂2 < 0 and significant. This
strategy has the appealing feature that it does not require the researcher to specify the labor mobility
threshold such that the country pair will join the PTA. However, it can be challenging to interpret
β̂1 and β̂2 due to the connection between the minimum and maximum. For example, interpretation
of β̂1 assumes the maximum is held constant. This is unlikely since if the minimum is increased
enough, then the maximum will eventually have to increase by definition. Thus, I also consider a
set of regressions that includes the minimum and maximum separately.
Using the minimum and maximum assumes transfers between countries are unavailable (Mar-
tin et al., 2012). Transfers do not need to be limited to just monetary payments, but could also
include provisions related to nontariff barriers and behind-the-border policies, such as intellectual
property rights. Given the importance of such policies in PTAs (see Rodrik, 2018), transfers likely
play an important role in trade liberalization. As previously mentioned, the average is a reduced
form method to include such transfers into the empirics. Thus, I use the weighted average labor
mobility as the main measure. I view the difference, minimum, and maximum measures as an
additional exercise.
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Overview of PTAs
According to the WTO, PTAs are reciprocal trade agreements between at least two countries that
include Free Trade Agreements, Customs Unions, Economic Integration Agreements, and Partial
Scope Agreements. Free Trade Agreements are the most common of these agreements. One of the
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main purposes of PTAs is to decrease tariffs. By using PTAs as a proxy for tariff decreases, I am
capturing the same spirit of the tariff cuts in section 2.2 and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007).
As suggestive support, the correlation of world average tariff levels computed by the World Bank
and the cumulative number of physical PTAs in force reported to the WTO between the years 1988
and 2015 is -0.8640.14 In other words, I am treating tariff cuts as dichotomous, and capturing the
extensive margin of tariff cuts. As is standard in the literature, I omit Partial Scope Agreements
since they only require tariff reductions for a subset of goods.
Why focus on PTAs? A PTA requires commitment from all members due to the reciprocal
liberalization in these agreements. This is important since the domestic-commitment story requires
the government to “tie its hands” to lobbying distortions. If governments unilaterally select to
lower their import protection of industries by decreasing tariffs, there is no commitment by the
government to some outside entity and they are still vulnerable to domestic lobbying. Thus, the
analysis excludes agreements or policies where trade liberalization is unilateral. The WTO also
serves as a credible commitment device with formal rules and a system for dispute settlements. In
section 2.6, I discuss tariffs negotiated under the WTO.
2.4.2 Review of Labor Mobility Estimates
The labor mobility measure comes from Artuc et al. (2015), who use a structural model to match
their model’s predicted and actual allocation of labor between 1986 and 2007. The authors use
eight manufacturing sectors (Metals and Minerals; Chemicals and Petroleum Products; Machinery;
Food and Beverages; Wood Products; Textiles and Clothing; Miscellaneous Equipments; Motor
Vehicles) from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and one non-
manufacturing sector from national accounts data. Data on actual labor flows are not available in
the UNIDO dataset. Instead, they obtain a time series of employment levels and wages by industry
for 56 countries.
Their identifying assumption is that workers respond to wage differentials. In each time period
14Physical PTAs means that good and service agreements are counted as the same agreement. Data is avail-
able for download from: (i) https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/tm.tax.mrch.wm.ar.zs; (ii) http://rtais.wto.org/UI/
PublicMaintainPTAHome.aspx.
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a worker can change sectors or stay in the current sector. If they choose to change sectors, they
experience a common cost and an idiosyncratic cost. The common cost is the same for all workers
within a country and the idiosyncratic cost is worker specific. This implies that workers only
change sectors if the expected future wage flows net of moving costs are greater than the current
wage flows. If workers do not switch sectors, they pay zero cost. The model takes the initial
allocation of labor and the future path of wages for each country as given and simulates the future
path of labor allocations. Using a minimum distance estimator that compares the predicted and
actual allocations, they estimate the common cost for each country. I refer to these as the “labor
mobility costs” (also denoted as LMC).
A map of labor mobility costs estimates from Artuc et al. (2015) is presented in Figure 2.2 and
the list of the estimates in Table 2.A.1. The average mobility cost is 3.29, which implies individ-
uals bear a common utility cost that is 3.29 times the annual average wage in the country when
switching sectors. Jordan and Estonia have the highest and lowest costs, respectively. Developed
countries have a higher average labor mobility costs than developing (2.76 < 3.71). The map also
shows that the mobility costs are the lowest in North America and Western Europe, implying labor
mobility is the highest in these regions.
2.4.3 Main Sample and Variables
I use a cross-section of 1,489 non-directional country pairs covering 56 countries from the year
2015.15 For example, the country pair of {United States, China} is treated the same as {China,
United States}.16 The set of countries covers 25 developed and 31 developing countries, with
country coverage being purely determined by the available estimates of labor mobility costs from
15In specifications with additional political economy controls, the number of observations drops to 1,434 due to the
availability of the “Polity Score” (polity2) variable for Malta.
16This is because the covariates in the model are not importer or exporter specific. One could follow Mansfield
and Reinhardt (2003) and include directional country pairs. This would mean the country pairs of {United States,
China} and {China, United States} are counted separately. In the directional case it is important to cluster the standard
errors at the country pair level since the sample size would increase from 1,489 to 2,978. Without this adjustment it is
possible to overstate the significance of the estimates.
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Artuc et al. (2015).17
Descriptive statistics of the main variables are in Table 2.1. The trade agreement status vari-
able, PTA, comes from the Gravity dataset complied by the Centre D’Etudes Prospectives et
D’Informations Internationales (CEPII), who use PTAs notified to the WTO (Head et al., 2010;
Head and Mayer, 2014). It equals 1 if countries i and j are in a PTA in 2015, and 0 otherwise.
Country pairs with an agreement on or before 1973 are excluded from the sample. This results in
51 country pairs being dropped (about 3.3 percent of the 1,540 possible pairs). Excluding these
PTAs is important due to the availability of the time-varying controls and is discussed at the end of
this section.
The labor mobility costs variables are the main variables of interest and are calculated from the
Artuc et al. (2015) estimates. To capture the overall labor mobility, LMC AVERAGE is computed
as a real GDP weighted average of labor mobility costs. A larger value implies the overall labor
mobility for a given country pair is lower. LMC DIFFERENCE is the absolute difference in labor
mobility costs. This compares the similarity of the labor mobility costs between a pair and provides
insight about whether the asymmetries of labor mobility are important. When it decreases, the
labor mobility in countries i and j are more similar. LMC MINIMUM and LMC MAXIMUM take
the value of the smallest and largest labor mobility costs for the pair, respectively. These allow for
a direct test of the within pair asymmetries of labor mobility.
The BB (2004) variables are used to control for possible economic determinants of trade agree-
ments that are correlated with the labor mobility costs variables. The predicted coefficient signs
from BB (2004) are in parentheses. The data on distance between capitals comes from the CEPII’s
GeoDist dataset (Mayer and Zignago, 2011). NATURAL (+) is the natural logarithm of the inverse
distance between the capitals of countries i and j. This implies the larger the distance between
countries, the smaller the value. REMOTE (+) is an interaction between a dummy variable equal
to one if the pair is on the same continent (CONTINENT) and a measure that captures how remote
17This could create a selection bias since labor mobility costs estimates are only available for countries that have
UNIDO data. This selection issue is a common challenge in this type of analysis (see Limão, 2016). While it is
important to acknowledge, there is little that can be done to avoid it in this context.
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the country pair is relative to the rest of the world (ROW).18 Intuitively, if there are two relatively
more remote countries from the ROW, such as Australia and New Zealand, they may benefit more
from a trade agreement. Data on real GDP and real GDP per capita are from the Maddison Project
and are in constant United States dollars (Inklaar et al., 2018). GDP (+) equals the sum of the
natural logarithm of real GDP, and GDP DIFFERENCE (–) is the absolute value of the difference
of the natural logarithm of real GDP in countries i and j. These measure the total size of the pair
and how similar in size each country is to one another, respectively. To proxy for differences in
factor endowments I use the absolute difference of the natural logarithm of real GDP per capita
in countries i and j, denoted GDPPC DIFFERENCE (+).19 The more different the factor endow-
ments of the pair, the more different are the comparative advantages of each country within the
pair.20 Accordingly, SQGDPPC DIFFERENCE (–) is the square of GDPPC DIFFERENCE to ac-
count for the hypothesis that increasing differences in factor endowments increases the probability
of a PTA only up to a point. Finally, ROW GDPPC DIFFERENCE (–) measures how similar the
factor endowments are to the rest of the world.21 A larger difference signifies there is a higher
opportunity cost for the pair to join a PTA due to the comparative advantage differences they are
not capitalizing on.



















19BB (2004) use capital-labor ratios instead of real GDP per capita. Egger and Larch (2008) use the same strategy
as I do here and show that this measure is highly correlated with capital-labor ratios.
20Alternatively, Levy (1997) has a median voter model that predicts countries with more similar factor endowments
are more likely to join a trade agreement, which is a different prediction on the estimate of GDPPC DIFFERENCE.
Appendix 2.10.4 shows that omitting SQGDPPC DIFFERENCE yields a negative estimate on GDPPC DIFFERENCE.
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above, they also may be correlated with political economy variables that are common in the lit-
erature. POLITICAL DISTANCE is the absolute difference in the polity2 score from the Polity
IV Project (2018) dataset and captures how politically similar i and j are with each other. The
values of the polity2 score range between -10 to 10 and are increasing in democracy. The results
from Mitra et al. (2002) suggests that PTAs may be more likely if they are between two democ-
racies. DEMOCRACY equals 1 if both countries have democratic regimes. This occurs when the
polity2 score is greater than zero for both countries. Other common controls available from the
CEPII’s Gravity dataset include: COMMON COLONIZER (equals 1 if common colonizer after
1945); COLONY (equals 1 if ever in colonial relationship); COMMON LANGUAGE (equals 1 if
the same official/primary language); LEGAL ORIGIN (equals 1 if the same legal origins). MIL-
ITARY ALLIANCE equals 1 if both countries are part of the same military alliance according to
the Correlates of War database (see Sarkees and Wayman, 2010) and is a measure of the stability
between the countries.
In addition to the standard political economy controls, I include two additional controls. First,
GDPPC is the sum of the natural log of real GDP per capita in countries i and j. This serves as a
proxy for the pair’s development status, which may independently affect PTA formation. However,
controlling for development status likely absorbs important variation in the labor mobility costs
variables. For example, GDPPC may capture social insurance programs and directly affect labor
market frictions. Nevertheless, I include it with the other political economy controls to ensure the
results are not purely driven by development status. Second, certain countries may have a natural
tendency to join PTAs with more countries. Thus, I include the variable PTA TRENDS that counts
the total number of countries the pair has PTAs with in 1973 (i.e, prior to the sample period).
The explanatory variables may be an outcome of PTAs. For example, a country’s GDP may be
affected when they join a PTA. To account for this endogeneity, all time varying control variables
are lagged to the earliest available year for the GDP data, 1973. For a small subset of countries,
the polity2 score is unavailable for 1973. In these cases, I use the closest available year. This helps
to address the simultaneity concern with the control variables since I drop all country pairs that
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signed a PTA prior to and including 1973. It is not possible to lag the labor mobility measures
since there is one estimate for each country over the time of 1986 to 2007. Instead, I use the
evidence from the literature, as discussed in the introduction, that examines the reallocation of
labor in response to trade liberalization (see Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007, 2016, for a review). For
developing countries, labor reallocation is small to none in response to trade liberalization. There
is some evidence of reallocation for developed countries. However, most studies only consider
the United States to examine if employment in a particular sector changes, and not whether the
labor eventually switches sectors. This evidence suggests that labor mobility costs do not change
drastically in response to trade liberalization. Thus, I make the assumption that labor mobility
costs are relatively stable over the time period of study. For a robustness check, I use a binary
transformation of labor mobility costs that only requires the general ordering to be unchanged over
the sample period.
2.5 PTA Formation Results
2.5.1 Main Probit Results
The main probit results are presented in Table 2.2. The probit estimation bounds the predicted
probability between 0 and 1. Only the signs and the significance of the coefficients can be inter-
preted due to the non-linear structure of Φ(·) in equations (2.6) and (2.11). The sign signifies the
direction of the marginal effect, while the magnitude of the marginal effect is dependent on where
the function is evaluated.22 Since the labor mobility costs variables are calculated from estimates
of labor mobility costs from Artuc et al. (2015) the standard errors are bootstrapped. The estimates
are robust to OLS and logit specifications; these results are in Appendix 2.10.2.
Beginning with overall labor mobility, column 1 estimates equation (2.6) with the average
labor mobility costs. The estimated coefficient on LMC AVERAGE is negative and significant
22The marginal effect of LMCi j in equation (2.6) is:




α +βLMCi j +Z′i jγ
)
×β ,
where φ is the standard normal probability density function.
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at the 1 percent level. This implies as the average labor mobility costs decreases, all else equal,
the probability of a PTA increases. In other words, as the overall labor market for a country pair
become less rigid, the probability of trade liberalization increases. This is consistent with the
theoretical prediction.
To account for possible omitted political economy variables that may bias LMC AVERAGE,
column 2 estimates the same regression with additional controls. Now the number of observations
decreases from 1,489 to 1,434 due to the availability of the polity2 score. The sign on LMC
AVERAGE is still negative and significant at the 5 percent level. The persistence of the negative
sign provides strong support for the prediction of an inverse relationship between the propensity of
PTA formation and labor mobility costs.
Next, to examine asymmetries of labor mobility within a country pair, columns 3 and 4 estimate
equation (2.6) with the absolute value of the difference between labor mobility costs. Here the
coefficients on LMC DIFFERENCE are positive, implying countries with different labor mobility
are more likely to be in a PTA with one another. The estimate in column 3 is significant at the 5
percent level, while in column 4 it is just insignificant at the 10 percent level. This is suggestive
that labor mobility asymmetries within the country pair are important.
To analyze the asymmetries in further detail, columns 5 to 10 consider the minimum and maxi-
mum. Columns 5 and 6 include only LMC MINIMUM. The estimates are negative and significant
at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively. It implies as labor mobility increases in at least one coun-
try, the likelihood of a PTA increases. Columns 7 and 8 replace the minimum with the maximum.
The estimates on LMC MAXIMUM are also negative, but only significant in the first regression.
This yields some support that as labor becomes more mobile in both countries, the likelihood of
a PTA increases. Finally, columns 9 and 10 include both the minimum and maximum to estimate
equation (2.11). For both columns, the coefficients on the minimum labor mobility costs are neg-
ative and significant at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively, while the coefficients on
maximum labor mobility costs are insignificant. Thus, for a given country pair, when the less rigid
county becomes even more mobile, all else equal, the probability of trade liberalization increases.
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From the empirical model, this suggests that one country is past the unobservable cutoff such that
they join a PTA. This supports the case that labor needs to be mobile in only one country for a
country pair to be in a PTA. From Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007), when labor is very mobile
within a country the domestic-commitment motive is strong in that country. Extending the intu-
ition, it is plausible if this motive is strong, then the country would be more likely to push a partner
country to join a trade agreement. This could involve some transfer in exchange for liberalization.
The average in columns 1 and 2 is a reduced form way to include such transfers into the empirics.
For this reason the results with the LMC AVERAGE are my preferred results. The results are also
consistent with standard trade models that incorporates labor frictions. Overall, the results imply
when labor finds it easier to reallocate, the probability of a PTA increases.
The constant and BB (2004) controls are contained in the top 8 rows, and the political economy
variables are in the following 9 rows of Table 2.2. Most of these estimates are similar to those of
BB (2004), with only REMOTE and GDP having different signs. Appendix 2.10.3 examines these
differences further, and compares the samples from BB (2004) and Artuc et al. (2015). For the
non-BB (2004) controls, the estimate on GDPPC is positive and significant. This is expected since
the overall development status of the pair is highly correlated with many potential determinants
of PTAs. However, as previously discussed, the downside to GDPPC is it likely captures some
important variation in the labor mobility costs variables. PTA TRENDS is also a strong predictor
of future trade agreements and is consistent with the idea of contagion. Some of the political
economy variables are insignificant, but are included since the main variables of interest may be
biased without them.
2.5.2 Non-Parametric Evidence
Plots of kernel densities in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 provide non-parametric evidence that country pairs
with a PTA have lower mobility costs. In Figure 2.3, the middle of the distributions for LMC
AVERAGE for country pairs with and without a PTA are similar. In the left tails of the distributions
where LMC AVERAGE is low, the PTA country pairs density is larger than the country pairs
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without a PTA. The opposite occurs at high values of LMC AVERAGE in the right tails of the
distributions. This suggests that country pairs with an overall more mobile labor force are more
likely to sign a PTA. Moreover, this result is consistent with the probit regressions in the previous
section presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.2.
The densities of LMC MINIMUM for pairs with and without a PTA are plotted in Figure 2.4
and the story is similar to Figure 2.3. For low levels of labor mobility costs the PTA country pairs
density is larger than the country pairs without a PTA. As labor mobility costs increases and labor
becomes less mobile, the density of country pairs without a PTA slightly overtakes pairs with a
PTA. This shows that country pairs with a PTA are more likely to have at least one country with
a mobile labor force relative to the no PTA pairs. With this plot, it is not possible to know if the
labor in only one or both of the countries within a given pair is sufficiently mobile, but the kernel
densities are in line with the probit results.
The kernel densities are not conditioned on any controls used in the probit models. This is
appealing since one may be worried that a control is “bad” in the sense that it is endogenous, even
after they have been lagged to a period prior to any PTAs being active in the sample. The con-
sistency of the probit results and these kernel densities provide additional support for the research
question.
2.5.3 Response Probabilities
I calculate the predicted probability of PTA formation at different values of average labor mobility
costs and minimum labor mobility costs while holding the other covariates at their mean values.
This sheds light on the economic significance of the Table 2.2 results. For binary variables, it
is challenging to interpret the mean value. For ease of exposition, I use the specifications from
Table 2.2 without the political economy controls to minimize the number of binary variables.
Moreover, the interpretation on the mean value of REMOTE is not clear since it is a product of a
binary and a continuous variable. It is positive when countries are on the same continent and zero
when countries are on different continents. Thus, I split the analysis into “natural” trading partners
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that are on the same continent and “unnatural” trading partners on different continents.
Figure 2.5 plots the response probabilities with the labor mobility measure changing by 1, 2,
and 3 standard deviations away from the mean on the horizontal axis and the predicted probability
on the vertical axis. The first row, panels (a) and (b), examines the response probability for LMC
AVERAGE and the second row, panels (c) and (d), examines the response probability for LMC
MINIMUM. The first column, panels (a) and (c), focuses on natural trading partners and the second
column, panels (b) and (d), unnatural trading partners. Consistent with the literature, the predicted
probability of being in a PTA is generally higher for pairs on the same continent (reviewed in
Baier et al., 2014). The predicted probabilities of PTA status are monotonically decreasing in
both labor mobility measures. Starting at the mean value of a natural trading partner, when LMC
AVERAGE decreases by 1 standard deviation the probability of a PTA increases by 14.1 percent
(10.2 percentage points). For an unnatural trading partner, the probability of a PTA increases
by 26.1 percent (6.4 percentage points). The results are similar for LMC MINIMUM. From the
mean value of a natural trading partner, when LMC MINIMUM decreases by 1 standard deviation
from the mean the probability of a PTA increases by 16.7 percent (12.2 percentage points). For
an unnatural trading partner, the probability of a PTA increases by 13.6 percent (3.4 percentage
points). These large absolute and relative changes highlight that labor mobility has economic
meaningful implications on the probability of being in a PTA.
2.5.4 Goodness-of-Fit
This section checks how well the empirical model predicts actual PTAs. One common measure of
goodness-of-fit is the pseudo R-squared. By definition it is one minus the ratio of the log-likelihood
for the estimated model relative to the intercept only model. The pseudo R-squared ranges from
0.227 to 0.301 in the probit specifications from Table 2.2. These are lower than the values obtained
in BB (2004), 0.73 in their preferred specification, but are not unreasonable from other papers of
endogenous trade agreement formation, such as the “third” country effects literature (see Baier
et al., 2014).
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Another measure of goodness-of-fit is the percentage of PTAs correctly classified by the em-
pirical model. If the predicted probability for a PTA is above the cutoff of 0.5 then the country pair
is classified as a predicted PTA and no PTA when below the cutoff. As suggested by Wooldridge
(2000), one should examine the percentage of true positives and true negatives rather than the per-
centage of correctly classified since it may be misleading. To see this consider that 62.5 percent of
the sample does not have a PTA in the year 2015. If the model is unable to predict even one PTA,
then the overall percentage of correctly predicted would still be 62.5 percent.
In Table 2.3, I calculate the true positives and true negatives for the LMC AVERAGE (from
Table 2.2 columns 1 and 2) and the LMC MINIMUM with LMC MAXIMUM (from Table 2.2
columns 9 and 10) specifications. For comparison purposes, I also run a specification without any
labor mobility costs variables in Appendix 2.10.5. The LMC AVERAGE obtains 56.35 percent
for true positives and 85.27 percent for true negatives without political economy controls. With
political economy controls included, the number of true positives increases to 59.92 percent and
true negatives increases to 87.58 percent. This suggests some of the additional political economy
controls add predictive power to the model. When examining LMC MINIMUM with LMC MAX-
IMUM specification, a similar pattern persists. In addition to the cutoff value of 0.5, I use a priori
information regarding the number of PTAs from the sample to select an alternative cutoff as sug-
gested by Cohen et al. (2003). Since the mean value of PTA from Table 2.1 is 0.375, I also try
a cutoff value of 0.375. For all specifications, this yields a true positive rate of over 66 percent
and the true negatives goes to around 76 to 79 percent. For both cutoff values the percent of true
positives is always below the percent of true negatives. One possible explanation for the difference
in the true positive and true negatives is a PTA is a relatively uncommon event which makes it
more difficult to predict. As in the pseudo R-squared values, these values are below the BB (2004)
values of 85 percent for true positives and 97 percent for true negatives.
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2.5.5 Robustness
2.5.5.1 Alternative Measures of Labor Market Frictions
I use two additional indexes that capture the amount of labor market regulation: the Rigidity of
Employment from the World Bank Group (2010) and Labor Freedom from the Heritage Founda-
tion (2019). These capture components of the labor market that are related to intersectoral labor
mobility but mainly examine the rigidity of labor within a sector. The government may use reg-
ulations to help solve labor market failures, as reviewed in Botero et al. (2004). For example,
if a country has a highly immobile workforce, employers may discriminate against them and the
government may use additional regulations. Observing additional regulations may proxy for the
degree of labor mobility. Botero et al. (2004) do not find empirical support of this view. Thus, I
present the results without making strict assumptions regarding the relationship between the labor
mobility costs estimates from Artuc et al. (2015) and these labor market regulation indexes. The
goal of this exercise is to show labor frictions are potentially an important determinant of trade
liberalization.
The Rigidity of Employment index takes a value between 0 and 100 and is a simple average of:
(1) the difficulty of hiring index; (2) rigidity of hours index; (3) difficulty of redundancy index. As
the value of the index increases there exists more labor market regulation. The index is available
for the years 2004 to 2009. To simplify the analysis, I take a simple average of the index for each
country and use that for the analysis.
The Labor Freedom index is a simple average of six factors scores covering: (1) ratio of mini-
mum wage to the average value added per worker; (2) hindrance to hiring additional workers; (3)
rigidity of hours; (4) difficulty of firing redundant employees; (5) legally mandated notice period;
(6) mandatory severance pay. A higher value of the index indicates less rigid regulation in that
country. The index is available for the years 2013 to 2019. Since my outcome variable of PTA
status is for the year 2015, I take a simple average of the Labor Freedom index between the years
of 2013 to 2015. To make the analysis comparable with the the Rigidity of Employment index, I
transform the Labor Freedom index to the “inverse” Labor Freedom index by calculating 100 di-
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vided by the Labor Freedom index. This implies the Rigidity of Employment and “inverse” Labor
Freedom index are both increasing in labor market regulation.
Table 2.4 reruns the analysis from Table 2.2 with the LABOR INDEX variables instead of the
LMC variables.23 The calculation for the LABOR INDEX variables follows directly from the LMC
variables but use the Rigidity of Employment index values instead of the Artuc et al. (2015) labor
mobility costs estimates. In general the sign and significance of the LABOR INDEX variables are
sensitive to the political economy controls. Additionally, some results different than Table 2.2. For
example, the estimate on the average and minimum measures is now positive and significant in
the political economy regressions. This implies additional regulations are associated with a higher
likelihood of PTA formation. Since this index is not directly measuring intersectoral labor mobility,
it does not appear out of line that the results are not the same as the main results in Table 2.2. This
provides some evidence that labor market frictions are important for trade agreements.
Table 2.5 also reruns the analysis from Table 2.2 but with the FREEDOM INDEX. As above,
the calculation for the FREEDOM INDEX variables follows directly from the LMC variables but
use the “inverse” Labor Freedom index. Different from Table 2.4, the estimates on the average in
columns 1 and 2 are now negative. In other words, as the overall labor market for the pair become
less regulated the probability of a PTA increases. For columns 3 and 4, FREEDOM INDEX
DIFFERENCE implies that when the country pairs have more similar labor frictions the probability
of a PTA increases. The estimates in columns 7 to 10 imply low labor frictions in both countries
increases the likelihood of trade liberalization. However, there is some evidence of the minimum
moving in the opposite direction with positive estimates in columns 5-6 and 9-10. This provides
stronger evidence of the importance of labor frictions than the Rigidity of Employment index.
Overall, I view the results from both indexes as showing that labor frictions are potentially an
important factor for the formation of PTA, but again stress they do not actually measure reallocation
across sectors as do the LMC variables.
23Standard errors are not bootstrapped here since the index measures are not estimates from another model. Boot-
strapped results for Tables 2.4 and 2.5 yield similar standard errors and are available upon request.
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2.5.5.2 Measurement Error
Another possible source of endogeneity is measurement error in the labor mobility costs estimates
from Artuc et al. (2015). To address this I transform the continuous labor mobility costs variables
into dichotomous variables. This also only requires the general ordering of the labor mobility
costs to remain unchanged over the sample period. The LMC BINARY variables equal to 1 if the
country pair is in the bottom 33rd percentile for the corresponding labor mobility costs variable
from Table 2.2, and 0 otherwise. For example, LMC AVERAGE BINARY equals to 1 if countries
i and j have a LMC AVERAGE that is in the bottom 33rd percentile, and 0 otherwise. The country
pairs in the bottom 33rd percentile have less rigid labor than country pairs above the 33rd percentile.
Moreover, the interpretation is now relative to the omitted country pairs with a labor mobility costs
variable above the 33rd percentile. Thus, the predicted sign of the LMC AVERAGE BINARY is
the opposite of the LMC AVERAGE variable from the main probit results in Table 2.2.
Table 2.6 presents the results with the binary transformation of the labor mobility costs vari-
ables. In columns 1 and 2, the positive sign on LMC AVERAGE BINARY indicates that countries i
and j are more likely to join a PTA relative to the higher overall mobility costs countries. However,
the estimate in column 2 is insignificant at the 10 percent level. These estimates follow the predic-
tions from the main analysis in Table 2.2. LMC DIFFERENCE BINARY has a negative sign and
implies the country pair with more different labor mobility costs are more likely to form a PTA,
which is also consistent with the main probit results. The LMC MINIMUM BINARY is positive
in all columns except for column 6, following the main results. Counter to the main results, LMC
MAXIMUM BINARY is negative. However, I note this specification is asking even more of the
data since much of the variation is reduced with the binary transformation.
2.5.5.3 Non-WTO Members
Four countries (Azerbaijan, Ethiopia, Iran, Syria) in the sample are not part of the WTO as of 2015.
The WTO only allows member countries to depart from the MFN rule if a “substantial” number of
goods receive decreased tariffs and MFN tariffs on non-PTA members are not raised. The terms of
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when a PTA is allowed are spelled out in: (i) Paragraphs 4 to 10 of Article XXIV of GATT 1994;
(ii) Paragraph 2(c) of the so-called Enabling Clause; (iii) Article V of GATS. It may be a concern
that non-WTO countries that join PTAs do not need to lower their tariffs and they join PTAs for
alternative reasons. Since PTAs are utilized to proxy for tariff decreases, I check the robustness of
the results from Table 2.2 when these four countries are omitted.
The probit regressions with the four non-WTO members omitted are in Table 2.7. The sign
of the labor mobility costs variables in the bottom four rows are in line with the Table 2.2 results.
The significance of some of the estimates are slightly different. This is to be excepted with the
decreases in sample size. Thus, the results are robust to the exclusion of non-WTO members.
2.5.5.4 Bilateral versus Multilateral Agreements
There may be a possible concern that many of the trade agreements involve more than two coun-
tries. I follow BB (2004) and treat entering a PTA as a bilateral decision and not a multilateral one.
BB (2004) use the argument that, “every country in the EU has the ability to veto an FTA with a
nonmember. In effect, every country in the EU decides bilaterally whether the net national welfare
gain from an FTA with another country warrants formation” (pg. 34). Thus, the identification in
this paper is silent on bilateral versus multilateral agreements.
2.6 Additional Evidence: MFN Bound Tariffs
Studying domestic intersectoral labor mobility and trade liberalization does not need to be limited
to PTAs. Countries also participate in other types of liberalization, such as WTO negotiations.
When countries engage in WTO negotiations, the upper bounds on possible applied tariffs are
determined, known as bound MFN tariffs. The prediction regarding the effect of labor mobility on
trade liberalization suggests bound MFN tariffs should capture domestic concerns about the ease
or difficulty of reallocating labor. Specifically, the bound tariffs should be higher when the labor
market is more rigid.
The most recent bound MFN tariffs are available from the WTO’s Consolidated Tariff Sched-
ules and accessible through the World Integrated Trade Solution. All other data sources are dis-
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cussed in section 2.4. Bound tariffs are only available for WTO members, which results in a sample
of 52 countries. To conduct cross country analysis it requires comparable tariff categories across
countries. The most detailed tariffs that are comparable across countries are recorded at the Har-
monized System 6-digit (HS6) level, which I refer to as “products”.24 Some bound tariffs are more
detailed than the HS6. The common strategy of taking a simple average across HS6 categories
for each country is used. Additionally, I use only ad valorem tariffs to avoid the challenges of ad
valorem equivalent tariffs (see Irwin, 1998).
To examine the relationship of bound MFN tariffs and labor mobility costs, I use a one-way
fixed-effects model that uses variation across countries within each product:
τig = β1ln(LMCi)+β2ln(RGDPi)+ γg + εig. (2.12)
The dependent variable, τig, is the bound MFN tariff for importer i of product g. LMCi is the
country’s labor mobility costs and is the main variable of interest. Support for the prediction that
more rigid labor markets are associated with higher bound tariffs is given by β̂1 > 0. RGDPi is
the real GDP and controls for importer market power. The literature that examines the difference
between bound and applied MFN tariffs, known as tariff water, has shown that the bound MFN
tariffs are decreasing in importer market power (Beshkar et al., 2015). This suggests that β̂2 < 0. I
take the natural logarithm of both variables. This helps with the interpretation of the coefficients by
using percentage changes (e.g., the marginal effect if the independent variable doubles). Finally,
γg are product fixed effects that control for unobservables that vary by product but not by country.
Since the estimates of labor mobility costs vary at the country level and the regression is at a more
refined product level, the standard errors are two-way clustered by country and product.25
The OLS results are in Table 2.8. Column 1 includes the labor mobility costs variable vari-
able with product fixed effects. The estimate is positive and significant at the 5 percent level,
24Some tariffs use different revisions of the HS6. To account for this all products are converted to the HS-1988/92
revision.
25Some countries are EU members that have a common MFN tariff. As a robustness check, I cluster the standard
errors by whether countries share a common MFN requirement. In other words, countries in the EU are treated as
single cluster. The results are robust to this alternative clustering, and available upon request.
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as predicted. When adding the real GDP control in column 2, the estimate on labor mobility
costs is still positive and now significant at the 10 percent level. The estimate on the real GDP
is negative and consistent with the tariff water literature. The results imply when labor mobil-
ity costs doubles, it is associated with a 9.107 percentage point increase in bound MFN tariffs.
Since the mean bound tariff is 14.902 percentage points, this corresponds to a 61 percent increase
(i.e., (9.107/14.902)×100). Thus, greater labor frictions are associated with higher bound tariffs,
consistent with the country pair analysis that examines PTA formation.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper examines the relationship between domestic intersectoral labor mobility and trade liber-
alization. I show the probability of a PTA increases when the average labor mobility of the country
pair increases. Examining the asymmetries of labor mobility within a pair, I find that labor only
needs to be sufficiently mobile in one country for a PTA to occur. Additionally, using measures of
labor frictions from the World Bank and the Heritage Foundation, I provide more support that labor
frictions are a potentially important determinant of trade liberalization. I also show the results are
consistent with the tariffs from WTO negotiations. More rigid labor markets are associated with
higher MFN bound tariffs.
These results provide evidence of a positive relationship between labor mobility and trade
liberalization. This is consistent with the model from Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) and
standard trade models with labor frictions. Thus, it is not possible to say these results provide
direct support for the domestic-commitment motive, but they are consistent with the prediction.
There are several possible channels for future research. First, finding a measure of intersectoral
capital mobility would be of great interest to include in this empirical framework. This would
provide for an even stronger test of the theory. Second, PTAs include additional behind-the-border
policies besides tariff decreases. Some agreements are “shallow”, while others are “deeper” (Bag-
well et al., 2016). A recent literature has attempted to measure the depth of trade agreements (Dür
et al., 2014). Examining the relationship between factor mobility and the depth of PTAs would be
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interesting, and may yield additional insights. Finally, there are the dynamics of the tariff reduc-
tions that are modeled in Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007). The cross-sectional analysis here is
not able to speak to these dynamics and suggests that future panel studies may be needed.
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2.8 Figures
Figure 2.1: Number of Country Pairs in a PTA by Year
Note: Calculated using active agreements as of March 6, 2019. Country pairs are non-directional. Country pairs
that show up multiple times due to being active in many PTAs during the same time period are counted separately.
Data from the WTO’s “Regional Trade Agreement Database” (http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainPTAHome.aspx).
Calculations by author.
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Figure 2.2: Map of Labor Mobility Costs Estimates
Source: Artuc et al. (2015).
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Figure 2.3: Kernel Density of LMC AVERAGE by PTA Status
Note: “PTA” includes country pairs that do have an agreement. “No PTA” includes country pairs that do not have an
agreement.
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Figure 2.4: Kernel Density of LMC MINIMUM by PTA Status
Note: “PTA” includes country pairs that do have an agreement. “No PTA” includes country pairs that do not have an
agreement.
99
Figure 2.5: Response Probabilities
Note: 95 percent confidence intervals denoted with vertical bands. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 999 replica-




Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Trade Agreement Status
PTA 0.375 0.484 0 1
Labor Mobility Costs
LMC AVERAGE 3.203 0.738 1.41 5.06
LMC DIFFERENCE 1.045 0.769 0 3.78
LMC MINIMUM 2.785 0.731 1.29 5.06
LMC MAXIMUM 3.830 0.742 1.43 5.07
Baier and Bergstrand (2004)
NATURAL -8.529 0.886 -9.89 -4.39
CONTINENT 0.272 0.445 0 1
REMOTE 2.351 3.851 0 9.39
GDP 50.037 2.515 42.4 57.7
GDP DIFFERENCE 2.107 1.534 .00137 8.28
GDPPC DIFFERENCE 1.083 0.776 .00201 3.26
SQGDPPC DIFFERENCE 1.775 2.113 4.02e-06 10.6
ROW GDPPC DIFFERENCE 0.958 0.447 .0353 2.34
Political Economy
GDPPC 17.533 1.260 13.9 20.2
PTA TRENDS 8.665 11.908 0 33
POLITICAL DISTANCE 9.177 6.928 0 20
DEMOCRACY 0.269 0.444 0 1
COMMON COLONIZER 0.024 0.152 0 1
COLONY 0.028 0.164 0 1
COMMON LANGUAGE 0.074 0.262 0 1
LEGAL ORIGIN 0.287 0.453 0 1
MILITARY ALLIANCE 0.047 0.212 0 1
Note: All variables have 1,489 observations except for POLITICAL DIS-
TANCE and DEMOCRACY have 1,434 each.
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Table 2.2: Probit Results for the Probability of a PTA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CONSTANT 8.031∗∗∗ 4.998∗∗∗ 5.810∗∗∗ 3.497∗∗∗ 7.395∗∗∗ 4.516∗∗∗ 7.531∗∗∗ 4.129∗∗∗ 7.808∗∗∗ 4.301∗∗∗
(0.956) (1.352) (0.953) (1.303) (0.957) (1.311) (0.989) (1.392) (0.990) (1.387)
NATURAL 0.793∗∗∗ 0.696∗∗∗ 0.789∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗ 0.795∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗ 0.695∗∗∗ 0.801∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.063) (0.059) (0.063) (0.060) (0.063) (0.059) (0.063) (0.060) (0.063)
REMOTE -0.010 0.013 -0.014 0.012 -0.014 0.011 -0.015 0.012 -0.014 0.011
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
GDP -0.006 -0.059∗∗∗ 0.015 -0.054∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.055∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.058∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.054∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.020) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015) (0.020) (0.015) (0.020) (0.015) (0.021)
GDP DIFFERENCE -0.074∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗ -0.048∗ -0.102∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.030) (0.026) (0.030) (0.026) (0.030) (0.026) (0.030) (0.026) (0.030)
GDPPC DIFFERENCE 0.669∗∗∗ 0.851∗∗∗ 0.677∗∗∗ 0.862∗∗∗ 0.729∗∗∗ 0.871∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗∗ 0.864∗∗∗ 0.732∗∗∗ 0.869∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.212) (0.195) (0.212) (0.197) (0.213) (0.198) (0.213) (0.197) (0.213)
SQGDPPC DIFFERENCE -0.358∗∗∗ -0.380∗∗∗ -0.361∗∗∗ -0.381∗∗∗ -0.376∗∗∗ -0.384∗∗∗ -0.354∗∗∗ -0.379∗∗∗ -0.373∗∗∗ -0.384∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.080) (0.078) (0.080) (0.078) (0.080) (0.078) (0.080) (0.078) (0.080)
ROW GDPPC DIFFERENCE -0.297∗∗∗ -0.337∗∗∗ -0.284∗∗∗ -0.321∗∗∗ -0.291∗∗∗ -0.328∗∗∗ -0.273∗∗∗ -0.320∗∗∗ -0.288∗∗∗ -0.327∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.112) (0.096) (0.111) (0.097) (0.111) (0.098) (0.112) (0.097) (0.111)
GDPPC 0.231∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) (0.060)
PTA TRENDS 0.022∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
POLITICAL DISTANCE 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.000
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
DEMOCRACY 0.086 0.030 0.052 0.078 0.041
(0.153) (0.155) (0.153) (0.153) (0.156)
COMMON COLONIZER 0.012 -0.028 -0.006 -0.000 -0.013
(0.260) (0.265) (0.263) (0.265) (0.264)
COLONY 0.161 0.112 0.135 0.115 0.132
(0.287) (0.284) (0.288) (0.283) (0.288)
COMMON LANGUAGE 0.498∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗
(0.169) (0.168) (0.169) (0.167) (0.169)
LEGAL ORIGIN -0.231∗∗ -0.236∗∗ -0.226∗∗ -0.243∗∗∗ -0.226∗∗
(0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.094)
MILITARY ALLIANCE -0.445∗∗ -0.383∗ -0.409∗ -0.399∗ -0.403∗
(0.209) (0.209) (0.209) (0.210) (0.210)
LMC AVERAGE -0.305∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗
(0.051) (0.058)
LMC DIFFERENCE 0.098∗∗ 0.082
(0.048) (0.053)
LMC MINIMUM -0.279∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗ -0.250∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗
(0.053) (0.057) (0.058) (0.064)
LMC MAXIMUM -0.182∗∗∗ -0.026 -0.071 0.027
(0.048) (0.055) (0.054) (0.061)
Pseudo R-squared 0.241 0.301 0.227 0.299 0.239 0.300 0.231 0.298 0.240 0.300
Log likelihood -748.1 -658.2 -762.0 -660.0 -749.6 -659.0 -758.2 -661.1 -748.9 -658.9
Observations 1,489 1,434 1,489 1,434 1,489 1,434 1,489 1,434 1,489 1,434
Dependent variable: PTA status. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (999 replications). Odd specifications control for Baier and Bergstrand (2004)
controls. Even specifications include additional Political Economy controls.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
102
Table 2.3: Classification of PTAs for Probit Model
LMC Specification: AVERAGE MIN and MAX
True Positive 0.5635 0.6708 0.5992 0.7233 0.5707 0.6601 0.6031 0.7195
True Negative 0.8527 0.7602 0.8758 0.7901 0.8645 0.7677 0.8802 0.7846
Correctly Classified 0.7441 0.7267 0.7748 0.7657 0.7542 0.7273 0.7789 0.7608
Baier and Bergstrand (2004) Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Political Economy Controls NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Classification Cutoff 0.5 0.375 0.5 0.375 0.5 0.375 0.5 0.375
Note: Numbers are in decimal form (0.5 = 50%). Specifications correspond with Table 2.2.
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Table 2.4: Probit Results for the Probability of a PTA with the Rigidity of Employment Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CONSTANT 4.978∗∗∗ 2.365∗ 5.374∗∗∗ 3.700∗∗∗ 5.513∗∗∗ 2.631∗∗ 5.489∗∗∗ 3.472∗∗∗ 5.535∗∗∗ 2.676∗∗
(1.032) (1.339) (0.990) (1.263) (1.021) (1.336) (1.042) (1.308) (1.048) (1.352)
NATURAL 0.785∗∗∗ 0.649∗∗∗ 0.801∗∗∗ 0.680∗∗∗ 0.806∗∗∗ 0.647∗∗∗ 0.802∗∗∗ 0.681∗∗∗ 0.806∗∗∗ 0.647∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.068) (0.062) (0.067) (0.064) (0.069) (0.063) (0.068) (0.064) (0.069)
REMOTE -0.020 0.015 -0.021 0.011 -0.022∗ 0.014 -0.022∗ 0.013 -0.022∗ 0.014
(0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015)
GDP 0.030∗ -0.059∗∗∗ 0.027∗ -0.062∗∗∗ 0.027∗ -0.063∗∗∗ 0.027 -0.057∗∗∗ 0.027 -0.063∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.020) (0.016) (0.020) (0.016) (0.020) (0.016) (0.020) (0.016) (0.020)
GDP DIFFERENCE -0.071∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.030) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.030)
GDPPC DIFFERENCE 0.687∗∗∗ 0.895∗∗∗ 0.685∗∗∗ 0.862∗∗∗ 0.686∗∗∗ 0.867∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗ 0.863∗∗∗ 0.686∗∗∗ 0.866∗∗∗
(0.191) (0.207) (0.191) (0.206) (0.191) (0.207) (0.191) (0.206) (0.191) (0.207)
SQGDPPC DIFFERENCE -0.357∗∗∗ -0.380∗∗∗ -0.356∗∗∗ -0.375∗∗∗ -0.356∗∗∗ -0.378∗∗∗ -0.356∗∗∗ -0.380∗∗∗ -0.356∗∗∗ -0.378∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.080) (0.077) (0.080) (0.077) (0.080) (0.077) (0.080) (0.077) (0.080)
ROW GDPPC DIFFERENCE -0.245∗∗ -0.309∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗ -0.312∗∗∗ -0.243∗∗ -0.322∗∗∗ -0.243∗∗ -0.324∗∗∗ -0.242∗∗ -0.321∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.111) (0.101) (0.111) (0.101) (0.111) (0.101) (0.111) (0.101) (0.111)
GDPPC 0.302∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.056) (0.058) (0.055) (0.058)
PTA TRENDS 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
POLITICAL DISTANCE -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.002
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
DEMOCRACY 0.053 0.040 0.028 0.070 0.026
(0.141) (0.141) (0.142) (0.141) (0.142)
COMMON COLONIZER 0.085 0.030 0.078 0.004 0.079
(0.285) (0.282) (0.284) (0.281) (0.284)
COLONY 0.072 0.109 0.076 0.098 0.078
(0.251) (0.250) (0.250) (0.250) (0.250)
COMMON LANGUAGE 0.552∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗ 0.566∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗
(0.171) (0.171) (0.172) (0.171) (0.173)
LEGAL ORIGIN -0.289∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗ -0.290∗∗∗ -0.252∗∗ -0.290∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.102) (0.103) (0.102) (0.103)
MILITARY ALLIANCE -0.285 -0.368∗ -0.327∗ -0.382∗∗ -0.327∗
(0.197) (0.194) (0.196) (0.193) (0.196)
LABOR INDEX AVERAGE 0.004 0.011∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
LABOR INDEX DIFFERENCE 0.001 -0.006∗
(0.003) (0.003)
LABOR INDEX MINIMUM -0.002 0.009∗∗∗ -0.001 0.010∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
LABOR INDEX MAXIMUM -0.001 0.004 -0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Pseudo R-squared 0.224 0.304 0.223 0.299 0.223 0.302 0.223 0.298 0.223 0.302
Log likelihood -730.7 -655.2 -731.6 -659.5 -731.5 -657.2 -731.6 -660.6 -731.5 -657.2
Observations 1,434 1,434 1,434 1,434 1,434 1,434 1,434 1,434 1,434 1,434
Dependent variable: PTA status. Standard errors in parentheses. Odd specifications control for Baier and Bergstrand (2004) controls. Even specifications
include additional Political Economy controls. LABOR INDEX variables are calculated similar to LMC variables, but with the Rigidity of Employment index
from the World Bank. One country from the Artuc et al. (2015) sample is missing this index: Malta.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.5: Probit Results for the Probability of a PTA with the Inverse of the Labor Freedom Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CONSTANT 6.705∗∗∗ 4.179∗∗∗ 6.506∗∗∗ 4.297∗∗∗ 6.090∗∗∗ 3.131∗∗ 7.224∗∗∗ 4.899∗∗∗ 6.985∗∗∗ 4.131∗∗∗
(0.969) (1.304) (0.951) (1.277) (0.956) (1.297) (0.973) (1.302) (0.981) (1.330)
NATURAL 0.804∗∗∗ 0.695∗∗∗ 0.790∗∗∗ 0.696∗∗∗ 0.798∗∗∗ 0.685∗∗∗ 0.798∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗ 0.794∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.067) (0.062) (0.068) (0.061) (0.067) (0.062) (0.067) (0.062) (0.068)
REMOTE -0.014 0.012 -0.013 0.010 -0.014 0.012 -0.012 0.011 -0.013 0.010
(0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015)
GDP 0.011 -0.056∗∗∗ 0.008 -0.065∗∗∗ 0.012 -0.065∗∗∗ 0.008 -0.055∗∗∗ 0.008 -0.066∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.020) (0.015) (0.020) (0.015) (0.020) (0.015) (0.020) (0.015) (0.020)
GDP DIFFERENCE -0.051∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.049∗ -0.097∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.029) (0.026) (0.030) (0.025) (0.029) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026) (0.030)
GDPPC DIFFERENCE 0.678∗∗∗ 0.860∗∗∗ 0.710∗∗∗ 0.930∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗ 0.865∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗∗ 0.901∗∗∗ 0.729∗∗∗ 0.927∗∗∗
(0.188) (0.206) (0.190) (0.208) (0.188) (0.206) (0.189) (0.206) (0.190) (0.208)
SQGDPPC DIFFERENCE -0.357∗∗∗ -0.380∗∗∗ -0.364∗∗∗ -0.393∗∗∗ -0.353∗∗∗ -0.379∗∗∗ -0.364∗∗∗ -0.387∗∗∗ -0.367∗∗∗ -0.392∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.080) (0.077) (0.080) (0.076) (0.080) (0.076) (0.080) (0.076) (0.080)
ROW GDPPC DIFFERENCE -0.262∗∗∗ -0.317∗∗∗ -0.278∗∗∗ -0.318∗∗∗ -0.278∗∗∗ -0.330∗∗∗ -0.247∗∗ -0.306∗∗∗ -0.262∗∗∗ -0.320∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.111) (0.099) (0.112) (0.098) (0.111) (0.099) (0.111) (0.099) (0.112)
GDPPC 0.248∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.055) (0.057) (0.055) (0.057)
PTA TRENDS 0.023∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
POLITICAL DISTANCE 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.003
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
DEMOCRACY 0.073 0.035 0.049 0.068 0.032
(0.140) (0.141) (0.141) (0.140) (0.141)
COMMON COLONIZER -0.027 0.010 0.047 -0.052 0.020
(0.281) (0.279) (0.281) (0.280) (0.280)
COLONY 0.113 0.070 0.085 0.113 0.067
(0.250) (0.252) (0.251) (0.250) (0.252)
COMMON LANGUAGE 0.487∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗∗ 0.552∗∗∗
(0.170) (0.171) (0.171) (0.170) (0.171)
LEGAL ORIGIN -0.236∗∗ -0.301∗∗∗ -0.281∗∗∗ -0.241∗∗ -0.307∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.103) (0.103) (0.102) (0.104)
MILITARY ALLIANCE -0.406∗∗ -0.271 -0.366∗ -0.346∗ -0.270
(0.193) (0.197) (0.194) (0.194) (0.197)
FREEDOM INDEX AVERAGE -0.296∗∗ -0.113
(0.119) (0.133)
FREEDOM INDEX DIFFERENCE -0.560∗∗∗ -0.620∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.126)
FREEDOM INDEX MINIMUM 0.016 0.343∗∗ 0.379∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗
(0.128) (0.145) (0.147) (0.164)
FREEDOM INDEX MAXIMUM -0.514∗∗∗ -0.359∗∗∗ -0.666∗∗∗ -0.595∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.117) (0.130) (0.137)
Pseudo R-squared 0.228 0.298 0.238 0.312 0.225 0.301 0.236 0.303 0.240 0.312
Log likelihood -760.9 -660.8 -751.1 -647.9 -764.0 -658.4 -752.4 -656.2 -749.1 -647.8
Observations 1,489 1,434 1,489 1,434 1,489 1,434 1,489 1,434 1,489 1,434
Dependent variable: PTA status. Standard errors in parentheses. Odd specifications control for Baier and Bergstrand (2004) controls. Even specifications include
additional Political Economy controls. FREEDOM INDEX variables are calculated similar to LMC variables, but with the inverse of the Labor Freedom index from
the Heritage Foundation.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.6: Probit Results for the Probability of a PTA with Binary LMC Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CONSTANT 6.450∗∗∗ 4.050∗∗∗ 6.046∗∗∗ 3.703∗∗∗ 6.393∗∗∗ 3.837∗∗∗ 5.977∗∗∗ 3.586∗∗∗ 6.252∗∗∗ 3.675∗∗∗
(0.933) (1.280) (0.941) (1.283) (0.936) (1.279) (0.940) (1.290) (0.936) (1.284)
NATURAL 0.806∗∗∗ 0.696∗∗∗ 0.795∗∗∗ 0.692∗∗∗ 0.808∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗∗ 0.717∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.063) (0.059) (0.063) (0.059) (0.063) (0.060) (0.065) (0.060) (0.065)
REMOTE -0.014 0.012 -0.014 0.011 -0.015 0.012 -0.015 0.011 -0.017 0.010
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
GDP 0.006 -0.058∗∗∗ 0.014 -0.055∗∗∗ 0.007 -0.058∗∗∗ 0.019 -0.054∗∗∗ 0.015 -0.053∗∗
(0.015) (0.020) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015) (0.021)
GDP DIFFERENCE -0.061∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.049∗ -0.101∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗ -0.100∗∗∗ -0.048∗ -0.095∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.030) (0.026) (0.030) (0.026) (0.030) (0.026) (0.030) (0.026) (0.030)
GDPPC DIFFERENCE 0.663∗∗∗ 0.856∗∗∗ 0.678∗∗∗ 0.871∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗ 0.862∗∗∗ 0.652∗∗∗ 0.849∗∗∗ 0.686∗∗∗ 0.845∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.212) (0.195) (0.212) (0.197) (0.213) (0.194) (0.211) (0.194) (0.212)
SQGDPPC DIFFERENCE -0.352∗∗∗ -0.378∗∗∗ -0.358∗∗∗ -0.383∗∗∗ -0.364∗∗∗ -0.378∗∗∗ -0.348∗∗∗ -0.375∗∗∗ -0.362∗∗∗ -0.375∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.080) (0.077) (0.079) (0.078) (0.080) (0.077) (0.079) (0.077) (0.079)
ROW GDPPC DIFFERENCE -0.299∗∗∗ -0.327∗∗∗ -0.283∗∗∗ -0.319∗∗∗ -0.278∗∗∗ -0.318∗∗∗ -0.277∗∗∗ -0.311∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗ -0.312∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.112) (0.096) (0.111) (0.097) (0.111) (0.096) (0.112) (0.097) (0.112)
GDPPC 0.250∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.061) (0.061)
PTA TRENDS 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
POLITICAL DISTANCE 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
DEMOCRACY 0.065 0.037 0.071 0.021 0.011
(0.152) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.155)
COMMON COLONIZER -0.007 -0.006 -0.003 -0.040 -0.055
(0.263) (0.265) (0.265) (0.273) (0.273)
COLONY 0.135 0.089 0.108 0.042 0.043
(0.282) (0.285) (0.281) (0.279) (0.281)
COMMON LANGUAGE 0.488∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗ 0.496∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 0.484∗∗∗
(0.167) (0.168) (0.168) (0.169) (0.170)
LEGAL ORIGIN -0.238∗∗ -0.236∗∗ -0.247∗∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗ -0.258∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.093) (0.095) (0.093) (0.095)
MILITARY ALLIANCE -0.409∗ -0.391∗ -0.391∗ -0.381∗ -0.387∗
(0.209) (0.209) (0.210) (0.210) (0.210)
LMC AVERAGE BINARY 0.256∗∗∗ 0.104
(0.079) (0.091)
LMC DIFFERENCE BINARY -0.169∗∗ -0.154∗
(0.076) (0.084)
LMC MINIMUM BINARY 0.302∗∗∗ -0.019 0.384∗∗∗ 0.065
(0.079) (0.093) (0.083) (0.098)
LMC MAXIMUM BINARY -0.200∗∗ -0.299∗∗∗ -0.305∗∗∗ -0.315∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.093) (0.089) (0.098)
Pseudo R-squared 0.230 0.298 0.227 0.299 0.232 0.298 0.228 0.304 0.238 0.304
Log likelihood -759.0 -660.5 -761.7 -659.5 -757.0 -661.1 -760.9 -655.3 -750.5 -655.1
Observations 1,489 1,434 1,489 1,434 1,489 1,434 1,489 1,434 1,489 1,434
Dependent variable: PTA status. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (999 replications). Odd specifications control for Baier and Bergstrand (2004)
controls. Even specifications include additional Political Economy controls. LMC variables are transformed to binary variables using the 33rd percentile of the
original LMC variables. If the country pair is below the cutoff then the LMC binary variable equals to 1, and 0 otherwise.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.7: Probit Results for the Probability of a PTA with Non-WTO Countries Omitted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CONSTANT 9.106∗∗∗ 6.124∗∗∗ 7.423∗∗∗ 4.904∗∗∗ 8.720∗∗∗ 5.792∗∗∗ 8.379∗∗∗ 4.705∗∗∗ 8.616∗∗∗ 4.884∗∗∗
(1.049) (1.524) (1.036) (1.472) (1.042) (1.483) (1.106) (1.585) (1.103) (1.586)
NATURAL 0.953∗∗∗ 0.858∗∗∗ 0.951∗∗∗ 0.845∗∗∗ 0.956∗∗∗ 0.859∗∗∗ 0.967∗∗∗ 0.846∗∗∗ 0.955∗∗∗ 0.845∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.081) (0.072) (0.081) (0.072) (0.081) (0.072) (0.081) (0.072) (0.081)
REMOTE -0.034∗∗ -0.006 -0.037∗∗ -0.008 -0.037∗∗ -0.008 -0.038∗∗ -0.007 -0.037∗∗ -0.008
(0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018)
GDP 0.002 -0.042∗ 0.017 -0.036 0.006 -0.039∗ 0.009 -0.039∗ 0.007 -0.036
(0.016) (0.021) (0.016) (0.022) (0.016) (0.022) (0.017) (0.022) (0.017) (0.022)
GDP DIFFERENCE -0.108∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.034) (0.028) (0.033) (0.028) (0.034) (0.028) (0.034) (0.028) (0.033)
GDPPC DIFFERENCE 0.671∗∗∗ 0.853∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗ 0.843∗∗∗ 0.714∗∗∗ 0.861∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗ 0.836∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗ 0.843∗∗∗
(0.209) (0.242) (0.208) (0.243) (0.210) (0.242) (0.209) (0.243) (0.210) (0.243)
SQGDPPC DIFFERENCE -0.377∗∗∗ -0.415∗∗∗ -0.374∗∗∗ -0.413∗∗∗ -0.390∗∗∗ -0.416∗∗∗ -0.370∗∗∗ -0.406∗∗∗ -0.390∗∗∗ -0.412∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.090) (0.082) (0.090) (0.083) (0.090) (0.082) (0.090) (0.083) (0.091)
ROW GDPPC DIFFERENCE -0.298∗∗∗ -0.300∗∗∗ -0.284∗∗∗ -0.286∗∗ -0.287∗∗∗ -0.291∗∗ -0.282∗∗∗ -0.284∗∗ -0.287∗∗∗ -0.286∗∗
(0.104) (0.115) (0.105) (0.115) (0.103) (0.114) (0.104) (0.115) (0.104) (0.115)
GDPPC 0.198∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.056) (0.058) (0.059) (0.059)
PTA TRENDS 0.020∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
POLITICAL DISTANCE 0.011 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.008
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
DEMOCRACY 0.166 0.106 0.145 0.137 0.106
(0.159) (0.161) (0.159) (0.160) (0.161)
COMMON COLONIZER -0.060 -0.106 -0.073 -0.081 -0.106
(0.361) (0.368) (0.365) (0.367) (0.368)
COLONY -0.118 -0.151 -0.136 -0.165 -0.151
(0.306) (0.304) (0.306) (0.301) (0.306)
COMMON LANGUAGE 0.544∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗
(0.197) (0.199) (0.197) (0.197) (0.199)
LEGAL ORIGIN -0.241∗∗ -0.239∗∗ -0.239∗∗ -0.253∗∗ -0.239∗∗
(0.109) (0.108) (0.109) (0.108) (0.109)
MILITARY ALLIANCE -0.641∗∗∗ -0.595∗∗ -0.615∗∗∗ -0.592∗∗ -0.594∗∗
(0.232) (0.233) (0.233) (0.234) (0.233)
LMC AVERAGE -0.231∗∗∗ -0.097
(0.053) (0.068)
LMC DIFFERENCE 0.124∗∗ 0.117∗∗
(0.053) (0.058)
LMC MINIMUM -0.214∗∗∗ -0.071 -0.222∗∗∗ -0.116∗
(0.056) (0.064) (0.063) (0.070)
LMC MAXIMUM -0.080 0.072 0.019 0.119∗
(0.054) (0.061) (0.061) (0.067)
Pseudo R-squared 0.273 0.330 0.267 0.331 0.272 0.329 0.265 0.329 0.272 0.331
Log likelihood -629.3 -553.8 -634.5 -552.8 -630.1 -554.2 -636.2 -554.2 -630.1 -552.8
Observations 1,275 1,224 1,275 1,224 1,275 1,224 1,275 1,224 1,275 1,224
Dependent variable: PTA status. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (999 replications). Odd specifications control for Baier and Bergstrand (2004)
controls. Even specifications include additional Political Economy controls. Non-WTO countries omitted from Artuc et al. (2015) sample: Azerbaijan,
Ethiopia, Iran, Syria.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Product FEs Yes Yes
Dependent variable: Bound MFN tar-
iffs. Standard errors in parentheses
and two-way clustered by country and
product. Number of country clusters is
52 and product clusters is 4,944. Non-
WTO members are dropped: Azerbai-
jan, Ethiopia, Iran, Syria.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2.10 Appendix
2.10.1 Labor Mobility Estimates
Table 2.A.1: Estimates of Labor Mobility Costs
Country Mobility Costs Standard Error Country Mobility Costs Standard Error
Estonia 1.29 0.26 Denmark 3.25 0.44
Finland 1.43 0.35 Russia 3.28 0.17
Germany 1.7 0.76 Oman 3.29 0.13
Netherlands 1.82 1.49 Egypt 3.4 0.5
Austria 1.9 0.29 Indonesia 3.46 0.33
Ireland 2.02 1.09 Chile 3.47 0.78
Argentina 2.13 0.12 Spain 3.54 0.41
United States 2.21 0.53 France 3.59 0.19
Norway 2.52 0.3 Ecuador 3.59 0.25
Singapore 2.57 1.99 Malta 3.61 0.34
Poland 2.66 0.33 United Kingdom 3.72 0.37
South Africa 2.68 0.37 South Korea 3.77 0.99
Trinidad and Tobago 2.74 0.57 Australia 3.77 0.16
China 2.75 0.35 Costa Rica 3.83 0.37
Slovenia 2.76 2.01 Senegal 3.83 0.02
Belgium 2.81 0.41 Colombia 3.96 0.42
Mongolia 2.82 0.05 Lithuania 4 0.44
India 2.87 0.17 Georgia 4.02 0.69
Kazakhstan 2.88 0.3 Cameroon 4.2 0.01
Czech Republic 2.92 0.75 Azerbaijan 4.47 0.78
El Salvador 2.93 0.3 Ethiopia 4.52 0.05
Syria 2.94 0.2 Latvia 4.58 0.29
Italy 2.95 0.67 Ukraine 4.62 0.3
Romania 3 0.47 Bulgaria 4.67 2.3
Sweden 3 0.56 Mauritania 4.79 0.26
Hungary 3.16 0.77 Bangladesh 4.89 0.14
Bolivia 3.2 0.34 Philippines 5.06 0.64
Iran 3.24 0.22 Jordan 5.07 0.97
Note: Countries in ascending order of labor mobility costs.
Source: Artuc et al. (2015).
2.10.2 OLS and Logit Results
Tables 2.A.2 and 2.A.3 present the OLS and logit results, respectively. The estimated coefficients
are robust to these specifications. The OLS estimates have the straightforward marginal effect
interpretation, but fail to bound the predicted probability between 0 and 1. This assumes the
variable of interest only shows up once. For example, the GDPPC DIFFERENCE shows up twice
in the regression. For the marginal effect of this it requires the derivative to be taken. The logit
interpretation is similar to the probit model and only the sign and significance can be interpreted.
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Table 2.A.2: OLS Results for the Probability of a PTA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CONSTANT 2.827∗∗∗ 1.984∗∗∗ 2.263∗∗∗ 1.629∗∗∗ 2.676∗∗∗ 1.895∗∗∗ 2.692∗∗∗ 1.777∗∗∗ 2.757∗∗∗ 1.829∗∗∗
(0.271) (0.335) (0.270) (0.320) (0.268) (0.324) (0.277) (0.338) (0.276) (0.338)
NATURAL 0.241∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
REMOTE -0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
GDP -0.000 -0.013∗∗∗ 0.006 -0.012∗∗ 0.002 -0.012∗∗ 0.002 -0.013∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.012∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
GDP DIFFERENCE -0.021∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
GDPPC DIFFERENCE 0.133∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
SQGDPPC DIFFERENCE -0.074∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
ROW GDPPC DIFFERENCE -0.096∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030) (0.027) (0.029)
GDPPC 0.053∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
PTA TRENDS 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
POLITICAL DISTANCE 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
DEMOCRACY 0.049 0.033 0.040 0.046 0.036
(0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041)
COMMON COLONIZER -0.033 -0.044 -0.038 -0.038 -0.040
(0.073) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072)
COLONY 0.013 0.005 0.008 0.005 0.008
(0.079) (0.078) (0.079) (0.078) (0.079)
COMMON LANGUAGE 0.131∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
LEGAL ORIGIN -0.045∗ -0.047∗∗ -0.044∗ -0.048∗∗ -0.044∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
MILITARY ALLIANCE -0.125∗∗ -0.112∗ -0.118∗ -0.117∗ -0.117∗
(0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
LMC AVERAGE -0.082∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗
(0.014) (0.015)
LMC DIFFERENCE 0.029∗∗ 0.022
(0.014) (0.014)
LMC MINIMUM -0.080∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017)
LMC MAXIMUM -0.047∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.015 0.009
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
R-squared 0.282 0.339 0.270 0.338 0.282 0.339 0.273 0.337 0.282 0.339
Log likelihood -786.2 -689.7 -798.5 -690.8 -786.4 -689.8 -795.6 -692.0 -786.0 -689.6
Observations 1,489 1,434 1,489 1,434 1,489 1,434 1,489 1,434 1,489 1,434
Dependent variable: PTA status. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (999 replications). Odd specifications control for Baier and Bergstrand (2004)
controls. Even specifications include additional Political Economy controls.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.A.3: Logit Results for the Probability of a PTA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CONSTANT 13.192∗∗∗ 8.743∗∗∗ 9.540∗∗∗ 6.448∗∗∗ 12.228∗∗∗ 8.010∗∗∗ 12.315∗∗∗ 7.384∗∗∗ 12.826∗∗∗ 7.648∗∗∗
(1.607) (2.357) (1.588) (2.252) (1.608) (2.286) (1.646) (2.375) (1.653) (2.381)
NATURAL 1.300∗∗∗ 1.169∗∗∗ 1.296∗∗∗ 1.153∗∗∗ 1.305∗∗∗ 1.170∗∗∗ 1.332∗∗∗ 1.168∗∗∗ 1.314∗∗∗ 1.165∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.109) (0.099) (0.109) (0.101) (0.109) (0.100) (0.109) (0.101) (0.109)
REMOTE -0.013 0.022 -0.020 0.018 -0.020 0.017 -0.022 0.019 -0.021 0.017
(0.021) (0.023) (0.020) (0.023) (0.021) (0.024) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.024)
GDP -0.010 -0.106∗∗∗ 0.025 -0.100∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.101∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.107∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.100∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.036) (0.024) (0.036) (0.024) (0.036) (0.025) (0.036) (0.025) (0.036)
GDP DIFFERENCE -0.131∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗ -0.189∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.053) (0.044) (0.052) (0.045) (0.052) (0.045) (0.052) (0.045) (0.052)
GDPPC DIFFERENCE 1.172∗∗∗ 1.516∗∗∗ 1.188∗∗∗ 1.542∗∗∗ 1.282∗∗∗ 1.554∗∗∗ 1.225∗∗∗ 1.547∗∗∗ 1.288∗∗∗ 1.551∗∗∗
(0.347) (0.387) (0.349) (0.387) (0.350) (0.389) (0.353) (0.387) (0.351) (0.388)
SQGDPPC DIFFERENCE -0.622∗∗∗ -0.664∗∗∗ -0.628∗∗∗ -0.668∗∗∗ -0.657∗∗∗ -0.672∗∗∗ -0.620∗∗∗ -0.664∗∗∗ -0.653∗∗∗ -0.672∗∗∗
(0.140) (0.145) (0.141) (0.145) (0.141) (0.146) (0.141) (0.145) (0.141) (0.146)
ROW GDPPC DIFFERENCE -0.517∗∗∗ -0.596∗∗∗ -0.499∗∗∗ -0.576∗∗∗ -0.501∗∗∗ -0.583∗∗∗ -0.487∗∗∗ -0.575∗∗∗ -0.498∗∗∗ -0.582∗∗∗
(0.170) (0.196) (0.166) (0.195) (0.168) (0.195) (0.170) (0.196) (0.169) (0.195)
GDPPC 0.382∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.107) (0.108) (0.109) (0.109)
PTA TRENDS 0.038∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
POLITICAL DISTANCE 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
DEMOCRACY 0.211 0.125 0.157 0.194 0.140
(0.272) (0.275) (0.273) (0.271) (0.275)
COMMON COLONIZER -0.001 -0.074 -0.034 -0.029 -0.047
(0.435) (0.442) (0.440) (0.445) (0.443)
COLONY 0.320 0.245 0.284 0.249 0.278
(0.503) (0.500) (0.507) (0.494) (0.508)
COMMON LANGUAGE 0.827∗∗∗ 0.828∗∗∗ 0.816∗∗∗ 0.823∗∗∗ 0.819∗∗∗
(0.290) (0.289) (0.291) (0.287) (0.291)
LEGAL ORIGIN -0.367∗∗ -0.374∗∗ -0.357∗∗ -0.384∗∗ -0.357∗∗
(0.161) (0.162) (0.162) (0.161) (0.162)
MILITARY ALLIANCE -0.826∗∗ -0.724∗∗ -0.769∗∗ -0.757∗∗ -0.757∗∗
(0.355) (0.357) (0.356) (0.358) (0.358)
LMC AVERAGE -0.501∗∗∗ -0.227∗∗
(0.087) (0.101)
LMC DIFFERENCE 0.168∗∗ 0.129
(0.080) (0.090)
LMC MINIMUM -0.469∗∗∗ -0.184∗ -0.424∗∗∗ -0.202∗
(0.091) (0.099) (0.101) (0.110)
LMC MAXIMUM -0.294∗∗∗ -0.037 -0.104 0.046
(0.080) (0.093) (0.090) (0.104)
Pseudo R-squared 0.239 0.298 0.226 0.297 0.238 0.298 0.229 0.296 0.239 0.298
Log likelihood -749.7 -660.6 -762.8 -661.9 -750.6 -661.1 -759.4 -662.8 -750.1 -661.0
Observations 1,489 1,434 1,489 1,434 1,489 1,434 1,489 1,434 1,489 1,434
Dependent variable: PTA status. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (999 replications). Odd specifications control for Baier and Bergstrand (2004)
controls. Even specifications include additional Political Economy controls.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2.10.3 Replication of Baier and Bergstrand (2004)
In Table 2.2, the estimate on REMOTE and GDP are different than BB (2004). I rerun the re-
gressions with only the BB (2004) controls and the same differences persist, which implies labor
mobility costs variables are not influencing the coefficient signs. The sample in this paper differs
from BB (2004) in three dimensions. First, I look at agreements in 2015, while BB (2004) uses
1996. Second, the control variables follow the same spirit as BB (2004), but the calculation differs
slightly. For example, I use real GDP per capita to proxy for capital-labor ratios, and BB (2004)
lags back the controls to an earlier time period. Third, my sample covers the 56 countries from Ar-
tuc et al. (2015). Only 33 countries overlap with the BB (2004) country list, see Table 2.A.4. Some
large developing countries such as China and India are omitted from BB (2004) but are included in
Artuc et al. (2015). Egger and Larch (2008) use a wider set of 145 countries in their cross-sectional
analysis and are able to replicate most of BB (2004) results but not the negative sign on the ROW
GDPPC DIFFERENCE term (denoted as DROWKL in their paper). They note that it is somewhat
surprising how well they are able to replicate the BB (2004) results given the lack of developing
countries used in BB (2004). To see if the different country selection is influencing the different
signs on the control variables and not the time period or variable calculation, I follow the main
specification from BB (2004)
P
(







and estimate it with the sample of countries from Artuc et al. (2015) and BB (2004) separately.
Table 2.A.5 presents the results of estimating equation (2.13). The (a) columns use BB (2004)’s
sample and the (b) columns use Artuc et al. (2015)’s sample. For both samples, similar trends in
the estimates persist.
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Table 2.A.4: Comparison of Countries from Baier and Bergstrand (2004) and Artuc et al. (2015)







Chile Finland Hong Kong
Colombia Georgia Iraq
Costa Rica India Japan
























Percentage in only one: 41% 39%
Note: Baier and Bergstrand (2004) includes 54 countries. Artuc et al. (2015) has 56
countries. Countries in alphabetical order. “Percentage in only one” is calculated by
counting the number of countries that are unique to each sample and dividing it by the






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.10.4 Levy (1997) Interpretation
The predicted sign on the absolute difference in factor endowments (GDPPC DIFFERENCE) has
an alternative predication in the context of Levy (1997). In that paper, a median voter framework
is utilized to show that when countries have similar endowments they are more likely to sign a
trade agreement. This implies the predicted sign is negative and not positive as in BB (2004).
To make the analysis clear I rerun the Table 2.2 specifications without the square of difference in
factor endowments (SQGDPPC DIFFERENCE) and political controls, see Table 2.A.6. The point
estimate on GDPPC DIFFERENCE flips and becomes negative. Thus, the results provide some
support for Levy (1997).
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Table 2.A.6: Probit Results with SQGDPPC DIFFERENCE Omitted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CONSTANT 8.395∗∗∗ 5.096∗∗∗ 6.253∗∗∗ 3.661∗∗∗ 7.730∗∗∗ 4.583∗∗∗ 7.916∗∗∗ 4.235∗∗∗ 8.197∗∗∗ 4.390∗∗∗
(0.949) (1.353) (0.940) (1.302) (0.953) (1.310) (0.977) (1.390) (0.980) (1.386)
NATURAL 0.765∗∗∗ 0.666∗∗∗ 0.763∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗ 0.765∗∗∗ 0.666∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.665∗∗∗ 0.773∗∗∗ 0.663∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.063) (0.059) (0.063) (0.060) (0.063) (0.059) (0.063) (0.060) (0.063)
REMOTE -0.005 0.017 -0.008 0.016 -0.008 0.015 -0.010 0.015 -0.009 0.015
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
GDP -0.010 -0.064∗∗∗ 0.010 -0.059∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.060∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.063∗∗∗ -0.007 -0.059∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.020) (0.014) (0.020) (0.014) (0.020) (0.015) (0.020) (0.015) (0.020)
GDP DIFFERENCE -0.072∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ -0.046∗ -0.099∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.030) (0.025) (0.029) (0.026) (0.029) (0.025) (0.030) (0.026) (0.029)
GDPPC DIFFERENCE -0.190∗∗∗ -0.075 -0.186∗∗∗ -0.068 -0.173∗∗∗ -0.066 -0.155∗∗∗ -0.060 -0.164∗∗∗ -0.068
(0.050) (0.070) (0.049) (0.071) (0.050) (0.070) (0.050) (0.070) (0.050) (0.070)
ROW GDPPC DIFFERENCE -0.391∗∗∗ -0.416∗∗∗ -0.381∗∗∗ -0.403∗∗∗ -0.389∗∗∗ -0.408∗∗∗ -0.366∗∗∗ -0.400∗∗∗ -0.384∗∗∗ -0.408∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.107) (0.090) (0.106) (0.091) (0.106) (0.091) (0.107) (0.091) (0.106)
GDPPC 0.249∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061)
PTA TRENDS 0.022∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
POLITICAL DISTANCE -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
DEMOCRACY -0.003 -0.056 -0.037 -0.010 -0.047
(0.150) (0.153) (0.151) (0.151) (0.153)
COMMON COLONIZER -0.057 -0.094 -0.076 -0.070 -0.082
(0.271) (0.277) (0.275) (0.277) (0.276)
COLONY 0.151 0.104 0.124 0.106 0.121
(0.282) (0.279) (0.282) (0.279) (0.283)
COMMON LANGUAGE 0.499∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.496∗∗∗
(0.166) (0.165) (0.165) (0.165) (0.165)
LEGAL ORIGIN -0.241∗∗∗ -0.247∗∗∗ -0.237∗∗ -0.252∗∗∗ -0.237∗∗
(0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093)
MILITARY ALLIANCE -0.437∗∗ -0.377∗ -0.401∗ -0.391∗ -0.396∗
(0.210) (0.210) (0.210) (0.211) (0.211)
LMC AVERAGE -0.302∗∗∗ -0.146∗∗
(0.051) (0.058)
LMC DIFFERENCE 0.083∗ 0.074
(0.047) (0.052)
LMC MINIMUM -0.263∗∗∗ -0.110∗ -0.231∗∗∗ -0.119∗
(0.053) (0.057) (0.058) (0.063)
LMC MAXIMUM -0.181∗∗∗ -0.023 -0.079 0.024
(0.047) (0.054) (0.052) (0.059)
Pseudo R-squared 0.229 0.288 0.214 0.286 0.226 0.287 0.219 0.285 0.227 0.287
Log likelihood -759.8 -670.3 -774.1 -672.2 -762.5 -671.4 -769.7 -673.1 -761.6 -671.3
Observations 1,489 1,434 1,489 1,434 1,489 1,434 1,489 1,434 1,489 1,434
Dependent variable: PTA status. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (999 replications). Odd specifications control for Baier and Bergstrand (2004)
controls. Even specifications include additional Political Economy controls.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2.10.5 Goodness-of-Fit
Table 2.A.7: Classification of PTAs Without LMC Variables for Probit Model
True Positive 0.5778 0.6422 0.5992 0.7176
True Negative 0.8645 0.7667 0.8769 0.7934
Correctly Classified 0.7569 0.7199 0.7755 0.7657
Baier and Bergstrand (2004) Controls YES YES YES YES
Political Economy Controls NO NO YES YES
Classification Cutoff 0.5 0.375 0.5 0.375
Note: Numbers are in decimal form (0.5 = 50%). Specifications correspond
with Table 2.2, but without the LMC variables..
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CHAPTER 3
The Effect of Phase-In Tariffs on Import Growth
(Co-authored with Xiuming Dong)
3.1 Introduction
The dramatic rise of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) has cemented their importance in the
international trading system. Between 1990-2020, the number of active PTAs has increased more
than six-fold from 45 to 307 (WTO, 2021). While PTAs cover a wide range of topics aimed
at reducing barriers to trade, the effect of tariff decreases on imports is of particular interest to
workers, firms, and policymakers alike. The general consensus in the empirical trade literature is
that PTAs increase imports between PTA members, as reviewed in the meta-analysis by Cipollina
and Salvatici (2010). However, the rise in imports does not only occur in a single year but gradually
over time (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; Anderson and Yotov, 2016; Dutt, 2020).
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) propose the delay of imports may be due to the structure of PTA
tariffs. When PTAs enter into force tariffs are often decreased over many years, known as phase-
in tariffs. The “phase-in hypothesis” implies that longer phase-in periods should yield slower
and longer periods of import growth. For example, products with phase-in tariffs lasting 5 years
should experience gradual import growth over 5 years before reaching their peak and leveling off.
Recently, Besedes et al. (2020) show that United States (US) imports under the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are not consistent with the phase-in hypothesis.1 They document
that products with tariffs immediately cut to zero and products with phase-in tariffs of 5-10 years
do not yield different patterns of import growth. While the insights from NAFTA provide a crucial
first step to understanding the relationship between phase-in tariffs and imports, it is unclear how
the results generalize to other PTAs.
1Besedes et al. (2020) refer to phase-in tariffs as “phase-out tariffs”. Both terms are referring to the same decrease
of PTA tariffs over time.
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This paper further explores the effect of phase-in tariffs on import growth for 11 PTAs signed
by the US between 2000-2007. To identify the causal effect of phase-in tariffs, we use a triple-
difference approach that builds on the work of Besedes et al. (2020). Intuitively, it takes a standard
difference-in-differences strategy that compares log imports in the pre- to post-PTA periods and
PTA members to nonmembers, by also comparing phase-in to already duty-free products. The
advantage of using already duty-free products as a comparison group is they have tariffs that do
not change after PTAs, which isolates the effect of phase-in tariffs. Our triple-difference empirical
strategy also controls for a wide range of unobservables and explicitly allows for heterogeneity
over time and by the length of phase-in tariffs. Introducing such heterogeneity is necessary to test
the phase-in hypothesis and avoids functional form assumptions on the estimates.
The main challenge when studying phase-in tariffs is obtaining detailed PTA tariff data (Baccini
et al., 2018; Deardorff and Sharma, 2020). We overcome this challenge by using recently available
PTA tariffs in the political science literature from Baccini et al. (2018). The tariff data is available
at the Harmonized System 6-digit (HS6) level and includes the negotiated PTA tariffs for all years
of the phase-in schedule, including future periods. This allows for the calculation of the phase-in
lengths for each product.
Using the triple-difference empirical strategy, we provide additional evidence that US import
growth is not consistent with the phase-in hypothesis. However, different from Besedes et al.
(2020), we show that phase-in tariffs do not necessarily yield additional import growth relative to
already duty-free products. This is directly counter to the phase-in hypothesis and implies longer
phase-in periods may not protect domestic industries from increased foreign competition in the
short run. We also show that phase-in tariffs lasting 1-5 and 6-10 years reach approximately the
same level of import growth after 10 years, yielding more support against the phase-in hypothesis.
For the analysis, we use a unified model that pools the 11 PTAs together and consider PTA-
specific estimates. The pooled model identifies the average effect of phase-in tariffs, while the
PTA-specific estimates document heterogeneity across the agreements. For example, US imports
from Jordan follow similar patterns of delayed import growth as NAFTA, while countries such
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as South Korea have much different trends with null effects. With South Korea having more
uncertainty regarding ratification than other PTAs, we view this as suggestive evidence that the
uncertainty managing motive of PTAs may be strongly related to import growth.
The next section provides an overview of the data and discusses the structure of phase-in tar-
iffs. Section 3.3 details the triple-difference empirical strategies. Section 3.4 presents the results.
Section 3.5 concludes and outlines possible avenues for future research.
3.2 Data
The empirical analysis requires data on the length of PTA phase-in tariffs, MFN tariffs prior to
each PTA, and import trade values from PTA and non-PTA members. The sample covers 11
PTAs signed by the US between 2000-2007. Table 3.1 lists the PTA members with the date of
signature and date of entry into force. The majority of the PTAs enter into force within 1-3 years
after signature, while Colombia, Panama, and South Korea have longer delays. Each PTA is a
bilateral free trade agreement between 2 countries and notified under Article XXIV, which requires
substantial decreases of tariffs for both members.
Import data
Import trade values are from the BACI database and are recorded annually between 1995-2017 for
imports of at least 1,000 US dollars (Gaulier and Zignago, 2010). Products follow the HS6 nomen-
clature under the 1992 revision. We focus exclusively on the imports to the US and drop imports
to all other countries. Countries that signed a PTA with the US outside the sample period are ex-
cluded to avoid the effect of contemporaneous phase-in tariffs (i.e., Canada, Israel, and Mexico).
In addition, we drop the US trading partners from the Dominican Republic-Central America-US
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) since the US only specifies a single tariff schedule for all
members.2 This implies the length of phase-in tariffs faced by each CAFTA-DR member is actu-
ally determined by when they enter into the agreement and not at the year of signature. All other
2CAFTA-DR includes Costa Rica (2009), Dominican Republic (2007), Guatemala (2006), Honduras (2006)
Nicaragua (2006), and El Salvador (2006). Year each country enters into the agreement are in parentheses.
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countries that are available in the import data are included in the analysis, see Table 3.A.1 for a list
of the 198 exporters.
Tariff Data
The US phase-in tariffs are from Baccini et al. (2018) and kindly provided by Leonardo Baccini.
Using appendices from the official PTA tariff schedules, they collect the negotiated ad valorem
tariffs at the HS6 level for each year. This includes future years since the negotiated tariffs are
listed through the completion of the phase-in process. In addition to the PTA tariffs, they also
collect the applied MFN tariffs for the year prior to each PTA entering into force. Using the
World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) product concordance, we map HS6 products to the 1992
revision to match the import data. The mapping results in some observations being categorized into
the same product. When this occurs we take a simple average across products for each exporter-
product-year combination. Merging the US import and tariff data results in approximately 40% of
the products (20,968 out of 53,096) from the tariff data being dropped. This suggests that many
products included in PTA negotiations are not actively imported by the US.
To measure the length of phase-in tariffs, we calculate how many years it takes each tariff to
reach its final PTA tariff (i.e., the tariff in the last year of the phase-in schedule). After the above
concording of products, some PTA tariffs are slightly different across the phase-in schedule due to
rounding and not actual tariff decreases. To adjust for these small differences, we round tariffs to
3 decimal points. Reassuringly, all tariffs are decreasing through the phase-in schedule except for
one, which we drop. Eliminating PTA tariffs is the norm for the US with over 98% of the tariffs
in the sample eventually decreased to zero. The remaining tariffs are either entirely exempt from
tariff decreases or decreased to some amount greater than zero.
Figure 3.1 highlights the distribution of US phase-in tariffs across the 11 PTAs.3 For ease of
exposition, we classify products into the following categories: (a) already duty free prior to the
PTA with an MFN tariff equal to zero and hence continue duty free; (b) immediately cut in the
first year; (c) phase-in tariffs lasting 1-5 years; (d) phase-in tariffs lasting 6-10 years; (e) phase-in
3Table 3.A.2 documents the data underlying the figure.
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tariffs lasting more than 10 years; and (f) entirely exempt from liberalization. The figure considers
the distributions of total imports between 1995-2017 and counting the number of HS6 products.
As shown in the figure, the majority of the products are either continue duty free or immediately
cut, while each remaining category is less than 10% of the total sample. In comparison with other
importers, the US cuts more goods to zero when PTAs enter into force. Teti (2020) shows that,




Identifying the causal effect of PTA phase-in tariffs on import growth is challenging since only
the outcome of joining or not joining a PTA is observed.4 PTA members require a control group,
such as non-PTA members, to serve as the counterfactual level of import growth. This observation
suggests a generalized difference-in-differences (DiD) strategy that compares import growth over
the pre- to post-PTA periods (first difference), and PTA to non-PTA members (second difference).
Consider the log of US imports from exporter j of product p in year t, denoted as ln(M jpt). The





= δ1D jt + γ j + γt + ε jpt , (3.1)
where D jt is a binary variable that equals one when the PTA between the US and exporter j is active
in year t, and zero otherwise. Exporter and year fixed effects are denoted by γ j and γt , respectively.
These control for time-invariant unobservables that vary by exporter (e.g., comparative advantage)
and time-varying factors that are common to all exporters (e.g., global macroeconomic shocks).
Finally, ε jpt is the error term.
There are two main concerns with the DiD approach when studying the effect of phase-in tar-
4Moreover, for countries that join a PTA only imports under the defined phase-in schedule are observed with
outcomes under alternative phase-in schedules unobserved.
122
iffs. First, it does not account for heterogeneity in the structure of phase-in tariffs. The coefficient,
δ1, estimates the average effect of PTA membership on imports and ignores variation of phase-in
schedules within PTAs. Second, the identifying assumption for δ1 to be interpreted as the causal
effect is particularly strong. The assumption implies that conditional on controls, the US follows
similar trends of import growth for products imported from PTA and non-PTA members in the
absence of an agreement (i.e., the parallel trends assumption). In other words, confounding de-
terminants of import growth are either time or exporter invariant and are absorbed by the fixed
effects.
3.3.2 Triple-Difference Specifications
To address the DiD concerns and estimate the causal effect of phase-in tariffs on import growth,
we use a triple-difference specification that builds on the work of Besedes et al. (2020). This
strategy takes the DiD specification in Equation 3.1 and includes a third difference along phase-in
tariff status. Specifically, it compares products that receive any phase-in tariff to products that are
already duty free prior to the PTA (i.e., products with MFN tariffs equal to zero prior to the PTA
entering into force). The advantage of using already duty-free products as a comparison group is
they have tariffs that do not change after PTAs, which isolates the effect of phase-in tariffs. The





= β1D jpt + γpt + γ jt + γ jp + ε jpt , (3.2)
where D jpt is a binary variable that equals one when the US has an active PTA with exporter j in
year t and product p is classified as receiving phase-in tariffs at any point within the PTA. Given
that the phase-in tariff schedule is known once the PTA is signed, we follow Besedes et al. (2020)
and treat a PTA as “active” the year after PTA signature. The product-year (γpt), exporter-year
(γ jt), and exporter-product (γ jp) fixed effects isolate variation at the exporter-product-year level.
Since the US is the only importer, each fixed effect also implicitly varies by importer. Standard er-
rors are clustered two-way by exporter-product and product-year. The exporter-product clustering
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addresses potential serial correlation in the error term, while the product-year clustering addresses
potential correlation in the US importing decisions of each product in a given year.5 Therefore, β1
is the coefficient of interest and allows for examination of the phase-in tariff hypothesis. A positive
estimate suggests that products receiving phase-in tariffs experience additional import growth than
products that are already duty free, as predicted by the phase-in hypothesis.
The triple-difference approach explicitly accounts for the structure of phase-in tariffs and re-
laxes the identification assumption. Specifically, the assumption now becomes that there exists
no contemporaneous shock affecting import growth of products with phase-in tariffs relative to
already duty-free products from PTA and non-PTA members (Gruber, 1994; Besedes et al., 2020).
This triple-difference equivalent of the parallel trends assumption is more plausible as it focuses on
the distribution of shocks affecting import growth across products and not on the total import trends
across PTA and non-PTA members. To explore its validity, we take an econometric approach with
an event study, as discussed below.
3.3.2.1 Event Study
The triple-difference specification in Equation 3.2 restricts β1 to be homogeneous over time. How-
ever, the phase-in hypothesis predicts import growth to vary based on how many years a PTA has
been active. To explore the heterogeneity of import growth over time, we relax the restriction by



















+ γpt + γ jt + γ jp + ε jpt . (3.3)
Since exporters form PTAs with the US over different years, we normalize the time period s to be
the number of years since the PTA was signed. Period zero denotes the signature year of each PTA
and serves as the omitted reference year. The dummy variable D jps equals to one when all the
following hold true: (a) the time period is s; (b) the US and exporter j have a PTA anytime over
the sample period; (c) product p from exporter j is classified as receiving phase-in tariffs at any
5Results are similar when clustering only by exporter-product, and available upon request.
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point. The phase-in hypothesis predicts positive and monotonic increases in import growth after
PTA signature.
The event study also allows for the examination of the previously discussed parallel trends as-
sumption. If the assumption is valid, then we expect estimates of βs that occur prior to PTAs, when
s is less than zero, to be insignificantly different from zero. Divergence prior to PTAs suggests that
at least some of the import growth effects in the post period, when s is greater than zero, capture
underlying trends not due to trade agreements.
3.3.2.2 Heterogeneous Phase-In Effects
In the previous sections we have differentiated between products receiving any phase-in tariff and
already duty-free products. However, there exists additional variation in phase-in lengths that is
valuable for identifying the effect of phase-in tariffs. To incorporate differing phase-in lengths the


































+ γpt + γ jt + γ jp + ε jpt , (3.4)
where i= 1 for phase-in tariffs that are immediately cut, i= 2 for phase-in tariffs that are decreased
over 1-5 years, i = 3 for phase-in tariff that are decreased over 6-10 years, and i = 4 for phase-in
tariffs that are decreased over more than 10 years.6 As before, products that are already duty free
and hence continue duty free serve as the reference group. The phase-in hypothesis predicts that
products immediately cut should experience a jump in imports then level off, while products with
longer phase-in periods should have longer and more gradual import growth.
3.3.2.3 PTA-Specific Effects
To this point, the PTAs signed by the US have been pooled into a single regression. This assumes
that estimates of phase-in tariffs on import growth are the same across PTAs. With differences in
6An alternative approach is to estimate a separate coefficient for every phase-in length and not group similar phase-
in lengths together. This will yield more imprecise estimates as some phase-in lengths are more sparse.
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exporters, such as developed versus developing economies, there likely exists important differences
in import growth. To explore heterogeneity across PTAs we re-estimating Equations 3.2-3.4 sepa-
rately for each PTA. For these PTA-specific regressions, the “control” group of non-PTA members
stays the same and imports from all other PTA members with the US are dropped.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Homogeneous Triple-Difference Results
The results from Equation 3.2 are presented in Table 3.2. Column 1 pools the 11 PTAs together,
which yields a point estimate of β1 that is negative and insignificant at the 10% level. This implies
that phase-in products do not experience significantly different patterns of import growth relative
to products that are already duty free. It is important to emphasize this does not suggest that import
growth is unaffected by PTAs; rather, the estimate implies that import growth is not directly due
to phase-in tariffs. One potential concern with the pooled regression is that Colombia, Panama,
and South Korea have longer delays between PTA signature and entry into force. These delays
could signal greater uncertainty of ratification, which in turn may affect import growth for reasons
unrelated to phase-in tariffs. In column 2 we drop these PTAs and the estimate becomes positive
but continues to be insignificant. The insignificant estimates are different than Besedes et al. (2020)
who show phase-in products under NAFTA experience strong upward import growth. They also
stand in direct contrast to the phase-in hypothesis that predicts phase-in products will have more
import growth than already duty-free products.
To explore whether similar patterns persist across PTAs, we re-estimate Equation 3.2 separately
for the 11 PTAs and present the results in columns 3-13. The point estimates vary considerably
with negative and positive values. For 5 out of 11 PTAs, the estimates of β1 continue to be insignif-
icant (i.e., Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Colombia, and Panama). For Jordan, Morocco, and Peru the
estimates are positive and significant at the 1% level. Jordan has the largest estimate of 1.171 log
points, which implies that phase-in products from Jordan experience additional import growth that
is about 222.5% (e1.171− 1 = 2.225) larger than already duty-free products. The Morocco and
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Peru growth rates are smaller, with additional import growth of 85.6% and 20.9%, respectively.7
However, for Oman, Singapore, and South Korea the estimates are negative and significant. The
negative values imply that imports of phase-in products actually contract after PTA signature rela-
tive to already duty-free products.
Overall, with the insignificant pooled estimates and varying PTA-specific estimates, we view
the results as casting doubt on the phase-in hypothesis. However, the positive estimates for some
PTAs suggests that further examination is necessary.
3.4.2 Event Study Results
We now relax the assumption that import growth is constant over time and use the event study
in Equation 3.3. The pooled results with 95% confidence intervals are plotted by year since PTA
signature in Figure 3.2. Beginning with the shaded baseline estimates that include all 11 PTAs, the
estimates are insignificantly different from zero right after signature. It takes until the tenth year
to have a positive increase of import growth that is also statistically significant at the 10% level.8
This upward trend continues until reaching 15-17 years where point estimates become imprecise
since only PTAs signed by 2002 have estimates available. Focusing prior to 15 years when the
estimates are more precise, import growth peaks around 0.12 log points (or approximately 13%).
In contrast to the homogeneous estimate in column 1 of Table 3.2, the gradual increase of import
growth for products receiving phase-in tariffs in Figure 3.2 provides some support of the phase-in
hypothesis.
The event study also allows for the examination of the common trends assumption. If the
assumption is valid then we expect statistically insignificant estimates prior to signature. While
the baseline estimates are statistically significant 7-12 years prior to signature, when approaching
the reference year the estimates are insignificant for 6 years.9 Nevertheless, we explore if certain
7In comparison to our estimates, the NAFTA estimates are not drastically different with additional import growth
of 47.4% for Mexico and 30% for Canada.
8See Table 3.A.3 for the underlying estimates of Figure 3.2.
9This is similar to the pretrends of Mexico from Besedes et al. (2020) who only have data for 3 years prior to
NAFTA, while for Canada they show statistically significant estimates in the 3 year lead up period.
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PTAs are responsible for the early periods of divergence by building on the insight that the only
PTAs included in the event study when s = −12 are Colombia, Panama, and South Korea. As
mentioned in the previous section, these agreements have greater uncertainty with the ratification
process suggesting that the reference year of PTA signature may be too early. Thus, we drop these
PTAs and re-estimate the event study, which is represented by the dashed lines in Figure 3.2. The
pretends are now insignificantly different from zero at the 5% level for all 11 years. After signature,
the results follow similar trends as the baseline estimates with gradual growth in later periods but
are more imprecise.
Figure 3.3 re-estimates the event study separately for each PTA. For 6 out of the 11 PTAs
(i.e., Australia, Bahrain, Colombia, Jordan, Morocco, and Peru) there are trends of delayed import
growth for phase-in products. The Jordan results continue to provide the strongest evidence of
the phase-in hypothesis. For the remaining 5 PTAs (i.e., Chile, South Korea, Oman, Panama, and
Singapore), the estimates are insignificant or have downward trends. One particularly interesting
result is the import trends of South Korea. Prior to the PTA, products that would be classified as
phase-in products had strong import growth relative to the already duty-free products. Once the
PTA was signed, the import growth differences diminish to zero.
The wide variety of outcomes across PTAs suggests that phase-in tariffs do not always lead to
additional import growth. This highlights an insight to policymakers when negotiating the structure
of PTAs. A policymaker may believe using longer phase-in tariffs will lead to more protection for
domestic industries by delaying import growth; while, our results suggest that may occur but is far
from certain.
3.4.3 Heterogeneous Phase-In Results
The previous analysis has differentiated between products that are already duty free versus products
with any phase-in tariff. To better account for differing phase-in lengths, we now compare import
growth by the length of phase-ins. The pooled results of Equation 3.4 are in Figure 3.4. Given the
similarity in results, we focus on the baseline sample with all 11 PTAs and include the results when
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dropping Colombia, Panama, and South Korea in Figure 3.A.1.10 Panel (a) plots the estimates for
products receiving immediate tariff cuts. The estimates are mostly insignificant prior and after
signature, with some divergence in the early pretrends. The phase-in hypothesis predicts a jump
of import growth right after the PTAs then leveling off, which is not consistent with the null result
we estimate.
Next, Panel (b) considers phase-in products of 1-5 years. After signature, import growth grad-
ually increases for 10 years before leveling off around 0.3 log points. In other words, products with
longer phase-in periods experience additional import growth than already duty-free products. For
phase-in tariffs lasting 1-5 years, the phase-in hypothesis expects to see leveling of import growth
near the fifth year. With some leveling of import growth between 4-6 years, this could be consis-
tent with the phase-in hypothesis. The later jump around 8 years after signature could be driven by
countries who ratify their PTAs more than one year after signature.
Panel (c) plots phase-in products lasting 6-10 years. After signature import growth increases
over approximately 13 years, a feature predicted by the phase-in hypothesis. However, phase-in
tariffs of 1-5 and 6-10 years reach 0.3 log points around year 10. This is inconsistent with the
phase-in hypothesis as it expects phase-in tariffs of 1-5 years to reach this point sooner. However,
there are more pretrend fluctuations implying care is needed for interpretation of the estimates.
Finally, Panel (d) examines phase-in tariffs lasting more than 10 years. The null estimates are
not supportive of the phase-in hypothesis that predicts even longer and slower periods of import
growth than the phase-in tariffs of 6-10 years. One likely explanation is the lack of power in the
data as less than 2% of HS6 products are classified into this category. Nonetheless, the results cast
more doubt on the phase-in hypothesis.
Figures 3.A.2-3.A.12 include the PTA-specific results. The lack of consistent trends across
PTAs with the wide range of heterogeneity provides the clearest evidence against the phase-in hy-
pothesis. Even for PTAs that provided some features consistent with the phase-in hypothesis in the
homogeneous and event study specifications, such as Jordan, are inconsistent with the hypothesis.
10See Table 3.A.5 for the underlying estimates.
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For Jordan, phase-in tariffs of 1-5 years grow slower than phase-in tariffs of 6-10 years during the
first 4 years after signature. This is opposite to what is predicted by the phase-in hypothesis.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence that US imports under 11 PTAs are not consistent with the Baier
and Bergstrand (2007) phase-in hypothesis. We first show that phase-in tariffs do not necessarily
yield additional import growth. This yields the interesting policy implication that longer phase-in
tariffs may not be an optimal strategy for policymakers who are interested in protecting domestic
industries in the short run. This suggests that other policies beyond delaying tariff reductions may
be more effective at protecting vulnerable industries. Moreover, if the use of phase-in tariffs is
done only to delay imports, then it may be optimal to actually eliminate phase-in tariffs as phase-in
negotiations are non-costly. Second, products with patterns of delayed import growth do not show
trends that are consistent with the length of their phase-in tariffs. For example, phase-in tariffs of
1-5 and 6-10 years reach approximately the same level of import growth after 10 years. Finally,
we document the wide range of heterogeneity across PTAs.
There are potential avenues for future research. This paper focuses exclusively on imports to
the US. However, import growth of other countries may be in line with the phase-in hypothesis. For
example, our analysis allows for comparison of North-North and North-South PTAs, but it does
not include South-South PTAs. Another avenue of future research is to better understand what




Figure 3.1: Distribution of US Phase-In Tariffs
Notes: CDF denotes “continue duty free” products, which are products that have applied MFN tariffs equal to zero
prior to the PTA entering into force. Immediate products are decreased to their final tariff in the first year of the PTA.
Exempt products do not experience any tariff cut and have applied MFN tariffs greater than zero. The remaining
categories denote how long the products are phased-in. Import value uses the total import values from 1995-2017.
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Figure 3.2: Time-Varying Triple-Difference Estimates
Notes: Shaded area represents the 95% confidence intervals of the pooled triple-difference estimates from Equa-
tion 3.3. Dashed red lines exclude Colombia, Panama, and South Korea. Dashed vertical line at year zero is the signa-
ture year and serves as the reference year. Standard errors are clustered two-way by exporter-product and product-year.
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Figure 3.3: Time-Varying Triple-Difference Estimates by PTA
Notes: Shaded area represents the 95% confidence intervals of the PTA-specific triple-difference estimates from Equa-
tion 3.3. Dashed vertical line at year zero is the signature year and serves as the reference year. Standard errors are
clustered two-way by exporter-product and product-year.
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Figure 3.4: Time-Varying Heterogeneous Triple-Difference Estimates
Notes: Shaded area represents the 95% confidence intervals of the pooled triple-difference estimates from Equa-
tion 3.4. Dashed vertical line at year zero is the signature year and serves as the reference year. Standard errors are
clustered two-way by exporter-product and product-year.
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3.7 Tables
Table 3.1: Sample of US PTA Trading Partners











South Korea 6/30/2007 3/15/2012
Notes: Sample includes 11 of the 12 PTAs that are signed by the US af-
ter NAFTA. Each country is in a separate PTA with the US. Countries are
listed alphabetically. Dates are from the WTO’s Regional Trade Agreement
Database.
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Table 3.2: Homogeneous Triple-Difference Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sample Baseline Exclude Australia Bahrain Chile Colombia Jordan
D jpt -0.032 0.043 0.012 0.363 -0.066 -0.039 1.171∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.029) (0.046) (0.240) (0.071) (0.064) (0.190)
R-squared 0.808 0.809 0.812 0.814 0.814 0.813 0.814
Observations 2,870,471 2,744,885 2,614,047 2,556,169 2,580,592 2,587,914 2,561,396
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Sample Morocco Oman Panama Peru Singapore South Korea
D jpt 0.602∗∗∗ -0.413∗ 0.000 0.190∗∗∗ -0.162∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.223) (0.085) (0.065) (0.066) (0.050)
R-squared 0.814 0.814 0.813 0.814 0.812 0.814
Observations 2,565,936 2,556,808 2,568,953 2,583,395 2,598,198 2,627,020
Notes: Triple-difference estimates from Equation 3.2. Dependent variable is the log of US imports. Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered two-way by exporter-product and product-year. The “Baseline” sample pools the 11 PTA
together. The “Exclude” sample drops Colombia, Panama, and South Korea. The remaining columns are PTA-specific
regressions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.8 Appendix
Figure 3.A.1: Time-Varying Heterogeneous Triple-Difference Estimates, Baseline and Dropped
Samples
Notes: Shaded area represents the 95% confidence intervals of the pooled triple-difference estimates from Equa-
tion 3.4. Dashed red lines exclude Colombia, Panama, and South Korea. Dashed vertical line at year zero is the signa-
ture year and serves as the reference year. Standard errors are clustered two-way by exporter-product and product-year.
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Figure 3.A.2: Time-Varying Heterogeneous Triple-Difference Estimates for Australia
Notes: Shaded area represents the 95% confidence intervals of the PTA-specific triple-difference estimates from Equa-
tion 3.4. Dashed vertical line at year zero is the signature year and serves as the reference year. Standard errors are
clustered two-way by exporter-product and product-year.
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Figure 3.A.3: Time-Varying Heterogeneous Triple-Difference Estimates for Bahrain
Notes: Shaded area represents the 95% confidence intervals of the PTA-specific triple-difference estimates from Equa-
tion 3.4. Dashed vertical line at year zero is the signature year and serves as the reference year. Standard errors are
clustered two-way by exporter-product and product-year.
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Figure 3.A.4: Time-Varying Heterogeneous Triple-Difference Estimates for Chile
Notes: Shaded area represents the 95% confidence intervals of the PTA-specific triple-difference estimates from Equa-
tion 3.4. Dashed vertical line at year zero is the signature year and serves as the reference year. Standard errors are
clustered two-way by exporter-product and product-year.
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Figure 3.A.5: Time-Varying Heterogeneous Triple-Difference Estimates for Colombia
Notes: Shaded area represents the 95% confidence intervals of the PTA-specific triple-difference estimates from Equa-
tion 3.4. Dashed vertical line at year zero is the signature year and serves as the reference year. Standard errors are
clustered two-way by exporter-product and product-year.
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Figure 3.A.6: Time-Varying Heterogeneous Triple-Difference Estimates for Jordan
Notes: Shaded area represents the 95% confidence intervals of the PTA-specific triple-difference estimates from Equa-
tion 3.4. Dashed vertical line at year zero is the signature year and serves as the reference year. Standard errors are
clustered two-way by exporter-product and product-year.
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Figure 3.A.7: Time-Varying Heterogeneous Triple-Difference Estimates for South Korea
Notes: Shaded area represents the 95% confidence intervals of the PTA-specific triple-difference estimates from Equa-
tion 3.4. Dashed vertical line at year zero is the signature year and serves as the reference year. Standard errors are
clustered two-way by exporter-product and product-year.
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Figure 3.A.8: Time-Varying Heterogeneous Triple-Difference Estimates for Morocco
Notes: Shaded area represents the 95% confidence intervals of the PTA-specific triple-difference estimates from Equa-
tion 3.4. Dashed vertical line at year zero is the signature year and serves as the reference year. Standard errors are
clustered two-way by exporter-product and product-year.
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Figure 3.A.9: Time-Varying Heterogeneous Triple-Difference Estimates for Oman
Notes: Shaded area represents the 95% confidence intervals of the PTA-specific triple-difference estimates from Equa-
tion 3.4. Dashed vertical line at year zero is the signature year and serves as the reference year. Standard errors are
clustered two-way by exporter-product and product-year.
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Figure 3.A.10: Time-Varying Heterogeneous Triple-Difference Estimates for Panama
Notes: Shaded area represents the 95% confidence intervals of the PTA-specific triple-difference estimates from Equa-
tion 3.4. Dashed vertical line at year zero is the signature year and serves as the reference year. Standard errors are
clustered two-way by exporter-product and product-year.
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Figure 3.A.11: Time-Varying Heterogeneous Triple-Difference Estimates for Peru
Notes: Shaded area represents the 95% confidence intervals of the PTA-specific triple-difference estimates from Equa-
tion 3.4. Dashed vertical line at year zero is the signature year and serves as the reference year. Standard errors are
clustered two-way by exporter-product and product-year.
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Figure 3.A.12: Time-Varying Heterogeneous Triple-Difference Estimates for Singapore
Notes: Shaded area represents the 95% confidence intervals of the PTA-specific triple-difference estimates from Equa-
tion 3.4. Dashed vertical line at year zero is the signature year and serves as the reference year. Standard errors are
clustered two-way by exporter-product and product-year.
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Table 3.A.1: Sample of Exporters Without US PTA
Afghanistan Fr. South Antarctic Terr. Paraguay
Albania France Philippines




Antigua and Barbuda Germany Rep. of Moldova
Argentina Ghana Romania
Armenia Gibraltar Russian Federation
Aruba Greece Rwanda
Austria Greenland Saint Helena
Azerbaijan Grenada Saint Kitts and Nevis
Bahamas Guinea Saint Lucia
Bangladesh Guinea-Bissau Saint Maarten
Barbados Guyana Saint Pierre and Miquelon
Belarus Haiti Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Belgium-Luxembourg Hungary Samoa
Belize Iceland San Marino
Benin India Sao Tome and Principe
Bermuda Indonesia Saudi Arabia
Bhutan Iran Senegal
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) Iraq Serbia
Bosnia Herzegovina Ireland Serbia and Montenegro
Br. Indian Ocean Terr. Italy Seychelles
Br. Virgin Isds Jamaica Sierra Leone
Brazil Japan Slovakia
Brunei Darussalam Kazakhstan Slovenia
Bulgaria Kenya So. African Customs Union
Burkina Faso Kiribati Solomon Isds
Burundi Kuwait Somalia
Cabo Verde Kyrgyzstan South Sudan
Cambodia Lao People’s Dem. Rep. Spain
Cameroon Latvia Sri Lanka
Cayman Isds Lebanon State of Palestine
Central African Rep. Liberia Sudan
Chad Libya Suriname
China Lithuania Sweden
China, Hong Kong SAR Madagascar Switzerland
China, Macao SAR Malawi Syria
Christmas Isds Malaysia TFYR of Macedonia
Cocos Isds Maldives Tajikistan
Comoros Mali Thailand
Congo Malta Timor-Leste
Cook Isds Marshall Isds Togo
Croatia Mauritania Tokelau
Cuba Mauritius Tonga
Curaçao Mongolia Trinidad and Tobago
Cyprus Montenegro Tunisia
Czechia Montserrat Turkey
Côte d’Ivoire Mozambique Turkmenistan
Dem. People’s Rep. of Korea Myanmar Turks and Caicos Isds
Dem. Rep. of the Congo Nauru Tuvalu
Denmark Nepal Uganda
Djibouti Neth. Antilles Ukraine
Dominica Netherlands United Arab Emirates
Ecuador New Caledonia United Kingdom
Egypt New Zealand United Rep. of Tanzania
Equatorial Guinea Niger Uruguay
Eritrea Nigeria Uzbekistan
Estonia Niue Vanuatu
Ethiopia Norfolk Isds Venezuela
FS Micronesia Norway Viet Nam
Falkland Isds (Malvinas) Other Asia, nes Wallis and Futuna Isds
Fiji Pakistan Yemen
Finland Palau Zambia
Fmr Sudan Papua New Guinea Zimbabwe
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Table 3.A.2: Number of Products Per Phase-In Type
Phase-In Type Number of Products Percent
CDF 12,152 37.82
Immediate 15,353 47.79
1 year 507 1.58
2 years 138 0.43
3 years 937 2.92
4 years 570 1.77
5 years 566 1.76
6 years 31 0.1
7 years 266 0.83
8 years 40 0.12
9 years 585 1.82
10 years 460 1.43
11 years 60 0.19
14 years 57 0.18
17 years 38 0.12
18 years 66 0.21
Exempt 302 0.94
Total 32,128
Notes: Each row counts the number of HS6 products per phase-
in type conditional on the availability of import data. CDF denotes
“continue duty free” products, which are products that have applied
MFN tariffs equal to zero prior to the PTA entering into force. Im-
mediate products are decreased to their final tariff in the first year of
the PTA. Exempt products do not experience any tariff cut and have
applied MFN tariffs greater than zero.
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Table 3.A.3: Time-Varying Triple-Difference Estimates (Panel A)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sample Baseline Exclude Australia Bahrain Chile Colombia Jordan
-12 0.221∗∗∗ - - - - - -
(0.073)
-11 0.172∗∗∗ -0.158 - - - 0.353∗∗ -
(0.060) (0.131) (0.146)
-10 0.129∗∗ -0.168 - 0.919 - 0.160 -
(0.057) (0.120) (0.565) (0.133)
-9 0.109∗∗ -0.007 0.132 0.518 - 0.293∗∗ -
(0.047) (0.066) (0.090) (0.542) (0.138)
-8 0.137∗∗∗ 0.091 0.211∗∗ 1.300∗ 0.023 0.108 -
(0.042) (0.056) (0.085) (0.726) (0.141) (0.126)
-7 0.084∗∗ 0.017 0.101 0.786 -0.103 0.193 -
(0.040) (0.053) (0.083) (0.593) (0.142) (0.121)
-6 0.060 -0.043 0.038 -0.127 -0.166 0.149 -
(0.038) (0.050) (0.080) (0.663) (0.132) (0.109)
-5 0.021 -0.084∗ 0.103 0.665 -0.227∗ 0.032 -0.544
(0.037) (0.048) (0.077) (0.552) (0.122) (0.109) (0.350)
-4 0.030 -0.030 0.050 0.794 -0.036 -0.069 -0.264
(0.035) (0.046) (0.072) (0.501) (0.130) (0.099) (0.401)
-3 0.043 -0.053 -0.021 0.892∗ 0.010 0.133 -0.627∗
(0.032) (0.043) (0.072) (0.493) (0.110) (0.092) (0.337)
-2 0.031 -0.047 0.071 -0.035 -0.136 0.192∗∗ -0.443
(0.031) (0.041) (0.068) (0.446) (0.100) (0.087) (0.357)
-1 0.018 -0.059 -0.019 0.823∗ -0.098 0.092 -0.193
(0.028) (0.037) (0.062) (0.443) (0.094) (0.080) (0.286)
1 -0.008 -0.045 0.059 0.607 -0.123 0.065 -0.066
(0.027) (0.036) (0.062) (0.489) (0.089) (0.083) (0.254)
2 0.006 0.013 0.152∗∗ 0.582 -0.198∗∗ 0.045 0.643∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.040) (0.068) (0.427) (0.096) (0.090) (0.245)
3 0.053 0.061 0.078 0.794∗ -0.110 0.092 0.943∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.043) (0.074) (0.417) (0.105) (0.092) (0.254)
4 -0.029 -0.024 -0.012 1.156∗∗ -0.076 -0.032 0.872∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.045) (0.077) (0.517) (0.108) (0.097) (0.271)
5 -0.033 -0.015 -0.036 1.467∗∗∗ -0.091 -0.086 1.070∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.045) (0.077) (0.522) (0.112) (0.102) (0.264)
6 -0.009 -0.024 0.015 0.670 -0.158 0.082 1.065∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.047) (0.078) (0.482) (0.112) (0.104) (0.273)
7 0.022 0.012 -0.030 1.058∗∗ -0.188 0.022 1.067∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.047) (0.078) (0.451) (0.116) (0.104) (0.270)
8 0.042 0.011 0.096 0.980∗∗ -0.185 0.170 0.858∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.048) (0.080) (0.489) (0.119) (0.105) (0.284)
9 0.032 -0.017 0.095 0.976∗∗ -0.311∗∗∗ 0.166 0.779∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.049) (0.083) (0.460) (0.120) (0.108) (0.298)
10 0.070∗ 0.066 0.164∗∗ 1.249∗∗∗ -0.197 0.197∗ 0.749∗∗
(0.038) (0.049) (0.083) (0.463) (0.123) (0.108) (0.295)
11 0.122∗∗∗ 0.069 0.077 0.339 -0.174 0.263∗∗ 0.892∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.050) (0.084) (0.461) (0.123) (0.114) (0.284)
12 0.071 0.032 0.158∗ 1.240∗∗ -0.134 - 0.871∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.055) (0.085) (0.531) (0.127) (0.290)
13 0.094∗ 0.057 0.144 0.000 -0.128 - 1.319∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.056) (0.088) (0.000) (0.128) (0.290)
14 0.090 0.054 - - -0.008 - 1.034∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.075) (0.136) (0.281)
15 0.233 0.195 - - - - 0.885∗∗∗
(0.173) (0.174) (0.281)
16 0.014 -0.019 - - - - 0.674∗∗
(0.182) (0.184) (0.278)
17 0.215 0.169 - - - - 0.844∗∗∗
(0.200) (0.200) (0.290)
R-squared 0.808 0.809 0.812 0.814 0.814 0.813 0.814
Observations 2,868,465 2,744,885 2,613,845 2,556,169 2,580,426 2,586,866 2,561,392
Notes: Triple-difference estimates from Equation 3.3. Dependent variable is the log of US im-
ports. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered two-way by exporter-product and product-
year. The “Baseline” sample pools the 11 PTA together. The “Exclude” sample drops Colom-
bia, Panama, and South Korea. The remaining columns are PTA-specific regressions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.A.4: Time-Varying Triple-Difference Estimates (Panel B)
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Sample Korea Morocco Oman Panama Peru Singapore
-12 0.207∗∗ - - 0.887∗∗∗ - -
(0.086) (0.254)
-11 0.218∗∗∗ - 0.321 0.607∗∗∗ -0.260∗ -
(0.083) (0.508) (0.232) (0.154)
-10 0.217∗∗∗ - 0.520 0.647∗∗∗ -0.306∗∗ -
(0.082) (0.541) (0.232) (0.145)
-9 0.163∗∗ -0.245 0.334 0.416∗ -0.156 -
(0.078) (0.238) (0.487) (0.215) (0.131)
-8 0.196∗∗ -0.250 0.561 0.244 -0.102 0.002
(0.076) (0.204) (0.503) (0.204) (0.134) (0.132)
-7 0.160∗∗ -0.573∗∗∗ 0.489 0.165 -0.243∗∗ 0.178
(0.074) (0.197) (0.491) (0.184) (0.121) (0.122)
-6 0.200∗∗∗ -0.598∗∗∗ 0.926∗∗ 0.190 -0.217∗ 0.019
(0.071) (0.186) (0.450) (0.178) (0.113) (0.114)
-5 0.204∗∗∗ -0.508∗∗∗ 0.176 0.162 -0.165 -0.160
(0.069) (0.187) (0.426) (0.169) (0.108) (0.112)
-4 0.174∗∗∗ 0.024 0.165 0.095 -0.285∗∗∗ -0.007
(0.066) (0.180) (0.407) (0.165) (0.098) (0.108)
-3 0.227∗∗∗ -0.062 -0.186 -0.046 -0.150 -0.056
(0.061) (0.166) (0.448) (0.174) (0.096) (0.092)
-2 0.175∗∗∗ -0.182 0.421 -0.278∗ -0.119 -0.119
(0.057) (0.162) (0.379) (0.154) (0.092) (0.091)
-1 0.171∗∗∗ -0.202 -0.140 0.059 -0.105 -0.053
(0.052) (0.142) (0.351) (0.123) (0.087) (0.082)
1 -0.007 0.149 -0.346 0.213∗ -0.163∗∗ -0.116
(0.051) (0.128) (0.456) (0.124) (0.082) (0.081)
2 -0.076 0.250∗ -0.393 0.129 -0.045 -0.138
(0.058) (0.149) (0.418) (0.130) (0.088) (0.089)
3 -0.034 0.413∗∗ -0.106 0.186 -0.003 -0.036
(0.061) (0.161) (0.448) (0.133) (0.097) (0.095)
4 -0.085 0.280∗ -0.279 0.066 -0.085 -0.191∗
(0.065) (0.169) (0.431) (0.138) (0.094) (0.101)
5 -0.075 0.213 -0.289 -0.076 0.011 -0.237∗∗
(0.066) (0.177) (0.459) (0.171) (0.100) (0.099)
6 -0.010 0.121 -0.207 -0.238 0.038 -0.252∗∗
(0.067) (0.180) (0.448) (0.176) (0.103) (0.106)
7 -0.006 0.322∗ -0.099 0.183 0.137 -0.189∗
(0.069) (0.193) (0.437) (0.146) (0.104) (0.109)
8 -0.036 0.590∗∗∗ 0.058 0.338∗∗ -0.018 -0.264∗∗
(0.071) (0.191) (0.495) (0.143) (0.103) (0.110)
9 -0.001 0.476∗∗ -0.391 0.282∗∗ 0.030 -0.262∗∗
(0.074) (0.198) (0.422) (0.140) (0.107) (0.114)
10 -0.002 0.399∗∗ 0.230 0.031 0.180∗ -0.234∗∗
(0.076) (0.191) (0.471) (0.193) (0.109) (0.112)
11 - 0.555∗∗∗ 0.098 - 0.205∗ -0.084
(0.201) (0.463) (0.112) (0.111)
12 - 0.482∗∗ 0.000 - - -0.289∗∗
(0.195) (0.000) (0.115)
13 - 0.644∗∗∗ - - - -0.266∗∗
(0.223) (0.116)
14 - - - - - -0.181
(0.120)
R-squared 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.813 0.814 0.812
Observations 2,626,816 2,565,925 2,556,676 2,568,885 2,583,317 2,598,105
Notes: Triple-difference estimates from Equation 3.3. Dependent variable is the log of US im-
ports. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered two-way by exporter-product and product-
year. Columns are PTA-specific regressions continuing from Table 3.A.3.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.A.5: Time-Varying Heterogeneous Triple-Difference Estimates
Immediate Cut Phase-in of 1-5 Years Phase-in of 6-10 Years Phase-in of >10 Years
-12 0.320*** -0.187 0.0362 1.717*
(0.0764) (0.137) (0.149) (0.963)
-11 0.183*** 0.0356 0.138 0.377
(0.0621) (0.134) (0.135) (0.437)
-10 0.144** 0.0136 0.0159 0.159
(0.0592) (0.120) (0.133) (0.409)
-9 0.0930* -0.0392 0.396*** -0.117
(0.0491) (0.0967) (0.0970) (0.243)
-8 0.133*** -0.0222 0.373*** -0.167
(0.0440) (0.0835) (0.0903) (0.219)
-7 0.0837** -0.128 0.313*** 0.0522
(0.0421) (0.0797) (0.0890) (0.228)
-6 0.0641 -0.0966 0.187** 0.0369
(0.0397) (0.0768) (0.0839) (0.197)
-5 0.0310 -0.127* 0.106 0.0291
(0.0383) (0.0754) (0.0795) (0.198)
-4 0.0340 -0.0919 0.141* -0.0200
(0.0363) (0.0707) (0.0783) (0.180)
-3 0.0453 -0.0425 0.104 0.146
(0.0340) (0.0646) (0.0764) (0.169)
-2 0.0332 -0.00164 0.0591 -0.0176
(0.0319) (0.0629) (0.0729) (0.149)
-1 0.0248 -0.0489 0.0640 -0.159
(0.0289) (0.0559) (0.0616) (0.132)
1 -0.0158 0.0506 -0.0282 0.121
(0.0287) (0.0556) (0.0587) (0.122)
2 -0.0183 0.0862 0.100 0.207
(0.0316) (0.0600) (0.0683) (0.162)
3 0.0254 0.182*** 0.135* 0.0725
(0.0336) (0.0637) (0.0720) (0.152)
4 -0.0729** 0.149** 0.125* 0.122
(0.0350) (0.0689) (0.0740) (0.179)
5 -0.0699* 0.137** 0.0815 -0.0272
(0.0363) (0.0689) (0.0755) (0.164)
6 -0.0441 0.118* 0.115 0.179
(0.0374) (0.0704) (0.0782) (0.167)
7 -0.00348 0.110 0.161** -0.0810
(0.0376) (0.0709) (0.0799) (0.199)
8 0.00547 0.185** 0.176** 0.130
(0.0381) (0.0725) (0.0801) (0.202)
9 -0.0123 0.173** 0.253*** 0.0715
(0.0391) (0.0750) (0.0834) (0.201)
10 0.0110 0.296*** 0.287*** 0.124
(0.0403) (0.0768) (0.0843) (0.222)
11 0.0602 0.365*** 0.403*** 0.0673
(0.0450) (0.0862) (0.0950) (0.239)
12 -0.0260 0.288*** 0.422*** 0.0151
(0.0535) (0.0889) (0.102) (0.254)
13 -0.0251 0.365*** 0.493*** -0.00491
(0.0550) (0.0937) (0.103) (0.251)
14 0.0133 0.268** 0.440*** -0.140
(0.0762) (0.113) (0.161) (0.483)
15 -0.0178 0.225 1.028*** 0
(0.293) (0.191) (0.249) (0)
16 -0.120 0.0264 0.693** -
(0.338) (0.196) (0.286)




Notes: Pooled sample triple-difference estimates from Equation 3.4. Dependent variable is the
log of US imports. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered two-way by exporter-product
and product-year.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
153
Bibliography
Anderson, J. E. and Yotov, Y. V. (2016). Terms of trade and global efficiency effects of free trade
agreements, 1990–2002. Journal of International Economics, 99:279–298.
Artuc, E., Chaudhuri, S., and McLaren, J. (2010). Trade shocks and labor adjustment: A structural
empirical approach. American Economic Review, 100(3):1008–45.
Artuc, E., Lederman, D., and Porto, G. (2015). A mapping of labor mobility costs in the developing
world. Journal of International Economics, 95(1):28–41.
Attanasio, O., Goldberg, P. K., and Pavcnik, N. (2004). Trade reforms and wage inequality in
colombia. Journal of Development Economics, 74(2):331–366.
Baccini, L. and Dür, A. (2018). Global value chains and product differentiation: Changing the
politics of trade. Global Policy, 9:49–57.
Baccini, L., Dür, A., and Elsig, M. (2018). Intra-industry trade, global value chains, and preferen-
tial tariff liberalization. International Studies Quarterly, 62(2):329–340.
Bagwell, K., Bown, C. P., and Staiger, R. W. (2016). Is the wto passé? Journal of Economic
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Dutt, P. (2020). The wto is not passé. European Economic Review, 128:103507.
Egger, P. and Larch, M. (2008). Interdependent preferential trade agreement memberships: An
empirical analysis. Journal of International Economics, 76(2):384–399.
Feliciano, Z. M. (2001). Workers and trade liberalization: the impact of trade reforms in mexico
on wages and employment. ILR Review, 55(1):95–115.
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